Elli Heikkilä (toim.)

Mihin suuntaan Suomi kehittyy? Liikkuvuuden ja muuttoliikkeen dynamiikka

In Which Direction is Finland Evolving? The Dynamics of Mobility and Migration

X Muuttoliikesymposium 2019

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MIGRATION INSTITUTE OF FINLAND

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Esipuhe

Siirtolaisuusinstituutti on vuodesta 1975 lähtien järjestänyt viiden vuoden välein Muuttoliikesymposiumeja, joista jokaisesta on toimitettu myös erillinen raportti. Symposiumit ovat ajankuva yhteiskunnassa tapahtuneista muutoksista, yhteisenä nimittäjänä muuttoliikkeet.

Siirtolaisuusinstituutti juhlisti 45-vuotista toimintaansa järjestämällä kymmenennen Muuttoliikesymposium 2019 -tapahtuman Turun Taidehallissa 17.—18.10.2019. Symposiumin teemana oli "Mihin suuntaan Suomi kehittyy? Liikkuvuuden ja muuttoliikkeen dynamiikka." Tapahtumassa käsiteltiin muuttoliikkeitä laajasti kansainvälisen muuton, maan sisäisen muuttoliikkeen ja liikkuvuuden sekä ulkosuomalaisten näkökulmasta. Muuttoliikesymposiumista tehtiin suora videointi, ja videot ovat katsottavissa Siirtolaisuusinstituutin YouTube-kanavalla,

https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCMFnJ-Kijeq0lnza5hUS5Kw/videos

Ohjelma oli rakennettu siten, että ensimmäisenä päivänä, joka pidettiin englanninkielellä, toimitusjohtaja Tuomas Martikainen loi katsauksen Siirtolaisuusinstituutin 45-vuotiseen toimintaan. Sen jälkeen saimme kiinnostavan ja laajan käsityksen maailman muuttoliikkeistä kautta aikain, jota käsitteli pääpuhujamme Professor Emeritus Patrick Manning USA:sta. Pohjoismaiden muuttoliikkeiden kehitystä tarkasteli toinen pääpuhujamme Senior Research Fellow Timothy Heleniak Ruotsista. Muilta osin Symposiumin ohjelma koostui eri asiantuntijoiden esitelmistä etupäässä Suomen tilanteesta, mutta myös Suomen ja Viron välisestä työssäkäynnistä, ja ulkosuomalaisuudesta. Viimeksi mainitusta oli myös paneelikeskustelu "Aivovuoto vai resurssi? Muuttuva ulkosuomalaisuus" -teemasta. Toinen päivä pidettiin pääosin suomenkielellä. Raporttiin tuotetut artikkelit ovat kielellä, millä ne Symposiumissa pidettiin.

Tapahtumassa syntyi monipuolista ja asiantuntevaa keskustelua muuttoliikkeistä ja niiden vaikutusilmiöistä. Tämä onkin yksi Muuttoliikesymposiumien keskeisistä anneista. Maastamuutto, maahanmuutto sekä maan sisäinen muuttoliike ja liikkuvuus sekä laajemmin aluekehitys ovat monin tavoin kytköksissä toisiinsa ja ilmiöiden syvempi tuntemus on ensiarvoisen tärkeää. Muuttoliikkeet ovatkin yksi tärkeimmistä väestöllisistä tekijöistä, jotka muokkaavat eri alueiden aluerakennetta. Alan asiantuntemusta on eri tahoilla ja Muuttoliikesymposiumin kaltaisia monialaisia ja -tieteisiä tapahtumia tarvitaan jatkossa.

Siirtolaisuusinstituutin tehtävänä on tarjota laaja-alaista ja monitieteistä tietoa muuttoliikkeisiin liittyvään keskusteluun yhteiskunnassamme. Koronaviruspandemia uutena ilmiönä on parhaillaan vaikuttamassa tämän päivän muuttoihin ja liikkuvuuteen ei pelkästään Suomessa, vaan maailman laajuisesti. Varmasti seuraava Muuttoliikesymposium 2024 tulee käsittelemään myös sen vaikutuksia muuttoihin. Aika ajoin tulee yllättäviä muutoksia, jotka voivat koskettaa jopa koko maailmaa.

Lämpimät kiitokseni kaikille Muuttoliikesymposiumiin osallistuneille arvokkaasta panoksestanne tapahtumaan.

Turussa 9.10.2020
Elli Heikkilä

Preface

The Migration Institute of Finland has organized Migration Symposia every five years since 1975. A separate report has also been published on each of the Symposia. The Symposia offer a snapshot of the changes that have taken place in society, with migration as the common point of focus.

The Migration Institute celebrated its 45th anniversary by organizing the tenth Migration Symposium 2019 at Kunsthalle Turku on 17—18 October 2019, with "In Which Direction is Finland Evolving? The Dynamics of Mobility and Migration" as its theme. The Symposium covered migration extensively from the perspective of international migration, country-internal migration and mobility, and expatriate Finns. The Migration Symposium was recorded live, and the videos can be viewed on the Migration Institute's YouTube channel,

https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCMFnJ-Kijeq0lnza5hUS5Kw/videos.

On the first day, held in English, Managing Director Tuomas Martikainen gave an overview of the Migration Institute's activities during the last 45 years. Our Keynote Speaker, Professor Emeritus Patrick Manning (USA), then provided interesting and extensive insights on "Migration in World History". Our second Keynote Speaker, Senior Research Fellow Timothy Heleniak (Sweden), elaborated on the development of migration in the Nordic countries. The rest of the Symposium's programme consisted of presentations by various experts, mainly on the situation in Finland, but also on work-related mobility between Finland and Estonia and on expatriate Finns. The latter was also the subject of a panel discussion entitled "Brain Drain or Resource? Changing Finnishness Abroad". The second day was held mainly in Finnish. The articles produced for the report are in their original language.

The event gave rise to a diverse and expert discussion on migration and its effects. This is one of the most crucial contributions of the Migration Symposia. Emigration, immigration and country-internal migration and mobility, as well as broader regional developments, are interlinked in various ways, and hence, a deeper understanding of the phenomena is vital. Indeed, migration is among the most important demographic factors shaping the structure of different regions. Scholars possess a diverse range of expertise in the field, and multidisciplinary events such as the Migration Symposium will be needed in the future.

The mission of the Migration Institute is to provide extensive and multidisciplinary information on migration-related discussions in our society. The coronavirus pandemic, as a new phenomenon, is currently affecting present migration flows and mobility, not only in Finland but worldwide as well. Certainly, Migration Symposium 2024 will address its implications for migration. Surprising changes emerge from time to time and can even affect the whole world.

I want to express my gratitude to all those who attended the Migration Symposium for their valuable contributions to the event.

Turku, Finland 9.10.2020

Elli Heikkilä

The Government's Greetings – Prime Minister Antti Rinne's Government Policy on Labour Migration

Kalle Myllymäki

Dear Participants of the Tenth National Migration Symposium, Ladies and Gentlemen,

On behalf of the Centre for Economic Development, Transport and the Environment (ELY) in Southwest Finland, I would like to thank you for inviting us to present the Government's greetings. This is a great honour in my role as the Head of Immigration Affairs.

In recent years, the regional state administrative agencies, and in particular the ELY Centre's area for economics, have become accustomed to the Symposium's main question "In Which Direction Is Finland Evolving?". The previous government prepared for a major regional reform and the current government is preparing to transfer the responsibility of managing employment to municipalities.

The regional governments of the Republic have recognised the effects of an ageing population and low birth rates on decreasing labour input and the increase in public expenditure. You could of course question whether the transfer of responsibilities for managing employment has an impact on these challenges.

During its 45 years of operation, the Migration Institute of Finland has been a major contributor to international migration research in Finland. The National Migration Symposium provides an excellent opportunity for interaction between decision-makers and researchers.

From my professional point of view, the symposium theme "In Which Direction Is Finland Evolving? The Dynamics of Mobility and Migration" could not be more relevant.

Political decision-makers and officials who implement the decisions need scientific research as a basis for decisions and implementation. There is a need for extensive discussion and interaction between groups and people from different perspectives. With regards to immigration, we should also take the critical points of view into account. We have a challenge here.

Immigration strongly divides opinions. The decline in the birth rate and the decrease in the number of people in the labour force will have a major impact on Finland's future development. Facts and statistics are needed to guide decision-making in order to influence and respond to demographic change. Immigration makes it possible to increase the supply of labour and contributes to securing productivity in Finland.

A key target for Prime Minister Antti Rinne's government[1] is to raise the employment rate to 75 percent. Immigration has been clearly highlighted in the Government Program as one of the solutions to raise the employment rate.

I will present briefly the Government's policy on labour migration.

There is widespread political acceptance of policies on labour migration. The policies form a broad and comprehensive package and a large amount of funding is reserved for it.

A new immigration program for the 2020s is being prepared in Southwest Finland. Preparations for it will continue during the rest of the year and will be published in early 2020.

In Southwest Finland, the dynamics of mobility and migration are most visible in rural areas and smaller towns. In these areas the issues seem to be primarily about the availability of labour, such as whether companies and employers in these areas are finding workers. In larger cities, population growth is generated specifically by immigration, and greater attention must be paid to immigrant integration, ethnic relations, discrimination, racism and segregation of neighbourhoods.

To finish off, I would like to congratulate the 45-year-old Migration Institute of Finland and wish everyone a very successful National Migration Symposium!

[1] Prime Minister Antti Rinne's government was functioning during the period of 6.6.2019—10.12.2019. Prime Minister Sanna Marin's government was formed on 10.12.2019.

Forty-fifth Anniversary of the Migration Institute of Finland

Tuomas Martikainen

Migration is an indicator of vitality in any society. It shows where the development potential of a society is located, or whether it is missing. It can be also a barometer of tragedy, as, at times, people are forced to move or flee. As we are now celebrating the 45^{th} anniversary of the Migration Institute of Finland (MIF), it is useful to remind ourselves of some key features of Finnish migration and how they relate to the Institute's story. The article is based on the history of the Migration Institute of Finland published in 2015 (Kauhanen, Korkiasaari, & Söderling, 2015) and for the following years on the annual reports and my personal recollections of the MIF.

A brief look into Finnish migration history

The overall picture of Finnish migrations over the past 150 years is as follows. With the modernization and industrialization of Finnish society from the mid-19th century onwards, we see an increasingly mobile population. Until then, the number of those living in the countryside was relatively stable and the town populations small. Though people had also been mobile before this time, usually such mobility had occurred on a geographically more limited scale and it took a longer time to travel. The introduction of the railway, followed by other modern forms of transport, ushered in a period of greater mobility and more rapid means of travel.

With industrialization, people began leaving the countryside to look for work in textile mills and other industries. Many in the, until then, rather stable rural population, boosted by population growth, began to look for new opportunities outside agriculture. Simultaneously, many Finns began to travel across the Atlantic Ocean in search for work. The United States and Canada became home for some hundreds of thousands of Finns at the turn of the twentieth century. The outcomes of the First World War, including the independence of Finland in 1917, reduced people's international mobility for several decades, but did not hinder urbanization.

Finnish cities grew gradually, and the young democracy was finding its own way in the world. The Second World War had a major impact on the Finnish population, as more than 400,000 evacuees from Karelia and north-eastern Lapland were first internally displaced and later resettled throughout the country as an outcome of the war and associated losses of territory. Starting in the mid-1950s, and lasting for two decades, Finland experienced what is known as the Great Migration, whereby hundreds of thousands of people moved away from the countryside to regional centres and major cities. At the same time, many found employment opportunities in neighbouring Sweden, making Finns the largest immigrant minority in Sweden for over half a century. Eventually about half of the emigrants to Sweden returned, but many stayed for good. Finland had high rates of domestic migration from the 1950s to the 1980s.

The end of Cold War at the turn of the 1990s marked the beginning of a new era. Domestic migration gradually continued and rose to new heights in the 2000s, but major changes came from outside Finland as well. Immigration to Finland started to grow immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union. From numerically small beginnings, Finland became a European mid-sized immigration country in the 2000s. By the late 2010s, the immigrant population could be divided into three similarly large groups by



Figure 1. International migration to Finland, 1946–2019. Source: Statistics Finland.

their origins: people from the Western countries, people from the former territories of the Soviet Union and people from elsewhere. Immigration has been much debated in Finland, and most attention has been given to people from the last group. Figure 1 summarizes Finnish international migration patterns since the Second World War.

The beginning

Migration was a hot topic in Finland during the 1960s and 1970s. Cities were expanding rapidly as people moved from the countryside, and city suburbs were built for the newcomers. Automobiles were becoming more common, and so people could easily visit their home villages during holidays and vacations. Emigration to Sweden peaked in 1969/1970, whereby the resident population in Finland fell for the first time since the great hunger years of the 1860s.

A group of researchers focusing on migration was formed around Professor Vilho Niitemaa at the University of Turku's History Department in the 1960s. They were primarily, though not solely, interested in long-distance international migration and in particular North America. Professor Niitemaa played a central role in the formation of the Institute of Migration (in Finnish, Siirtolaisuusinstituuttisäätiö; the English-language name was changed to its current form — Migration Institute of Finland — in 2016). The Institute was established on 15 March 1974 as an independent foundation, but it has from its beginnings had a close relationship with the University of Turku and the City of Turku. However, the Institute has a national scope and its founding members included all universities in Finland, several ministries and key NGOs in its field.

The Institute's activities started later the same year, with PhD Olavi Koivukangas appointed its first director. Dr Koivukangas had done research on Finnish emigration to Australia and New Zealand. During the first years, the Institute's activities focused on research, documentation, publications and outreach through education and co-operation. While the Institute looked at migration as a general phenomenon, historical research and documentation played a central part in its identity and activities, perhaps relating to the fact that the key individuals in the initial phase were all migration historians. From the very beginning, conducting research and providing overviews of existing research became an essential part of the Institute's activities. Migration to Sweden and return migration to Finland were also of major interest.

In 1975, the first Migration Symposium was organized. Its main topic was internal migration within Finland, as the urbanization process was at its post-war peak at the time. Since its initial launch, the Symposium has become a landmark event in Finnish migration research and brought together many of the best domestic researchers to discuss a variety of topics. Another conference series in which the MIF has been active is FinnForum, which brings together people studying Finns abroad from around the world. The MIF was already present at the second FinnForum, held in Toronto in 1979. The Institute has also participated in many cultural festivals organized by Finns living abroad, for example FinnFests in the USA and Finn Grand Fests in Canada.

To the surprise of the newly appointed Director Koivukangas, genealogists showed great interest in the Institute from the beginning. Much of the interest had to do with relatives, their fate and their whereabouts in the United States, as migration to North America has greatly informed the Finnish migration experience. Efforts to serve genealogists were to play major role at the Institute in the coming decades. Throughout the 1970s, the Institute was located near the University of Turku campus.

The 1980s and 1990s

Whereas the 1970s represented a formative period for the Institute, the following two decades were ones of steady growth and strengthening the profile of the Institute. In 1981, the Institute moved to a new location at Piispankatu 3, not too far away from the previous space; the new location provided ample space for an expanding staff, library and exhibitions.

While the 1980s were a more stable decade in migratory terms, the years were characterized initially by a gradually slowing return migration from Sweden, with major changes looming on the horizon. The bipolar world and the battle for hegemony between the Soviet Union and United States came to a sudden halt at the turn of the 1990s, as the Soviet Union and the eastern bloc collapsed. The changes launched by the end of the Cold War influenced international migration patterns for Finland in a highly significant way. Finland became a country of positive net migration during the 1990s. Together with the growing affluence of Finnish society, much assisted by the phenomenal growth of Nokia as a leading mobile telecommunication company in the early 2000s as well joining the European Union in 1995, immigrants began looking at the country as an attractive place to live.

The Institute was by now a central place of research and brought together scholars and other interested parties in many ways. As it matured, the Institute launched a grand project, the History of Finnish Emigration, in 1991, which was to become a six-volume overview of Finnish historical and contemporary migrations. While it took more than a decade to complete, with the last volume only being published in 2008, the series is a monument to all Finns who chose to move abroad and the lives they created for themselves. Weighting altogether 6.9 kilograms, the series is a vast compilation of knowledge that will serve future generations as a starting point for additional studies.

Beside research, collecting material for the Institute's archive became increasingly important over time. The Migrant Archive is a unique collection, based mainly on donations, and it contains an impressive collection of diverse migration-related materials. It is best known for its migrant letter collection, but over the years it has become a home for many artefacts, paintings, miscellaneous documentation and migrant publications, such as newspapers. Serving the needs of genealogists has been important part of the archive's work as well. The Migrant Register is a jewel for genealogists. Consisting of various lists of person-related information, primarily of passenger lists and passport information, it includes over 800,000 entries that people have searched though to find out about their distant relatives. The Register has been available online since 2000. As the archival materials accumulated, interest arose in making them more visible. Thereby, the Institute began to plan for exhibitions. Whereas the first photo exhibition had been held already in 1976 to honour the United States bicentennial, the first exhibition to reach a truly significant audience was the migration exhibition on Finnish emigration to Sweden, which toured in both countries in 1980—1982.

A long-time dream of Director Koivukangas began to take shape when a regional centre of the Institute was founded in 1994 in Peräseinäjoki, in southern Ostrobothnia. The Ostrobothnia region was a major point of origin for American emigration in particular, and so interest in migration is strongly present there. The regional centre was in many ways designed as a miniature version of the Institute itself, but with a particular focus on the region. The Peräseinäjoki centre worked in close co-operation with the Finnish Migration Museum, also a project based on Koivukangas's initiative.

The 2000s

During the 2000s, the MIF has been mobile itself. Åbo Akademi University bought the Institute's premises from the City of Turku to transform the entire city block into its new Faculty of Arts building complex. A new location for the Institute was found at Linnankatu 61, towards the city harbour, where the Institute stayed until 2008. Then, it moved Eerikinkatu 34, a bit closer to the city centre. This was not the final move, as in 2019 a new place was found at Hämeenkatu 13, just next to the Turku Cathedral and the two local universities.

Koivukangas retired from the Institute in 2009, whereupon Dr Ismo Söderling became the new director. With his background in social policy and demographics, as well as his experience at the Population Research Institute in Helsinki, he put more emphasis on current affairs, including immigration and internal migration than was the case previously. Söderling even introduced the John Morton Recognition Award to honour individuals with outstanding merits in migration research and documentation. The first prize was given to Managing Director Antti Välikangas for his contribution to visual documentation of Finns abroad. The prize has since been awarded annually.

Under Söderling's tutelage, the Institute's researchers' took hold of topical themes. One study worth special mention is that of the Institute's own researchers, Mr. Krister

Björklund and Dr Markku Mattila's study of immigrant integration in the municipality of Närpiö/Närpes, in Ostrobothnia. Närpes is known both for its difficult-to-comprehend local Swedish dialect as well as its concentration of greenhouses, which produce the majority of Finnish vegetables. Less known was its extensive use of foreign labour and apparently successful integration programmes. That study from 2013 brought much publicity to the MIF, and even still people talk of the "Närpes model" of immigrant integration as a great success.

Events and exhibition were still organized on a regular basis in the early 2000s, but two of them require special mention. These are the "Finland in Our Hearts" festival in 2011 and the Titanic exhibition in 2012. Both gained much popularity and solidified the MIF's dedication to keeping alive the memory of Finnish emigrants as well as providing venues for meeting others interested in such topics. One of the final developments under Söderling's productive leadership period was the creation of the Centre for Finland Swedes by the MIF. The establishment of the Centre started independently from the MIF, but the project was soon taken under the Institute's wings. In 2014, the Centre was launched in Kronoby, Ostrobothnia, with Mr Magnus Enlund in charge. The Centre proved highly successful in gaining additional resources and launched many innovative projects.

When Director Söderling retired in 2015, Dr Tuomas Martikainen was appointed the new director. His background in the study of contemporary immigrant integration research became topical as the European migrant crisis unfolded in 2015. Refugees from conflicts in the Middle East became the main national topic of migration discussion for several years, as some 32,000 asylum seekers arrived in the country. Several funding calls were launched, and the MIF was successful in gaining much new project funding. As a result, the staff of the Institute grew significantly and project-based research became more common. This growth of the Institute coincided with the retirement of several long-time employees, including Mr Jouni Korkiasaari, who enjoyed an outstanding 36-year career as a migration specialist at the Institute and is well known among Finnish and foreign researchers alike.

Since 2015, several major and minor changes have been implemented at the Institute, including moves of the regional centres to new locations. The Seinäjoki office was relocated under the umbrella of the University Consortium of Seinäjoki and the Kronoby centre relocated to Vaasa as part of Åbo Akademi University's campus. The aim of the relocations was to enhance co-operation with universities. A similar move occurred in Turku as well, where the Hämeenkatu 13 premises are now next to the University of Turku and Åbo Akademi University. The new locations signal a change from an organization to a network-centric form of operation and thinking.

Another recent novelty has to do with the importance of digitalized media and information transmission. The MIF has dedicated itself to the open science project, and it has begun to merge its own IT infrastructure and collections with that of other specialist organizations, including co-operation with the University of Turku Library and collaboration with the National Archives of Finland. Moreover, all of the Institute's publications will become free to access on the Internet through the open access principle. While these changes will take some time, it nevertheless provides new opportunities through co-operation with many of the Institute's friends located elsewhere in the world and makes its publications easily accessible anywhere on the digitalized planet.

Concluding remarks

The Migration Institute of Finland is the only specialist organization focusing solely on internal and international migration in Finland. It grew out of a general recognition of the importance of migration as a societal phenomenon in the 1970s. Since then, it has gradually grown and developed over time, with the key focus shifting in the past decade from emigration to immigration. However, the Institute's uniqueness lies in its ability to combine different types of migration research as well as associated documentation, be it historical, contemporary or both. It is also my firm belief that this is one aspect of the Institute's legacy that should not be compromised.

Another specific feature of the Migration Institute of Finland can be found in its fundamental task of being a bridge builder between different interest groups related to migration. Its board and council contain representatives from many key national organizations, ranging from ministries and universities to NGOs, and the many jointly held events are created together with even additional interest groups. Even though Finland is a small country, communication between different organizations does not always occur quite so smoothly. Therefore, we need institutions like the MIF, which explicitly aim to facilitate cooperation.

While this brief overview of the Migration Institute of Finland certainly does not do justice to everything related to it, I hope that I have been able to highlight how the Institute has evolved over time, has been responsive to developments in society and the world at large, and has worked hard to do its best in the complex and always changing world of migration. I am sure that this will continue also in the future.

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Migration in World History

Patrick Manning

Migration across the Millennia

This article is to consider the history of migration in broad scope. By broad scope, I mean that the study of migration goes back to very early times, to the traditions and myths of origin of each people. Yet migration is also a recent discipline, as European scholars began to study urbanization and overseas migration in the nineteenth century. Today, with expanded disciplines of the social sciences, humanities, and natural sciences, we can explore the whole of the human experience through study of migration, reaching across time and space. To address this wide range of issues, I begin with a qualitative discussion of the main flows of human migration and changing migratory influences on social structures. Then I offer suggestions on how best to quantify and analyze flows of migration. I conclude by reviewing the functions of migration in society, adding projections of future migration.

Long ago, in the early Pleistocene epoch, the hominid predecessors of *Homo sapiens* expanded across Africa and into Eurasia, in gradual migrations that were similar to those of other large mammals. I begin with *Homo erectus*, an early ancestor who existed from 2 million years ago, declining after 500,000 years ago. This species is known from skulls, skeletons, and characteristic Acheulian hand axes — in Africa, Europe, southern Asia, and as far east as Java and Beijing. Its body was hardly distinguishable from our own; its cranial capacity averaged 900 cc, two thirds that of humans today; its teeth were larger than ours.

It is now known, based on geological analysis since 1950, that the world of *Homo erectus* was governed by climatic fluctuations. The Earth has undergone several million years of cycles of just over 100,000 years: long periods of cooling concluded with great expanses of glaciation, followed by short periods of rapid warming, as shown for the past eight cycles in Figure 1. The fluctuations in average global temperature were of 10 ºC from top to bottom, resulting especially as the Earth's changing orbit brought varying intensity of solar energy. *Homo erectus* survived, expanded and declined in response to fluctuating climate, eventually giving way to succeeding species.



Figure 1. Average temperatures over 800,000 years. Source: Hansen & Sato (2011).

In the nineteenth-century discoveries of hominid remains, *Neanderthals* and *Homo heidelbergensis* became known in Europe. From the first, the field of paleontology focused on the issue of brain capacity. But only in the twenty-first century did a fuller chronology become clear: *Heidelbergensis* emerged in Africa some 600,000 years ago, replacing *Homo erectus*, migrating and giving rise to three groups: *Neanderthals* from over 400,000 years ago in Europe and West Asia; Denisovans in eastern and southern Asia somewhat later, and *Homo sapiens* in Africa by 300,000 years ago.

Beyond phenotype and brain size, research since 1980 has revealed complexity in the evolution of *Homo sapiens*. Genetic analysis began with analysis of mitochondria, tracing female ancestry to show that *Homo sapiens* arose in Africa before 200,000 years ago; Y-chromosome analysis traced somewhat earlier male ancestry in Africa (Cann, Stoneking & Wilson 1987). The new field of "cultural evolution" focused on processes of learning in *Homo sapiens*, showing how practice and imitation were exchanged and recorded in the brain, combined with genetic tendencies toward collaboration. Parallel research traced gestures for communication, elements of language, and the nature of emotions.[1] These discoveries of successive developments in *Homo sapiens* contributed to the understanding of big changes to come.

Pleistocene innovations in migration

A great social change arose with the emergence of spoken language in Northeast Africa some 70,000 years ago.[2] Speech brought an expanded social order in this Homeland, leading to rapid migration and settlement in increasingly varied habitats. While details of the emergence of spoken language are not confirmed, I argue that syntactical language began in the interaction of children, playing with communication and forming

1 On cultural evolution, see Boyd & Richerson (2005); on language, see Berwick & Chomsky (2016); and Fitch (2010).

2 The Homeland included modern Ethiopia, Kenya, and Tanzania.

communities of discourse. A community of about 150 speakers then arose to sustain the vocabulary and especially the syntax of a language. This speaking community became the first social institution: communities and their languages expanded, divided, and spread with time (Manning 2020, 37—43).[3]

The exchange of young migrants across communities — what I call "cross-community migration" — was an additional social institution of the new community of speaking humans. This became the basic model of human migration, supplementing earlier, simple colonization of new lands. Young adult migrants moved to new communities, where they had to learn new language and customs, thus facilitating exchange of knowledge, genetic exchange, and creation of networks linking communities through speech (Manning 2006; Manning 2020, 56). With this additional institution, human migration now became distinctive from that of other mammals.

In the Homeland and then further afield within Africa, the large communities of speaking *Homo sapiens* encountered hominids who lived in groups of perhaps 30 and did not speak. From genetic evidence we know that there was interbreeding among communities: this tendency to interbreed across communities can be seen as an inherent quality, a migratory instinct within humans. Those who joined the speaking community as adults therefore had thick accents, weak syntax, or spoke creole and pidgin versions of early language. The spread of speaking humans from the Homeland — southward and westward throughout the African continent, absorbing other hominid communities — is documented in analyses of archaeology and languages (Ehret 2015). Speaking *Homo sapiens* transformed their own social order and, eventually, transformed the Earth's ecology.

At the same time as speaking humans spread south and west throughout Africa, related groups migrated eastward, from 60,000 to 25,000 years ago, initially settling tropical Asia and later occupying temperate Eurasia. Geneticists now argue that there was a single migration from Africa into Asia, and that all populations outside of Africa descend from this initial migration (Lopéz et al. 2015).[4] By the same logic, a single African language was ancestral to all the languages spoken outside the continent. Nilo-Saharan languages are of particular interest: they may be seen as descended within Africa from the languages that also moved eastward.[5]

Through analysis of archaeological sites and surviving language groups, we can argue that humans moved eastward across the consistent tropical ecology of the Indian Ocean shore, reaching Sahul (now Australia and New Guinea) by 50,000 years ago (O'Connell et al. 2018). Boats were likely significant throughout human expansion along

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3 Languages changed inherently over time in lexicon, syntax, and phonology.

4 For an authoritative overview of recent historical analysis through whole-genome analysis, see Reich (2018).

5 For Nilo-Saharan languages and for a comprehensive review of human migration as seen through the distribution of language groups, see "Language Resources", www.cambridge.org/Humanity, 3.Nilo-Saharan.

the Indian Ocean littoral: they were definitely needed for the initial crossing of the Red Sea to Arabia and to cross open-water stretches of 60—100 km to reach Sahul.

The next stage of migration — northward into temperate Eurasia — was no easy matter. The era from 50,000 to 40,000 years ago was exceptionally cold and dry, so that the Sahara, Arabia and regions north of them were virtually impassable. Figure 2 shows the periodic fluctuations in the force of insolation at 30 degrees north latitude, indicating the alternations between greenery and desert (at high and low insolation, respectively) that made migration either feasible or difficult.[6] As warmth and humidity began to return, 45,000 years ago, the easiest route north was along the foothills just west of the Himalayas. Migrants who reached the grassy steppes, once they adjusted to the habitat, found ample game for hunting plus temperate fruits and vegetables.



Figure 2. Northern hemispheric insolation. Source: Aubrey Hillman in Manning & Hillman (2013).

6 Figure 2 indicates the degree of insolation (and hence temperature and humidity). It shows the varying levels of insolation as language emerged (70,000 years ago), tropical migration began (65,000 years ago), temperate migration began (45,000 years ago), the Glacial Maximum (21,000 years ago), and the beginning of the Holocene (11,000 years ago).

Across the steppes toward the west, the Caucasus appears from language evidence to have been a key region of human settlement. From there, migrants moved to the Black Sea and on to Mediterranean lands and the Danube Valley. These settlers, known as Cro-Magnon in the terminology of early paleontologists, arrived roughly 45,000 years ago. At much the same time, migrants also moved eastward along the steppes, eventually arriving in the forested Amur Valley, from which the Eurasiatic languages arose roughly 30,000 years ago.

Humans of this era, living as foragers, extended their basic model of migration with networks at two levels. Among nearby communities, cross-community migration and periodic gatherings sustained local networks, sharing knowledge on each new habitat and speeding the colonization of additional lands. Further, broader networks linked localized communities into continental webs. The effectiveness of broad networks is attested by the exchange of technical advances over great distances; parallel exchanges spread archery, atlatls (throwing sticks), sewing and weaving. Dogs, who joined human societies some 30,000 years ago, most likely in northeast Asia, spread to communities on every continent.

Sophisticated skills in representation, in the hands of these speaking humans, are tangibly documented through extraordinary visual portrayals. Dated as early as 44,000 years ago, these works survive as cave paintings in Southeast Asia, Europe, and India; rock paintings in Africa and Australia; and ivory sculptures in Siberia.[7] Such representations, apparently universal among humans, appear to have arisen from the inherent logic of speaking communities, though they surely benefited as well from exchange among networks. Overall, these works confirm the impressive early advances in human intellectual, cultural, technical, and migratory advance.

The last few millennia of the Pleistocene epoch, from 25,000 to 12,000 years ago, brought extraordinary climate shifts, provoking fundamental changes in human life and new migration patterns. Temperature reached its low point 21,500 years ago, by which time great glacial sheets had spread over polar regions (see Figure 1). The Last Glacial Maximum caused all species to retreat, seeking lower latitudes and lower altitudes. In contrast, for the succeeding 10,000 years, average temperature rose at the rate of 1 °C per millennium, while sea level rose at the rate of 10 meters per millennium. Overall, humans responded with widespread experimentation resulting in two main types of social change. First, communities adjusted their model of migration, adding consolidation to their previous pattern of dispersal: existing communities of 150 combined to form confederations of roughly 500 members, creating a governance structure to coordinate their new and more complex activities. Second, within confederations, humans turned to the development of productive techniques—construction of shelter,

[7] The team led by Maxime Aubert documented an image of a small bovine, painted on a cave wall in Borneo over 40,000 years ago, then found a full hunting scene is a Sulawesi care, dated to 44,000 years ago (Aubert et al. 2019).

intensive gathering of grains and other vegetable materials, and creation of textiles and ceramics through the organization of workshops to rely on collaboration in production.

Settlement of new lands continued, especially with the terminal Pleistocene rise in temperature and humidity. Despite the great Laurentide ice sheet separating North American and Asian lands, two groups of settlers were able to move from Siberia to the Americas. In each case, voyagers from Northeastern Asia, relying on types of boats that are unknown in detail but may have been skin boats, followed the Pacific currents and the "kelp highway", the offshore collection of kelp, fish, birds, and maritime mammals that provided food for maritime voyagers. The initial group settled in the Salish Sea at the mouth of the Fraser River. In this homeland, the Amerind languages took form. Some of these settlers moved rapidly inland to settle North America. Others moved even more rapidly by sea along the Pacific coast, forming settlements and Amerind-language subgroups in what are now California, Mexico, Colombia, Peru, and Chile — reaching the settlement known as Monte Verde in Chile at a time now dated to 18,500 years ago. Genetic and linguistic data confirm each other on this interpretation (Manning 2020, 95 — 100; Scheib et al. 2018). A second group of migrants, now known as speakers of Na-Dene languages, settled to the north of their predecessors, roughly 17,000 years ago, and expanded north along the coast and then into the Yukon and Mackenzie Valleys as the ice sheet receded.

The final great shock of the Pleistocene epoch was the Younger Dryas, a sudden and severe cooling from 12,800 to 11,600 years ago, named after the subarctic flowers that thrived during its cold spell.[8] North American temperatures declined by 10 ºC within a decade and then, a millennium later, rose by 10 ºC at the same rapid pace. Perhaps the crisis resulted from shifts in glaciers and oceanic currents along with warming; maybe it was from extra-terrestrial impact, of which we have a candidate in the Greenland crater recently discovered but not yet dated. This same moment brought extinction of the megafauna of the Americas (Kjaer 2018; MacPhee 2018).

The first global consequence of human migration was the human imprint on global habitat. In the late Pleistocene, speaking humans settled the continents and seized a place at the top of the food chain. Our ancestors, an invasive species, modified the habitat of the many localities in which they settled, shifting the balance among other species and laying the groundwork for further migrations. The expansion of our species, within 50,000 years, included absorption of competing hominid species, advances in technology, adaptation to new habitats, and innovations in representation, all relying on the constructed social institutions of spoken language, community, and cross-community migration. Migration, relying on high levels of intercommunication,

[8] The flowering *Dryas octopetala* expands in times of sudden cold. Three succeeding periods of cooling were the Oldest Dryas (15,070—14,670 years ago), Older Dryas (ca. 14,000—ca. 13,800 years ago), and Younger Dryas (12,800—11,600 years ago). Specific dates were confirmed when radiocarbon dating became available.

maintained local communities and colonized new lands, sustaining regional networks and long-distance exchange. This sudden expansion and its reliance on speech tends to confirm the hypothesis that spoken language and cross-community migration emerged together, roughly 70,000 years ago.

Variations in Holocene migration

The Holocene epoch, opening 12,000 years ago and continuing until the recent past, brought change upon change, magnifying human leadership in the animal kingdom and developing additional patterns of migration. Humans developed productive skills that gave them increasing independence from the natural world. The results of Holocene-era expansion were both positive and negative: human society now exploited the Earth with an intensity sufficient to bring about climate change.

Holocene variations in the basic model of migration amplified both dispersion and consolidation of populations. Dispersion brought settlement of additional habitats; consolidation brought exploitation of existing habitats with denser populations. In a genuinely new variation on migration, vertical migration arose to enable the creation of social hierarchies. During the 12,000 years of the Holocene, these further variations on cross-community migration facilitated institutional and technological innovation, creation of new networks of dispersion and consolidation, and population growth. Ultimately, one more variation in migration arose with the emergence of worldwide migratory connections. Human societies became increasingly influential in the earthly environment, yielding major modifications in climate, disease, and society itself.

In dispersion, the continued warming of the early Holocene reinforced the spread of migrants across distances. In West Asia, speakers of Afroasiatic languages moved from the Nile Valley to all of Northern Africa, the Levant, and Arabia; in East Asia, speakers of Chinese languages moved from southwest highlands to the northeast of today's China (Manning 2020, 93—98). In the Americas, migrants moved eastward in South America and from North America into Meso-America.

In consolidation, the social organization of the Holocene epoch confirmed the concentration of migrants by creating societies of 1,000 or more members which formed by consolidation of six or more of the earlier communities. Formation of Holocene societies expanded the size of language groups, reinforcing social diversity and division of labor yet sharing an identity that we can call ethnicity. As the Holocene proceeded, agriculture arose in key centers — in Asia, New Guinea, Africa, and South America — and then spread within those regions. Initial crops included wheat, barley, rice, millet, sorghum, taro, and yams; domesticated animals included donkeys, goats, sheep, cattle, pigs, and chickens. Towns formed, reaching populations of 10,000.

Dispersion and consolidation in migration, in the mid-Holocene era, brought a second wave of global migratory consequences. That is, migration and expanded agriculture brought stable climate from the mid-Holocene to the Anthropocene. Climate stability, in turn, encouraged further settlement and social expansion. The multi-pronged argument of geologist William Ruddiman (Ruddiman 2014) is central to this analysis. He began by noting that the post-Ice Age peak in insolation and temperature, 10,000 years ago, was followed by a decline in temperature and in atmospheric carbon dioxide and methane, as in the previous glacial cycles of climate. But in the most recent glacial cycle, the decline in carbon dioxide reversed and began a rapid rise from about 6,000 years ago. Ruddiman showed that human clearing of forest and brush for farming, in many parts of the world, reduced the absorption of carbon dioxide by plant life and also increased Earth's reflectivity. These combined factors caused atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration to increase, preventing solar energy from escaping the earth and raising temperatures. In parallel, methane gas, arising from chemical change in wetlands and later from the burping and flatulence of numerous grass-eating large animals, is even more efficient in increasing temperature. Methane concentration, initially declining after the peak in insolation, began to increase 4,000 years ago, reinforcing temperature rise. Ruddiman's explanation was that growing numbers of oxen, cattle, and water buffalo, pulling ploughs in farming — reinforced by the rise of equine culture — combined to expand atmospheric methane 4,000 years ago (Ruddiman 2014, 19—42).

The overall result, confirmed in recent analysis, was that the Earth's natural temperature decline was cancelled out by human creation of greenhouse gases, initially through forest clearing, then by intensive cultivation aided by animals (Vavrus et al. 2018). As a result, temperature from 6,000 years ago until the twentieth century maintained a stability that was virtually unprecedented in climate history. This era of Holocene climatic stability, resulting from migration, towns, and agriculture, provided the basis on which human society and economy expanded and evolved dramatically.

In the late-Holocene epoch, 5,000 years ago to 1,000 years ago, social hierarchy added vertical networks to the horizontal networks of dispersion and consolidation: states, warfare and empires expanded along with agricultural and urban societies (Ruddiman 2014, 1—4, 19—42).[9] This was the era of early cities in Mesopotamia, the Nile, and Yellow River Valley. The Achaemenid state of Persia launched the first large empire in 550 BCE (2,500 years ago), after which empires replaced each other until the twentieth century. Reliance on domestic animals, especially in the Old World, provided societies with food, motive force, fibers, and skins: horses expanded the scale of war and of enslavement. Technical and social innovations brought metals, water supply, and literacy. At the same time, farming populations dispersed in many directions: Indo-European-speakers settled and opened farms in Europe and South Asia, as did Austronesians in

9 On initiatives to create social hierarchy and the actions by which hierarchy was long resisted, see Flannery & Marcus (2012).

island Southeast Asia, Bantu-speakers in the southern third of Africa, and farmers in North and South America. Fluctuations in climate, disease, and hierarchy continued in rural and urban societies.

The terminal Holocene epoch — the thousand years from 800 CE to 1800 CE — brought a third wave of global migratory consequences. Expansion in military conflict combined with a revised migratory model that achieved global interconnection. These human factors combined with epidemic disease to cause population decline and global cooling. This "Era of Collisions", as I call it, included collisions within human society and collisions of humanity with the natural world, bringing alternations of growth and disaster. The collisions included warfare among societies, expansion of both high-status and low-status migration, the creation of a fluctuating global commercial network, and epidemics and climate disasters resulting in part from human expansion. Steady warming took place from 700 CE up to 1250 CE. Such warming, causing population and agricultural output to rise, is well documented for Europe but also confirmed for other parts of the world (Campbell 2016, 21—22). At the same time, in the regions where societies had built the densest populations and the most innovative technology, an era of warfare and social conflict unfolded along with the warm and humid climate. Examples on every continent document this era's warfare and successive imperial conquests, alternating with commercial expansion.[10] The Mongol state, exploding from 1200 CE, became the extreme example of conquests in response to new opportunities. Then, after 150 years of Mongol conquest and widespread empire, epidemic disease checked the empire. Bubonic plague, perhaps facilitated by increased contact of the Mongol empire, spread beyond Mongol frontiers from the 1340s through Asia and Europe, causing population, commerce, and empire to decline, and soon affecting Africa.[11]

Ruddiman (2014) argues that these epidemics show how changes in human society can reduce temperature as well as increase it. Declining population meant less farming — the fields became overgrown and herds of animals declined, so that carbon dioxide and methane emissions declined, resulting in temperature reduction. Then, from the sixteenth century, Old World diseases caused a collapse in American populations and, with it, declining agricultural output.[12] This Columbian Exchange may also have led to disease and population decline in the Old World that has not otherwise been accounted for, as exemplified by the case of syphilis. The Little Ice Age, a three-century worldwide decline in temperature, reached its low point in the mid-17th century, thus responding in part to changes in human society.

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[10] Viking, Fatimid, Song, and other conquerors built empires between 800 and 1000 CE.

[11] Work by Monica Green (2018) and others indicates that Africa too suffered from plague and population decline.

[12] Genetic techniques estimate a population decline of roughly 50% for the Americas (O'Fallon & Fehren-Schmitz 2011).

Migration studies, expanding in geographic and temporal scope, are gradually revealing the long-term dynamics of world history from 800 to 1800. Such studies, clearly linking worldwide population flows since 1500, are beginning to show connections to pre-1500 populations and migration worldwide. Global commerce and warfare each expanded, with fluctuations, from the 11th-12th centuries until they brought the opening of global maritime connections by 1500. Merchants turned especially to enslavement as they sought labor to support expanding commerce. From the fourteenth century, enslavement focused on African laborers so that, from the mid-17th to the mid-19th century, the principal flow of international migrants was that of African captives crossing the Atlantic but also driven to the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean. Atlantic flow reached 100,000 captive voyagers per year.

In an important analytical advance, migration scholars Jan and Leo Lucassen (2014, 3—54) developed a comprehensive framework for accounting of migration, applying it to large and literate cultural and political units. Focusing initially on Europe (including European Russia), they tallied several types of both domestic and cross-border migration. For the period 1500—1800, they found the largest category of internal migration to be temporal multi-annual migration, consisting of the recruitment of soldiers, sailors, and artisans within the region, as indicated in Figure 3. They also tallied seasonal migration, urbanization, and rural resettlement. For external migration, they tallied immigration to Europe (which was tiny) and emigration from Europe (which was larger



Figure 3. Europe's Cross-Cultural Migration Rate, 1500–1800. Source: Lucassen & Lucassen (2014, 17).

though much smaller than the contemporary forced migration of Africans). The Lucassens calculated a Cross-Cultural Migration Rate, summing migration in 50-year periods for Europe as a whole and taking it as a percentage of mid-period population for each period. Study of the parallel territories of China, Japan, and India showed some similarity in migration patterns.

For other times and places, one may ultimately be able to trace migratory detail parallel to that of the Lucassens' analysis. The results should reveal how human society transformed itself greatly during the 12,000 years of the Holocene epoch, relying at every step on the institutions and expansion of the preceding Pleistocene epoch. As people from around the world encountered each other more regularly, new hierarchies and new prejudices arose. Racial categorization and racial discrimination became a part of what marked the difference between migrants of high status and migrants who were subordinated (Manning 2009, 136—145). Such hierarchy is not unrelated to today's rejection and subordination of so many immigrants. One last collision in this era of collisions was the rise of capitalist economic organization — a new type of global commercial network, centered in the maritime powers of northwest Europe. Through creation of social institutions linking leading proprietors to national governments, Dutch, British and then other national economies expanded their influence in the global commercial network through a combination of warfare and investment in commercial practice. By the mid-nineteenth century, an alliance of proprietors, pro-capitalist governments, and their expanding empires gained leadership in much of the global economy.

Anthropocene magnification of migration

The Anthropocene epoch, beginning in roughly 1800 CE, is defined through the accelerated transformations by which human society became the principal influence on the natural ecology, making it appear that nature was at last being mastered. This epoch opened the fourth great wave of consequences of migration. Migration itself expanded, relying on networks of labor migration and knowledge exchange to bring about parallel expansions in the arenas of economics, population, and knowledge. After two centuries, the results brought unprecedented social inequality and environmental warming. To face these and related threats to the human system, new networks were required to attend to the needs of refugees fleeing social and environmental crises.

I turn first to the process of growth in migration and society, then to the emerging crises. Language provides an index of the expanding scale of society, as localized dialects gave way to national languages. While statistics are scarce on populations by language, certain language communities had grown by the nineteenth century to a million people — even several million — speaking virtually the same language. Language communities consolidated further during the twentieth century, through the influence of school systems and electronic communication.[13]

Nineteenth-century migration expanded at once for people of low status and high status: steamships had both staterooms and steerage. Travelers included viceroys, generals and their troops, labor migrants for agriculture and industry both rural and urban, as well as merchants and hawkers, students and skilled professionals. Through migration arose industrialization and its ideology of civilizational hierarchy by race, religion, and economic role. Capitalist economic structures expanded in North Atlantic metropoles and colonial peripheries. Coal was essential to developing steam power, but the burning of petroleum, beginning in 1860, became globally dominant before 1900.

I discuss the process of Anthropocene migration in further detail since it has become so huge and globally connected. Enslavement worldwide rose to a peak in the mid-nineteenth century in the Americas, Africa, and Asia, then declined as wage labor expanded. Irish migration exploded with the famine of the 1840s, followed by other European flows. This was the start of the era of free trade, in which great powers allowed no restrictions on trade and considered migrants as commodities in free trade, to be settled wherever there was a market for them. Nevertheless, indentured laborers too moved to the Caribbean, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific.

Historian Adam McKeown (2008) showed that the century of expanded international migration, 1840—1940, was not only transatlantic. As shown in Figure 4, McKeown traced



Figure 4. McKeown (2008) on global migration.

13 The same era brought the loss of many languages and dialects absorbed into these huge communities.

peaks of 3 million emigrants per year — migrants leaving China, India, and Japan as well as those leaving Europe; he traced both the eastward and westward movement of Russians. Combining McKeown's analysis of international migration with the Lucassens' (2014) comprehensive analysis, both confirm that emigration grew greatly for Europe, while the Lucassens show that, in domestic migration, European urbanization expanded while "temporal multi-annual" migration declined.

Elsewhere, other migratory factors intervened, transforming the regulation of migration. Migrations from the 1840s to 1870s included Chinese migrants to California and elsewhere in North America. White citizens of the United States, having just conquered California, alternated between recruiting Chinese migrants as subordinate workers and expelling them as threats to American dominance of their newly acquired territory. McKeown (2008) found that US national bureaucrats sought to replace crude expulsion with another tactic for limiting immigration. They replaced the idea of migrants as commodities with the idea that some migrants might qualify as "free persons," persons of civilized background, able to contribute to the progress of the nation. The result allowed admission of small numbers but rejected most applicants. Each applicant for entry had to demonstrate an elaborate record of familial and professional excellence. In response, schools developed in China to prepare the applicants. Elaborate systems of passports and visas, inspected by a complex border bureaucracy, grew up within the US, then among other American nations, and gradually worldwide. In the 1920s, the US was able to establish restrictions on the number of persons who could enter the nation from any other land, privileging high-status over low-status migrants.

In two world wars, empires fought to the death in great, global cataclysms, involving huge migrations of military forces and great flows of refugees.[14] The Second World War led to restructuring of the global social order. A wave of decolonization brought national independence for Asian countries in the 1940s, for African countries in the 1960s, and then more generally. Formation of the United Nations, in part to preserve the peace among great powers, ended up doing at least as much to facilitate relations within the expanded community of nations. By the 1970s, empires had been replaced by passports and visas — and national statistics — for nearly 200 nations.

But with the abolition of slavery and the limits on admission of overseas workers, the demand for low-wage agricultural workers became more insistent. In the 1940s, the U.S. set up separate arrangements to bring in temporary workers from the English-speaking Caribbean for eastern US farms, and from Mexico for western lands. Out of these initially temporary flows developed permanent settlements of West Indians and Mexicans in the eastern and western portions of the U.S (Hahamovich 1997; Galarza 1964). In the context of decolonization, these migrations reflected the increased mobility of colonial and semi-colonial peoples. Even so, there had arisen two regimes of

[14] The migrations during World War I and especially World War II should be studied in more detail.

international migrants: to oversimplify it, high-status migrants could gain citizenship in their countries of destination, while low-status migrants could move only as temporary laborers.

By the end of the twentieth century — after decolonization, the rise and fall of communism, and the marginalization of trade unionism — a newly powerful industrial and financial capitalism had incorporated 200 nations into a global economic network that was united by migration, commerce, and communication. The social and environmental crises of this new order soon became apparent. Social inequality reached unprecedented levels, while hostility to migrants and ethnic differences brought social turmoil. Disruption of the natural world emerged most obviously with rising average temperature, but also with extinctions of species, elimination of forests, disruption of waterways, and eventually by huge mining and manufacturing projects that disrupted the atmosphere, the oceans, the lithosphere, and living creatures of all sizes. Viewed from this perspective, the future of humanity appears uncertain.

The argument that I offer here, asserting the role of migration in past transformation and present disruption, can be sustained only through more detailed documentation. Fortunately, advances in scholarship and data-collection provide a basis for detailed analysis of past migration and for projection of future migration. The United Nations has actively collected statistics since 1950, steadily broadening its scope to coordinate expanding nationhood and social complexity. Analysts, now with expanded knowledge, are therefore in a position to document migration systematically in present and past, making it possible to gain understanding of migration more fully (though not necessarily to control the effects of migration). In addition to population statistics, the UN first emphasized international migration, thinking especially of migration to relatively rich nations. For international migration, tallies have focused on *stocks* of "foreign-born" persons, by nation of residence. The largest such population is in the United States, which had over 40 million migrants in 2015 (15% of the national population total of 320 million). For the stock of out-migrants in 2015, the largest was 15 million born in India and living elsewhere. Yet stocks of foreign-born provide a one-dimensional view, making migratory populations look huge by showing accumulated numbers over an unspecified time period. Measures of *flows*, in contrast, are more specific in that they give the two dimensions of origin and destination and are also specified by duration.

Recent work on migrant flows has developed imaginative graphics such as that in Figure 5, showing regions of origin and destination.[15] It shows a total of 80 million migrant departures and arrivals in the period 2010—15, corresponding to departure plus arrival of 40 million individual migrants, at the rate of roughly 8 million per year.[16]

15 This version aggregates migration flows by continent; disaggregated versions show migration flows among nations. On the methodology underlying this graphic, see Abel & Sander (2014).

16 Outflows of migration begin at the edge of the circle; inflows of migration end with arrows pointed at the destination. Totals of in-migrants and out-migrants are shown at the edge.



Figure 5. Migrant flow, 2010–2015. Source: International Organization of Migration (2018).

The major flow from Latin America to the US is clear in Figure 5; it is also striking to see how many migrants moved from one part of Asia to another and from one part of Africa to another.

This and other alternative modes of presentation point toward methods for more coherent quantification of migration. One can now identify at least four frameworks for documenting migration, all of which have been reformulated and improved within the past 15 years: (1) censuses and passenger lists, showing emigration and immigration, as shown in Figure 4 (McKeown 2008)[17]; (2) cross-community migration and diaspora, a

[17] McKeown upgraded this display from 2000 to 2007.

framework for thinking about longer periods of time and migration from community to community (Manning 2006; 2020)[18]; (3) cross-cultural migration rate, accounting for domestic and foreign migration for a territory (Lucassen & Lucassen 2014); and (4) United Nations census summaries since 1950, expanded to include urban and rural population, migrant stocks, refugee stocks, and other surveys. All of these frameworks for reporting on migration are calculated on an annual or five-year basis, except for the Lucassens' (2014) 50-year calculation of the cross-cultural migration rate.

I believe it is feasible to devise standard figures, on an annual or five-year basis, to facilitate comparison of migrant flows over time and space. For 2015, I show the stock of global population, then five major flows as numbers of migrants and as rates of migration per thousand population: births (or net flows of population gain per period), domestic urbanization, and international migrants (the total of professional-level migrants and temporary migrant workers, social refugees, and environmental refugees).[19] Table 1 provides a summary of data for the year 2015.

Table 1. Worldwide migration by category, in millions of persons per year, 2015. Source: United Nations (2018); International Organization of Migration (2018).

	Population stock & flow	Rate o/oo
Global population stock, 2015	7383	
Annual flows, 2015:		
Net population growth	85	*11,5*
Migrants to urban areas	78	*10,6*
International migrants	8	*0,1*
Social refugees	13	*1,8*
Environmental refugees	25	3,4

Based on this approach, it should be possible to create standardized, multidimensional estimates of migration flows as a widely recognized statistic. These standard migration rates would need to be calculated on an annual or quinquennial basis. Such standardized migration rates per thousand population — calculated for nations, sub-national regions, continents, or the globe — could be compared to figures for GDP per capita. While gross domestic product gives a measure of output for discrete and isolated units of society, migration flows indicate interactions within and among societies. Combining per capita estimates of GDP and migration would yield a more representative summary

18 For the African slave trade, this approach links a home population (40 million in Western Africa) to migrant flows of up to 100,000 per year, and to a diaspora population that expanded to 8 million.

19 Asylum statistics, estimated by the UN for recent years, are not shown here.

of social units and their links. Details on migration could be shown by breaking down Table 1 by region or otherwise. Thus, births take place everywhere; population growth centers on tropical regions; international migrations are destined especially for wealthy countries; social refugees flee their homes especially in West Asia and eastern Africa; while environmental refugees are spread widely.

Future changes in migration

This article's overview of past migration, though rapid, provides a basis for projecting future migration. In particular, I compare current population and migration (2020) with projections for the year 2050, roughly one human generation from today. I begin with the UN-projected global population of 9,771 million for 2050 (Table 2, Column 3), based on more than a half-century of UN demographic experience. Regional subtotals within this total reveal the following expected developments. Populations are to decline by 2050 in Europe and northern Asia, while populations will increase modestly in the Americas and Oceania, especially because of immigration. Populations in South, Southeast, and West Asia and especially Africa will increase. By 2050, Nigeria's population of over 400 million will exceed that of the US; Nigerian population density will be roughly ten times that of the US.

But the UN, while it projects rates of urbanization, has yet to project levels of refugee migration because of their high level of fluctuation. Nevertheless, for the future years of the Anthropocene, one must acknowledge that refugee flows have become part of our reality — both social refugees escaping national-level conflicts and environmental refugees escaping natural disasters. After comparing various migration flows and rates, I offer some speculations on future change in population and migration.

To clarify the complexities of projecting migration into the future, I offer two polar-opposite sets of assumptions. At one extreme, I assume that societies will put forth *maximal reform* efforts to reform society and limit climate change. That is, societies will regulate environmental degradation but also seek to limit economic inequality, limit group antagonisms, and achieve collaboration of all nations — large and small, rich and poor. That is a dream at one pole. The second and opposite polar option is that of *minimal reform*, in which I assume that individuals and societies will implement no additional corrective policy for climate change or social reform. This second pole is the path on which we are currently headed. In Table 2, Column 4 shows my projected 2050 figures for the maximal reform option, while Column 5 shows my estimates for the minimal reform option.

To complete the figures for Columns 4 and 5 in Table 2, I made additional assumptions, as follows. *Global population* and its growth are less than the UN projection in Column 3 because of lower tropical birth rates in the case of Max Reform and because of higher mortality rates worldwide in the case of Min Reform. *Urbanization* rises for

Table 2. Two Speculations on World Population and Migration, 2050 (in millions). Source: United Nations (2019); International Organization of Migration (2018); Manning speculative estimates for Columns 4 and 5.

Col. 1 Variables	Col. 2 Year 2015 UN Estimate		Col. 3. Year 2050 UN Projection		Col. 4. Year 2050 Max Reform		Col. 5. Year 2050 Min Reform	
	millions	Rate o/oo	millions	Rate o/oo	millions	Rate o/oo	millions	Rate o/oo
Global population stock	7383		9771		9500		9300	
Annual flows:								
population growth	85	*11,5*	54	*5,5*	45	*4,7*	35	*3,8*
migration to urban areas	78	*10,6*	74	*7,6*	74	*7,8*	80	*8,6*
international migrants	8	*0,1*	–		25	*0,3*	16	*1,7*
social refugees	13	*1,8*	–		20	*2,1*	40	*4,3*
environmental refugees	25	*3,4*	–		40	*4,2*	120	12,9

the case of Min Reform as people flee the countryside. *International migration* triples with Max Reform because of expert allocation of skilled workers; it will double with Min Reform. *Social refugees* rise only modestly with Max Reform because of international cooperation but rise rapidly with Min Reform because of environmental and social chaos. *Environmental refugees* rise despite Max Reform because of temperature rise but rise even more to become the main form of migration in the case of Min Reform. While I have assumed that life expectancy and birth rates will each decline because of environmental crisis, my projections assume — perhaps dubiously — that levels of education and professional skill will continue to improve. These are preliminary speculations but I hope they can stimulate discussion, both to improve the technique of projecting migration and to draw the attention of policy-makers. I would not be surprised to find, if I were to survive for 30 years, that the deviations from past patterns became greater than I projected.

Conclusion: Functions of migration

I have emphasized the role of human migration in creating an expanding succession of social groups and multi-layered networks. The basic human model of cross-community migration developed a sequence of variations, responding to changing social circumstances. Pleistocene migration began by supporting individual communities, then facilitated the colonization of new lands, the maintenance of community networks, and the long-distance exchanges of technology and culture. Holocene migration added a balance among dispersion, consolidation, and hierarchy of populations, finally generating global interconnection in migration. Anthropocene migration built networks for moving labor and knowledge, then began creating networks of social and environmental refugees.

I identify four principal functions of migration in the human order, which have operated simultaneously at the levels of community, society, and global system. Most basic is the function of sustaining human diversity in genetic constituents and in the social order. Cross-community migration, in which some young people typically leave their home to join another community, is a social mechanism of diversification that adds to the pre-existing genetic mechanisms.[20] Cross-community migration expands genetic diversity by bringing new genetic constituents into communities which, if left isolated, might become narrowly specific through genetic drift. Similarly, cross-community migration expands social diversity by opening discussions among people of different backgrounds, both enabling them to exchange their existing ideas and to develop new ideas out of their interaction. In another sort of diversity, migration is commonly unpleasant, fearsome, and dangerous. It facilitates human stratification through hierarchy and inequality. The arrival of migrants in a community may raise hostilities of one sort or another — as the receiving community seeks to repel or otherwise eliminate the migrants or as the migrants seek to conquer, oppress, or eliminate the community they enter.

The second function of migration is to mediate society's links to the Earth's climate and environment. Human activities have caused both rise and fall in global temperature, initially at a relatively small but significant level, and now with great power. A new factor today is the idea of conscious human intervention to limit temperature change. Nevertheless, temperature rise is such that polar ice caps will soon disappear and will not return. A third function of migration is to mediate connection within human society. Migration may cause social changes but may also simply spread news. Migration causes change as it influences both diversity and stratification: in recent centuries of global interconnection, migration has facilitated changes in identity. Even when migration is not a causal agent, it carries messages of change and innovation, as in spreading news on how to accomplish the shift in governance from empires to nations. Finally, the fourth function of migration is to influence conceptualization. Each migrant gains a new physical standpoint, creating new perspectives and generating new observations. Migration facilitates interactive thinking, as it takes one beyond thinking within a single category. Overall, migration is socially and biologically valuable in the interconnections that it facilitates at various levels.

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20 Genetic mechanisms of diversification include mutation of genes, recombination of chromosomes, and epigenetic or life-course modification of genetic activity by proteins.

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The Wary Welcome: Migration and Diversity in the Nordic Countries

Timothy Heleniak

Introduction

The Nordic countries have been net receivers of people from other countries since the 1970s, but recently the size of these flows has increased considerably. Managing the large influx of newcomers is an enormous challenge to the Nordic countries and the success of the Nordic welfare model. For most of their histories, the populations of the Nordic countries were rather homogenous but they have become increasingly diverse in recent decades. Managing increased diversity has not proven easy for countries with much longer histories of immigration. The title "the Wary Welcome" conveys the policy dilemmas faced by the Nordic countries. The Nordic countries are prosperous and stable and are thus prime destinations for migrants from elsewhere in Europe and outside Europe. The Nordic countries also seek to live up to their obligations to take in persons fleeing persecution until international refugee agreements. The populations of the Nordic countries are ageing and there is a perceived need to allow migrants to compensate for aging and labour shortages. The sharply increased diversity has caused a backlash among some political parties and segments of the population who harken for a return to a previous time of more homogenous Nordic populations or to greatly limit future immigration. This anti-immigrant sentiment is not unlike other immigrant-receiving Western countries.

There has been a rather sustainable change in the countries of origin of immigrants over the past decades, which has added the challenges of integration. Several decades ago, the top sending countries to the Nordic countries were other Nordic countries (Heleniak 2018a). This is a result of the long-standing policy of allowing Nordic citizens to move freely to other Nordic countries because of the 1954 Nordic passport union. In the 2000s, Poland and other new EU member states, Russia, and Turkey became major sending countries to the Nordic region. More recently, refugee-sending countries such as Eritrea, Iran, Iraq, Somalia, and Syria have been the top sending countries. Over the past decade, there has been a shift in reasons for immigration. In the late 2000s, immigration for family reasons or education were the largest categories. Since then, the largest increases have been for refugee status, subsidiary protection, and humanitarian reasons. This was the single-largest reason for several years in some Nordic countries. This trend poses several challenges regarding integration.

There have been competing reactions to the increase in immigration into the Nordic countries. The success of the Nordic welfare model rests on high levels of employment among both male and female migrants, which is why there have been numerous efforts to facilitate integration at the national and regional levels with some aimed at specific migrant groups. The populations of the Nordic countries are aging and because migrant populations tend to be younger than the native populations, migration can help counter though not fully reverse aging. The Nordic countries are high in rankings of having integration policies and introduction programmes in place, but these have been challenged by the size and composition of recent flows. There have been several recent studies carried out by the Nordic Council of Ministers examining the effectiveness of integration measures (Calmfors & Sánchez Gassen 2019; Damm 2017).

In response to the influx of refugees and asylum seekers, the Nordic countries took various measures to stem the inflows. The combination of policies aimed at reducing inflows and intensified efforts at integration of those already in the Nordic countries reflect the complex policy challenges facing them with the high and increasing numbers of foreign-origin people.

This article is structured as follows. The next section describes recent migration trends into the Nordic region including migration as a component of population change and the composition of migration by country of origin and reason for migration. This section also presents data on migration stocks in the Nordic countries and the foreign-origin populations by region. The following section analyses the evolution of migration policy in the Nordic countries in response to the increased migration and how migration and integration impact the Nordic welfare model. As is shown, the policy responses range from increased efforts at the integration of newcomers to more restrictive policies aimed at significantly lowering current flows. A final section concludes with an examination of the possible future role of migrants in the Nordic countries.

Recent migration trends into the Nordic countries

Natural increase and net migration

Since 1990 up to 2020, the population of the Nordic countries has grown by 19 percent from a combination of natural increase (more births than deaths) and positive net immigration (more immigrants than emigrants) (Table 1). Over this period, net immigration has accounted for about two-thirds of the total population increase and natural increase for one third. In Iceland, migration into and out of the country has fluctuated considerably, and because it has among the highest fertility rates in Europe, natural increase has contributed to most of the population growth in the country. Migration into Norway, Sweden, and Denmark has accounted for the bulk of population growth in those countries. In Finland, natural increase and net migration have contributed roughly equally to population increase. In both Greenland and the Faroe Islands, the excess of births over deaths has been almost exactly offset by net migration out of these regions, so the populations have stayed roughly the same. Since 2007, net migration has increased considerably in Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark and has become the major source of population increase, far exceeding that of natural increase. As discussed

Table 1. Population change by component in the Nordic region in 1990–2020. Source: Nordic national statistical offices.

	Total population		Population change, 1990–2020 (absolute)			Population change, 1990–2020 (percent)		
	1990	2020	Total	Natural increase	Net migration	Total	Natural increase	Net migration
Total	23 227 060	27 515 593	4 288 533	1 449 549	2 665 388	18,5	6,2	11,5
Iceland	253 785	364 134	110 349	71 175	31 782	43,5	28,0	12,5
Norway	4 233 116	5 367 580	1 134 464	468 207	629 035	26,8	11,1	14,9
Sweden	8 527 036	10 327 589	1 800 553	430 437	1 268 476	21,1	5,0	14,9
Finland	4 974 383	5 525 292	550 909	251 868	282 829	11,1	5,1	5,7
Denmark	5 135 409	5 822 763	687 354	205 115	471 280	13,4	4,0	9,2
Greenland	55 558	56 081	523	14 133	-13 044	0,9	25,4	-23,5
Faroe Islands	47 773	52 154	4 381	8 614	-4 970	9,2	18,0	-10,4
Åland	24 231	29 884	5 653	956	4 381	23,3	3,9	18,1

Sources and notes:
Iceland: Statistics Iceland. Accessed 21.4.2020. Based on preliminary quarterly data.
Norway: Statistics Norway. Accessed 22.4.2020.
Sweden: Statistics Sweden. Accessed 22.4.2020.
Finland: Statistics Finland. Accessed 22.4.2020.
Denmark: Statistics Denmark. Accessed 22.4.2020.
Greenland: Statistics Greenland. Accessed 21.4.2020.

below, much of this increase is due to EU enlargement but is also attributable to the influx of refugees and asylum seekers. Between 2007 and 2019, the excess of births over deaths added 216,000 people to the population of Norway while net immigration added 432,000 people. In Sweden over the same period, there were 270,000 more births than deaths and 870,000 more immigrants than emigrants; in Finland, there were 61,000 more births than deaths and 181,000 more immigrants than emigrants. In Denmark, there were 86,000 more births than deaths and 283,000 more immigrants than emigrants. Thus, since 2007, in the four Nordic countries that account for the bulk of the region's population, adding new people through immigration has been the primary source of population increase, contributing to increasingly diverse populations.

Migration flows

Between 1990 and 2005, there was an annual average of 160,000 persons migrating into the Nordic region. In Sweden, the largest Nordic country, immigration averaged 56,000 over this period, less than 1 percent of the population (Figure 1). Starting in 2006, and every year since, the inflow of migrants to the Nordic region has exceeded 200,000,



Figure 1. Immigration into the Nordic countries in 1990–2019. Source: Nordic national statistical offices.

driven in part by the 2004 expansion of the European Union to include ten new countries. Immigration rose to a peak of 374,000 persons in 2016 during the "refugee crisis", including 163,000 who migrated to Sweden in that year which was nearly two percent of the country's population. Immigration declined to 300,000 in 2019 but this level is still double the levels prior to 2005 (Heleniak 2020).

Net migration — the difference between immigration and emigration — is useful for measuring the relative impact on population change. However, it is composed of flows both into and out of a country, and thus of two groups of people with quite different characteristics and motivations. In 1990, 144,000 persons immigrated to the Nordic countries, while 94,000 emigrated away from the Nordic countries, a ratio of roughly three immigrants to two emigrants. Emigration rose steadily to 135,000 in 2006 and the ratio of immigrants to emigrants remained roughly the same. From the 2007 to the 2018, the ratio of immigrants to emigrants increased to two immigrants to one emigrant, as emigration increased to over 170,000 in the years 2015 to 2018. Some of these recent emigrants are the same people who immigrated in earlier years, but many emigrants are native-born persons.

In recent years, there has been a small net emigration of citizens of the Nordic countries. At the same time, there has been a huge influx of persons with foreign citizenship and it is these persons who are make up most of the immigrants to the Nordic countries. An important aspect of social and labour market integration is whether the people migrating to a country are citizens of that country returning from stays abroad or citizens of other countries. Non-citizens who migrate to the Nordic countries would obviously take longer to integrate into society and the labour market than would returning citizens. Citizens and non-citizens of the Nordic countries have quite different patterns of migration.

In Iceland, citizens and non-citizens responded differently to recent periods of economic expansion prior to and following the 2008 banking crisis (Figures 2 and 3, which are shown on the same scale to facilitate comparison). In the years 2004—2007, most of the net immigration into the country was driven by non-citizens as there was net immigration of 15,544 of non-citizens and a net emigration of 767 Icelandic citizens. Following the 2008 banking crisis, Icelandic citizens responded more strongly than non-citizens by leaving. In the period 2008—2012, there was a net outflow of 6,893 Icelandic citizens and of only 655 non-citizens. The trend of Icelandic citizens leaving and non-citizens coming to the country has increased. In the past few years, two-thirds of those people migrating to Iceland have been non-citizens. Since 2013, there has been a net emigration of 2,207 Icelandic citizens and a net immigration of 10,438 non-citizens.

Norway has had a similar pattern of net emigration of Norwegian citizens and net immigration of foreign citizens. Since 2000, there has been an annual average net emigration of about 1,000 Norwegian citizens each year and a net immigration of more than 30,000 foreign citizens.



Figure 2. Net migration of citizens in 1960–2019.Source: Nordic national statistical offices.

Sweden has had a similar pattern of net emigration of Swedish citizens and net immigration of foreign citizens. Between 2000 and 2016, there was net emigration of 93,000 Swedish citizens and a net immigration of 965,000 foreign citizens. The huge inflow of nearly 120,000 non-citizens in 2016 is largely composed of asylum seekers who arrived in 2016 and were granted residency.

In Finland, there has been a similar pattern of net immigration of foreign citizens and net emigration of Finnish citizens. Since 2000, there was a net emigration of 24,000 Finnish citizens and a net immigration of 224,000 foreign citizens.

Denmark is like the other Nordic countries in that the overall patterns of migration have been driven by non-citizens in recent years. Since 2000, there has been net emigration of 30,000 Danish citizens and net immigration of 329,000 foreign citizens.

One trend in international migration in the Nordic countries is that with increased overall levels of immigration, the diversity of countries of origin has also increased. No longer do immigrants mostly originate from other Nordic countries or even from other EU countries, including the new accession countries, but are increasingly coming from countries outside the EU. This has implications for integration, as many of these new migrants are more linguistically and culturally distant from the Nordic societies.

In Iceland in 1986, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and the United States were the top sending countries, together accounting for more than three-quarters of all immigrants



Figure 3. Net migration of non-citizens in 1960–2019. Source: Nordic national statistical offices.

in that year. In 2005, the first full year after the EU accession of ten new countries, immigration had more than doubled and Poland was now the country sending the largest number of immigrants.

In Norway in 1980, when immigration was quite low, the main sending countries were the United States (mainly returning Norwegians), the other Nordic countries, and some of the larger countries of Europe. Following the EU expansion, Poland became the largest sending country, with fellow accession countries of Lithuania and Latvia also becoming major source countries. More recently, reflecting the refugee and asylum flows, Syria was the largest sending country. Also, among the top ten countries were Lebanon and Eritrea.

Sweden has had the largest increase in immigration of the Nordic countries since 2000 and a similar pattern of diversification. In 2000, 58,659 people immigrated to Sweden and the largest country of immigration — based on country of birth — was in fact Sweden, obviously consisting of returning Swedes. The other Nordic countries, as well as other large countries in Europe, such as Germany and the United Kingdom, were also large senders. However, there was already evidence of significant refugee migration. Iran, Iraq, and the former Yugoslavia were among the top ten sending countries. By 2016, immigration had even increased further to 163,005 people. Again, this reflects the fact that of the many refugees and asylum seekers, people born in Syria were the largest group of immigrants as well as there being large numbers from Eritrea, Iraq, Somalia, and Afghanistan.

Similar to the other Nordic countries, over the past several decades, immigration into Finland has both increased and diversified. In 1990, Sweden was the largest sending country, accounting for 44 percent of all immigrants. In 2010, Estonia became the largest sending country to Finland, followed by Sweden and Russia. Again, reflecting the increased flows of asylum seekers and refugees, Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, and Syria were among the top sending countries, along with traditional sources such as Russia, Estonia, and Sweden.

Over the three and a half decades from 1980 to 2015, immigration into Denmark has increased substantially from 30,000 in 1980 to nearly 100,000 in 2015. At the same time, like the other Nordic countries, the sending countries have diversified and become more geographically (and culturally) distant. In 1980, the top sending country was Greenland, which is a protectorate of Denmark. This was followed by immigrants from the United Kingdom and the USA and then fellow Nordic countries Sweden and Norway. More recently the top sending countries remained the same, but new sending countries among the EU accession countries — Poland, Romania, and Lithuania — were now among the top ten. Reflecting the large refugee flows of recent years, the largest sending country in 2015 was Syria.

Migration stocks

Immigration has accounted for two-thirds of the population increase in the Nordic region since 1990, and even more since 2006. This has caused the foreign-born proportion of the population to rise to historically high levels (Figure 4). Sweden has the highest share, 19 percent in 2019, a significant increase from 1990 when it was 9 percent. In Iceland and Norway, 16 percent of the populations are foreign-born and in Denmark 12 percent. Finland has the lowest share of the countries, 7 percent in 2019, but this is still a significant increase from 1990 when it was just 1.3 percent. Greenland is a notable exception to the overall Nordic trend, with a decline in the proportion of foreign-born people in its population from 17 percent in 1990 to 10 percent in 2018. Sweden now has a foreign-born population that is higher than that of the United States and just less than the shares in Canada and Australia, countries with much longer histories of being migration destinations.

The United Nations defines a migrant as a person who resides outside his/her country of birth. Globally, there were 244 million migrants in 2015, amounting to 3.3 percent of the world's population (United Nations Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2015). This is an increase from 1990 when there were 154 million migrants, but only a slight increase in percentage terms when this number represented 2.9 percent of the world's population. While globally the number of international migrants has increased by 60 percent since 1990, it has increased 250 percent in the Nordic region. Since 1990, the number of foreign-born people in the Nordic coun-



Figure 4. Foreign-born in the Nordic countries and regions in 1990–2019 (%). Source: Nordic national statistical offices.

tries has increased from 1.3 to 3.3 million. This number means that one in eight Nordic residents were born abroad.

Foreign-born is a useful and comparable measure of the proportion of the population of different origin than the host country and is what the United Nations uses to count the international migrant population at the global level. From an integration perspective, however, foreign background provides a much more nuanced portrait. This data is also somewhat more complex due to the different definitions used to classify people with a foreign background in each of the Nordic countries. The share of foreign-born persons and their descendants has increased to historically high levels (the Nordic countries define immigrant populations differently). In Iceland, the total proportion of the population with some foreign background (including foreign-born and second-generation immigrants) is now 17 percent of the Icelandic population, a significant increase from 20 years previously when it was just 5 percent (Figure 5). In Norway, the immigrant population (including first-generation immigrants without Norwegian background and persons born in Norway with foreign-born parents) increased to 23 percent in 2017, from 7 percent in 1990. In Sweden, the foreign population (foreign-born or Swedish-born with at least one foreign parent) increased from 21 percent in 2002 to 31 percent in 2016. In Finland, the foreign population (consisting of first- and second-generation immigrants) increased from less than 1 percent in 1990 to 7 percent in 2016. In Denmark, the immigrant population (immigrants and descendants of immigrants), increased from 3 percent in 1989 to 13 percent in 2017.



Figure 5. Foreign-origin population in the Nordic countries in 1990–2019 (% of population). Source: Nordic national statistical offices.

With the large inflows, the share of non-citizens as a percent of the total population has increased considerably as is now between 4 and 12 percent of the total populations of the Nordic countries (Figure 6). In Iceland, the increased immigration of non-citizens during the 2000s, caused the number of noncitizens in the population to increase to 12.4 percent of the population. In Norway, the large influx over recent decades has caused the proportion of non-citizens in Norway to increase from 2 percent of the population in 1986 to 11 percent in 2019. The proportion of the population with foreign citizenship was around 5 to 6 percent of the population of Sweden until the mid-2000s, but with the recent increase in immigration into Sweden is now 9.2 percent of the population. The proportion of non-citizens in Finland has increased from just 0.5 percent in 1990 to 4.7 percent in 2018. In Denmark, the proportion of non-citizens has increased from 4.9 percent in 2000 to 9.2 percent in 2020. In summary, over recent years there has been a small amount of net emigration of citizens of the Nordic countries. At the same time, there has been a huge influx of people with foreign citizenship, and such people account for most of the immigrants.

There is a well-established age pattern to migration that holds across most migration streams. Mobility is highest among those in the young working ages, in their 20s and 30s. Thus, migrant populations tend to have quite a different and typically much younger age profile than the native or non-migrant population. These migrant populations tend to be predominantly of working age and concentrated in the young working ages. The migrant populations in the Nordic countries have shown to have a quite different and younger age structure than the native population (Heleniak 2018a).



Figure 6. Proportion of foreign citizens among total population in the Nordic countries in 1973–2020 (%). Source: Nordic national statistical offices and Eurostat.

One possible policy option for countries concerned about declining or aging populations is replacement migration — allowing or even encouraging international migration in order to counteract decline and aging of native populations. The populations of the Nordic countries are aging, and replacement migration has been suggested as possible policy to stem the population aging. Because of the younger age structure of migrant populations, they have been shown to continue to population growth and to slow the aging of the population.

Sánchez Gassen and Heleniak (2016a; 2016b) study produced several scenarios for the Nordic countries under different migration conditions. It came to the following conclusions. The Nordic countries are likely to remain popular destinations for migrants in the future. This will lead to sustained population growth in the Nordic region. Without future immigration, population sizes are likely to decline in Denmark, Finland and Norway during the next decades. In Sweden and Iceland, population growth would be substantially lower if migration would stop. Migration will also slow down population ageing in the Nordic countries, but it cannot stop the ageing process. The migration levels required to keep age ratios at current levels are unrealistically high to make this a feasible strategy.

Regional patterns of migrant populations

With the increases in the foreign-born populations at the national level, there has necessarily been increases also at the regional and municipal levels. Figure 7 shows the change in the percent foreign-born by region and municipality between 1995 and 2015. There has been an increase in the percent of foreign born in almost every region as the immigrant populations have spread out across the Nordic countries. At the regional level, the increase has been fastest in Rogaland, Oslo and Akershus in Norway and in Suðurnes in Iceland. The only municipalities that have seen declines in the percent of foreign-born are selected municipalities in Iceland and central and northern Finland outside the larger urban areas and across Greenland. Similar to the national levels, where the presence of foreign-origin populations are transforming the societies and economies, they are having an impact to the local levels, especially in municipalities where there were almost no immigrants just a few decades ago. Much of the responsibility for the integration of immigrants has become a regional or municipal responsibility.

Because of past and more recent immigration and settlement patterns, the largest minority group (defined by country of birth) among municipalities shows an interesting pattern (Figure 8). The figure shows the largest minority group in each of the municipalities and the proportion of the total municipal population made up by that group. For simplicity and for analytical purposes, the map shows the country group to which the largest minority belongs. For example, black shading on the map means that the largest minority group in that municipality comes from a single country within the EU-15 (e.g. Germany) and that people from that country alone make up over 5 percent of the population (Heleniak 2020).

While there has been increased immigration into the Nordic countries from outside the Nordic region, intra-Nordic immigration remains considerable. People born in Norway are the largest minority group in 17 municipalities in Sweden, mostly along the southern portion of the border, and make up more than 10 percent of the population in some municipalities. People born in Sweden make up the largest minority in 160 municipalities outside Sweden, mostly in northern and western Finland, and account for more than 10 percent of the population in several regions in Åland. People born in Finland are the largest minority group in 79 municipalities, nearly all in Sweden, with the highest shares being in municipalities in the north near the border with Finland. People born in Denmark are the largest minority in all regions of Greenland and the Faroe Islands and a few other municipalities in the other Nordic countries, mostly in southern Sweden. Places where people born in one Nordic country are the largest minority group represent historical patterns of migration or more recent cross-border flows.

People born in one of the EU-15 countries are the largest minority in 47 municipalities; most of them were born in Germany. Some of these municipalities are in southern Denmark, just across the border from Germany. The proportion of people from any single EU country in any municipal population is quite small, and never accounts for more than 5 percent of the population.

A much larger category is that of people born in the EU accession countries, where they are the largest minority group in one-third of municipalities. This group includes people born in Poland or one of the Baltic States. The reason for separating people from



Figure 7. Change in percent foreign-born by region in the Nordic countries, 1995 to 2015 (%). Source: Nordic national statistical offices.



Figure 8. Largest minority population by municipality in the Nordic countries in 2018. Source: Nordic national statistical offices

the EU-15 and accession countries is that while people from both groups now have the same access to the labor markets in the Nordic countries, this was not always the case and the two groups have different migration histories. People born in Poland are the largest minority group in many municipalities, mostly in Iceland and Norway, where they have arrived as migrant labor. In many municipalities in Iceland, they make up more than 10 percent of the population. People born in Estonia are the largest minority in many regions in Finland, to which they have linguistic and historical ties. People born in Lithuania are the largest group in several Norwegian municipalities, including large concentrations in several regions in northernmost Norway.

People born in the former Soviet Union (including those listed as being born in the former Soviet Union, Russia or Ukraine but not the Baltic states) are the largest minority group in 100 municipalities. Nearly all the municipalities in which this group is the largest minority are in south-east Finland, which borders Russia. In most cases, the proportions are quite small, never more than 4 percent of the total municipal population.

Another category is that of countries experiencing major conflicts or civil unrest. This category includes people born in Eritrea, Iran, Iraq, Somalia, Afghanistan and Syria. People born in one of these countries make up the largest minority group in 21 percent of municipalities. These municipalities are in a large cluster in southern Sweden and a few in Norway. In some municipalities, people from one of these countries make up more than 5 percent of the population. A final group are the 25 municipalities in which there are no foreign-born people; apart form one, these are all in Finland.

While labor migrants are allowed to settle where they wish in the Nordic countries, obviously close to where jobs are, there is a debate about settling refugees evenly across the countries or allowing them to choose their destination (Hernes et al. 2019). The Nordic countries have different approaches to refugee settlement. In Denmark, Finland and Norway, refugees are dispersed throughout the country. In Denmark, this is done centrally, while in Finland and Norway it is based on municipal settlement agreements. In Sweden, refugees have more choice of destinations though if they cannot find housing, they receive assistance and are allocated to regions with availability. The policy debate is whether refugees benefit from being in proximity to co-nationals or whether this leads to "ghettoization" and acts as a barrier to integration. Disbursement to rural areas is often to less-desirable labor markets. In spite of initial placement in remote rural areas, in both Denmark and Norway, people tend to move from these regions in large numbers and settle in larger urban areas.

When refugees are settled in rural areas, a host of policy challenges arise. Case studies of integration in six rural areas across the Nordic region came to the following conclusions (Harbo et al. 2017): Language is important for career advancement and citizenship, but people need time to learn, and there is often a lack of higher and specialized courses in smaller settlements. There are housing shortages in some places and a mismatch between location of housing and employment. There is a need to the validation of skills which needs to be done early and home-country skills don't always transfer.

The case studies also stressed the importance of an integration coordinator, a person who initially substitutes for the lack of professional and social networks.

Policy responses

The Nordic welfare model and immigration

The Nordic welfare model rests on high rates of taxation to provide high levels of public services. This is accomplished in part through high levels of employment for both men and women. There are generous family leave policies in all Nordic countries with increasing amounts of time designated for fathers so that women can have and continue careers after giving birth. As a result, women in the Nordic countries have among the highest employment rates in Europe. One challenge with the recent high levels of immigration is to ensure that both male and female immigrants find their way into the labor market as quickly as possible. However, one problem is that a gradient has developed in employment levels with natives having the highest employment rates, followed by immigrants from the EU, followed by immigrants born outside the EU.

The successful labor market integration of migrants, especially of refugees is crucial for both the Nordic welfare model and for the migrants themselves. Integration is especially challenging for refugees who are low-educated and who come from countries with quite different labor markets. Women from non-Western countries present a particular challenge for several reasons. They often have less education, lower levels of knowledge of the host country language, and more health problems. Many are also in prime child-bearing ages. Cultural traditions from male-dominated countries also pose barriers.

According to the Migrant Integration Policy Index, the Nordic countries rank high in terms of having policies in place to integrate immigrants (Migration Integration Policy Index 2015). In spite of this, efforts continue to design better policies to successfully integrate immigrants into the Nordic societies and labor markets. These include integration programs for those who arrive as refugees.

Integration of newcomers

Because of the high levels of labor force participation among natives, particularly women, the Nordic countries tend to have the greatest negative immigrant-native employment differentials (Damm 2017). The causal factors which lead to successful immigrant integration is complex, stretching international policies and actions, to the national and regional levels to the individual migrant and their characteristics. As mentioned above, the Nordic countries rank high in terms of having policies and programs in place for the successful integration of newcomers. These have been found to be successful for initial labor market integration in the first few years following arrival. Denmark was the first Nordic country to establish a dedicated integration program for refugees in 1999, followed by Norway in 2004, and Sweden in 2010, though it had locally-organized programs starting in the 1990s.

One study for Norway, however, found that after 5 to 10 years, the integration process goes into reverse with widening immigrant-native employment differentials and increasing rates of immigrant social insurance dependency (Bratsberg et al. 2017). A similar pattern was found in Finland where immigrant-native gaps in employment and earnings decreased over time but remained large (Sarvimäki 2017). Ten years after arriving in Finland, earnings of immigrant men were only 22 to 38 percent that of native men of the same age. Sweden has a much longer record of refugee immigration but similarly, these persons often find work on low-wage service sectors (Åslund & Iileberg 2017).

Integration will remain a challenge despite well-established policies and programs in place. A key conclusion is that no single policy is enough to fully integrate these newcomers into the labor market. A nuanced combination of education, active labor market, social benefit and wage policies are needed.

Restrictions on migration

During the 'refugee crisis' of 2015—2016, the Nordic countries and the European Union took several steps to restrict the flow of refugees and asylum seekers. The major factor which stemmed the flow of asylum seekers into Europe was the 2016 agreement between Turkey and the EU. Many of the asylum seekers from Syria and other countries transited through Turkey. The EU-Turkey Deal had several components but the major ones were: all new irregular migrants crossing from Turkey into Greek islands as from 20 March 2016 will be returned to Turkey and for every Syrian being returned to Turkey from Greek islands, another Syrian will be resettled from Turkey to the EU (European Council 2016). In exchange, an immediate disbursement of 3 billion € would be made to Turkey under the Facility for Refugees in Turkey and an additional 3 billion € would be granted at the end of 2018. Restrictions on border crossings into the EU were already in place at the beginning of 2016 but this agreement had the effect of swiftly and dramatically reducing the number of asylum seekers entering the EU and the Nordic countries (Heleniak 2018b). Among the restrictions were checks at the border between Denmark and Sweden.

In October 2015, the Swedish government decided to offer temporary resident permits rather than permanent ones to newly arrived persons. In June 2019, this law extended to July 2021 (Local 2019). The new law also limits opportunities for asylum seekers to gain permanent residency. Sweden has a longer history of welcoming refugees than the other Nordic countries but the large flows in 2015—2016 caused a rethinking and a turn towards more restrictive measures (Skodo 2018). Along with more restrictive measures, the Swedish government also invested heavily in the early integration of refugees and shifted funds from foreign aid to assistance for asylum seekers, which is seen as a form of development assistance (Traub 2016).

Finland responded the 2015—2016 rise in refugees in three ways: increasing the number of reception centers, making Finland a less attractive destination, and a rethinking of integration policies (Sarvimäki 2017). These new policies were based in part on an evaluation of the labor market success of previous waves of asylum seekers into Finland.

Along with the rise in immigration, there has been a rise in right-wing parties opposed to immigration and a shift in public attitudes towards migration (Tanner 2016). The Danish People's Party, Sweden Democrats, Finns Party, and Progress Party (Norway) have different origins but all share in common anti-immigrant platforms, which derive from and also contribute to public opinion (Widfeldt 2018). Similar to radical-right parties elsewhere in Europe, these parties in the Nordic countries have gained a significant enough following to gain between 13 and 21 percent of seats in parliament in recent elections. The success of the Sweden Democrats in the 2018 election was enough to stop a government from forming for four months. Arguably, the presence of these parties contributed to the shift in more restrictive immigration policies in 2015 and 2016 and will continue to be a presence in migration debates for the foreseeable future.

Conclusions

All the Nordic countries regularly carry out population projections, which are used for a variety of planning purposes. Norway, Sweden, and Denmark do projections by nativity though they use different methodologies and different categorization of foreign-origin populations (Calmfors 2020). In Denmark, immigrants and Danish-born with at least one immigrant parent is currently 13.7 percent of the population. This share is projected to rise to 20.6 percent in 2060. Immigrants and Norwegian-born with at least one immigrant parent are today 17.3 percent of the population of Norway. This share is projected to steadily increase to 30.6 percent in 2100. The share of foreign-born in the population in Sweden is currently 19.6 percent and is projected to increase to a peak of 22.7 percent in 2043 and then decline slightly to 19.0 percent by 2100. Immigrants from non-Western countries can also be projected. Such projections by nativity show that there is the expectation that immigration into the Nordic countries is expected to continue into the future. Having such high foreign-origin populations are a key factor in fiscal sustainability analyses for two reasons. The first is that, as demonstrated, foreign-origin populations tend to have lower employment rates and thus pay lower taxes. They also tend to be higher users of public services.

Countries with much longer histories of immigration continue to struggle with determining sustainable levels of immigration, proper rights to accord to newcomers, and best means of integration. The United States is a country essentially founded on immigration, which has had positive immigration nearly every year for its entire history. The country has vacillated between being welcoming to newcomers and erecting restrictions. This has often occurred simultaneously with different measures aimed at particular immigrant groups. Like most public policy issues, migration policy in the United States has long been a battle between conservatives who desire more restrictions on immigrants and liberals, who either welcome further immigration or who wish to legalize and integrate those already in the country. Partly because of this tension, and also because of the lack of understanding of the unintended consequences of migration policy, there are currently about 11 million undocumented or illegal immigrants in the country. There has not been any meaningful reforms to immigration legislation in the United States in over thirty years, only isolated executive actions. Given the current political climate there is not likely to be any reforms to migration policy in the foreseeable future.

The title "The Wary Welcome" signifies the careful balancing act the Nordic countries are facing with the increased levels of immigration of recent decades. While immigration has been increasing in all the Nordic countries in recent decades, it was the record-breaking number of asylum seekers in the 2015—2016 period, which really caused a recalibration of migration and integration policy. On the one hand, there is recognition that increased immigration can assist with lowering the age structure of the populations, that many immigrants are in prime working ages, and that they fill important labor market niches. However, more so than in most countries, immigrants, especially those coming from outside Europe, must find their way into the labor market as quickly as possible and achieve levels of labor force participation close to those of native populations so that they can contribute to the Nordic welfare model. As such, considerable efforts have been made by researchers and policy makers to understand how best to formulate and implement migration and integration policies. Obviously, not all people or political parties agree that high levels of immigration and increased integration are the appropriate policy goals. This segment of society is having an increased voice in policy formation regarding migration matters and is one that can no longer be ignored.

As of the finalization of this article in spring 2020, a global pandemic caused by the COVID-19 virus was dominating the headlines and impacting economic and social life throughout the world. The course of the pandemic is uncertain, and its impacts are unknown. However, one area on which it already seems to be having an enormous impact is mobility and migration. There are restrictions on entry to the EU and some countries have introduced their own barriers to entry. It seems that there will be greatly reduced migration into the Nordic countries for some time to come.

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"The Journey Made Us" – Exploring Journey Memories of Karelian Evacuees and Iraqi Refugees[1]

Johanna Leinonen

The purpose of this article is to explore meanings attached to evacuation and refugee journeys to Finland in narratives of two groups of forced migrants: Karelian evacuees who fled from the Soviet-occupied areas of Finland during World War II and refugees from Iraq who arrived in Finland in the 2010s. The political, institutional, and historical contexts where these journeys took place are, of course, vastly different. Nevertheless, I am interested in examining similarities and differences in the journey narratives at the level of experiences. What kinds of meanings did the evacuees and refugees attach to the journey later on, years or decades after it happened? This article should be read as an exploratory paper that provides early reflections on the on-going data collection.

My research is inspired by the observation that the journey that forced migrants take in order to reach safety has been largely ignored by scholars both in Finland and internationally. As Gadi BenEzer and Roger Zetter have noted (2014; see also Griffiths, Rogers & Anderson 2013, 10), the journey, with all its perils and promises, has remained under-studied and under-theorized in research on migration, including forced migration. This is even though the studies that exist on the topic suggest that displaced people may consider the journey as a formative experience (Hopkins & Hill 2008; Kuusisto-Arponen 2009; Buil & Siegel 2014; Nardone & Correa-Velez 2015; Iqbal 2016; Lyytinen 2017). As BenEzer and Zetter (2014, 299) put it, the journey is "one of the most significant processes of 'becoming' and 'being' a refugee." Moreover, BenEzer (2002) earlier argued that the journey experience may have psychological implications for the individual and social identity effects for the group who experienced the journey.

[1] The research has been conducted for the project *Refugee Journeys: Narratives of Forced Mobilities* (Academy of Finland, decision number 317751).

I suggest that to ignore this constitutive experience in forced migrants' lives is to overlook a factor that can crucially influence the way they are able to adapt to a new society. What I found in my research is that the journey can be a very difficult, even traumatic episode in life, but it can also be considered as an empowering experience — one that people associate positive meanings with, despite the difficulties. Moreover, for many Karelian evacuees and Iraqi refugees, the interview provided a setting where they could, implicitly or explicitly, "leave their mark" and associate or contrast their story against a larger narrative. In the case of the Karelians, by sharing their evacuation story, the interviews could associate themselves with the great Karelian survival story that has been brought up in numerous ways in literature, music, art, and family and community reminiscence since the War (see Kuusisto-Arponen 2009, 2012). For at least some of the Iraqi research participants, the interview provided an opportunity to tell their story in their own words amid the heated public discussion that often stigmatize their journeys to Europe. It is telling that all except one of my interviewees wanted their story to be archived for future use.

Several scholars have pointed out that social scientific and historical research on migration tends to have a "sedentarist bias" (Malkki 1995) or an "ontological predisposition to dwelling and stasis" (Rogaly 2015). That is, scholarship focuses on causes and consequences of migration in the country of settlement or departure. What happens *in-between* the countries of departure and destination has received much less scholarly attention. The "sedentary" approach is visible in most research on refugees and asylum seekers in Finland as well (cf. Pentikäinen 2005), where the main concern has been, broadly speaking, issues of refugee settlement, health and well-being, integration, and, in recent years, questions related to migration governance and control (see Leinonen 2019).

In the Geneva Refugee Convention of 1951, "refugees" became defined in international law as persons forced to flee their country of origin because of persecution. However, a majority of the world's displaced people — those who did not cross an international border — were excluded from the Convention, and, subsequently, became largely invisible to state authorities, policymakers, and scholars (Marfleet 2007). Scholarship on forced migration increasingly focused on asylum seekers and international refugees and their reception in nation-states of the Global North. This analytical focus ignores the fact that most of the world's displaced people move only short distances to a neighboring country or within their home country, like the Karelians did during World War II (UNHCR 2019). Furthermore, in migration scholarship more broadly speaking, an implicit priority is typically given to movements that take place across international borders and involve crossing long geographical distances (Rogaly 2015).

In the case of the 407,000 Karelian evacuees who fled to other parts of Finland during World War II, there is new scholarship that considers their wartime movement as forced migration, even though they moved within the (former) Finnish borders (Kuusisto-Arponen 2009; Savolainen 2015; Kuusisto-Arponen & Savolainen 2016).[2] However, the main body of literature on Karelians' wartime and postwar experiences focuses on the reception of the evacuees, their cultural and organizational life after the war, or on memories attached to the home region inaccessible until the collapse of the Soviet Union (e.g. Sallinen-Gimpl 1994; Fingerroos 2010; Raninen-Siiskonen 2013). As Maunu Häyrynen (2012) has pointed out, research on Karelian evacuees tends to suffer from methodological nationalism (see Wimmer & Glick Schiller 2002). It generally lacks a comparative or transnational perspective, so that the movement of Karelians is not analyzed in the international context or connected with other corresponding forced migrations of the era. According to Häyrynen, public discussions regarding Karelians also tend to be characterized by "backward-looking nostalgy" (ibid. p. 12).

Although rarely applied to the Karelian case (see, however, Fingerroos & Savolainen 2019), there is a considerable amount of literature on refugee diaspora and transnationalism that highlight the significance of linkages between countries/regions of origin and destination (e.g. Tiilikainen 2015). However, the actual transnational *movement* has remained understudied. This has been pointed out by scholars representing the "mobilities paradigm" (e.g. Sheller & Urry 2006; Urry 2007; Cresswell 2010), who have argued for research that takes precisely movement — or, more specifically, meanings attached to movements, i.e. mobilities — as the focal point of research. My research builds on this critique of mobilities scholars and proposes an examination of what happens in-between the conditions of departure and arrival.

I am purposefully bringing research on international refugee movements and internal displacements in conversation with one another to inquire about the journey experiences of both international refugees and internally displaced people. The goal is not to "reify" the refugee journey as an experience transcending any spatio-temporal specificities. In this article, my humble goal is to simply reflect on some of the meanings forced migrants attached to the journey at different times and in different contexts.

This paper is based on 29 interviews, 19 with Karelian evacuees and 10 with refugees from Iraq. One of the interviews with Karelians was conducted with a married couple. Altogether, eleven men and nine women participated in the interviews with Karelians. Nine of the Iraqi interviewees were men and one woman. All research participants live in southern Finland, mainly around Turku or the Helsinki metropolitan area. The interviews lasted 1—4 hours each, and they were conducted alone in Finnish with the Karelian evacuees, and alone in English or in Arabic with an interpreter with the Iraqi interviewees. The interview format was a mix of narrative and semi-structured interview method, in the sense that in the beginning, I usually asked the participants to tell

[2] It has also been debated whether the word "refugee" (*pakolainen*) can be applied to Karelian evacuees, even though in the UNHCR's classification today, they would likely be called as "internally displaced people", which in Finnish translates to country-internal refugees (*maan sisäinen pakolainen*) (see e.g. Kanervo, Kivistö & Kleemola 2019).

me about their journey experience, as they remembered it. In other words, they could choose the starting point for their narrative and recount their memories freely with little guidance from me. I made notes during the narration, and after the interviewee reached an endpoint to the story and expected input from me, I started asking clarifying questions. Of course, there was variation in how extensively the interviewee was willing or able to tell me about the journey without any input from me. Some talked for a long time, even hours, some reached their end point quite soon or clearly needed me to ask questions along the way.

Ethical questions were considered carefully from the start, as the journey experience can be a sensitive topic for many. In my research advertisements and when meeting with the participants, I was clear about the goals of the research and that the participants were free to refrain from answering my questions or withdraw from the interview at any point. The data collection and analysis are on-going.

Towards a definition of the refugee journey?

To understand what the "journey" means for those who have experienced it is a rather complex matter. What I have learned from my interview materials so far is that there is no simple definition of the evacuation/refugee journey. It is easy to think about the journey as a "trip" that starts from the home country or region and ends when the person or family arrives at a new destination (a new country, a new domicile, etc.). However, as research has shown (e.g. Griffiths, Rogers & Anderson 2013; Crawley et al. 2018), journeys of refugees and asylum seekers can take multiple years and include stays in different countries and in different statuses along the way. Even in voluntary migration, people may move multiple times in their lives for different reasons and in different statuses (Leinonen 2012). In addition, for example in the case of Karelian evacuees, the "mobile period" in their lives extended over multiple years. Furthermore, while refugees and displaced people may have physically arrived at a destination, the journey can continue in their minds, as an emotional or mental journey of adaptation and building a life in the new environment. In my interviews, the participants often started their journey narrative from the moment they had to leave their home and ended their story when they arrived in a more permanent place of settlement in Finland. However, especially among the Karelian evacuees, many continued their story much further in time, some up until today, to the moment when the interview was conducted. In other words, the interview offered them an opportunity to reflect on their "life journey" more broadly speaking.

An important issue to note is that the temporal distance between the interview moment and the journey experience, as well as the age and the life-stage of the interviewees, crucially affected the way they talked about their journey experience. While I am not discussing in depth the journey as a narrated memory in this article (cf. Savolainen 2012, 2015), it should be kept in mind that the journey experience is constructed retrospectively, years or decades after it happened. In addition, the interview moment (both the interview interaction itself and the societal situation in which the interview takes place) inevitably influences the narrative.

The Karelian evacuees interviewed for this research were born in the 1920s or 1930s and experienced the journey as a child or a young person. As children, they did not often know much about what was going on, as adults refrained from telling them details about the war situation (see also Näre & Kirves 2007). It is likely that their journey narrative has been molded by the stories that they had heard over the decades from their parents, grandparents, and other Karelians they knew. In addition, as noted above, there is a long tradition of public remembrance of the Karelian evacuation. The journey plays a prominent role in the "great Karelian narrative" of settlement and adaptation and in the formation of regional Karelian associations in postwar Finland (Kuusisto-Arponen 2008, 2009). Scholars have noted that dislocation can produce a sense of community (Ahmed 1999; BenEzer 2002), in particular when the "home" remains inaccessible, as was the case with Karelians (until the 1990s, when visits to Russian Karelia became possible after the collapse of the Soviet Union). As Savolainen (2015) has noted, the "home" in Karelia was "doubly unattainable": in the past and behind the impermeable border. This amplified the sense of longing for many Karelians (cf. Rosinska 2011), and the journey became a crucial part of the collective memory of the lost Karelia. It is against this collective and familial memory landscape that the interviewees constructed their own narrative.

The context is quite different for the Iraqis interviewed for this research. They all left alone as adults during the 2010s, and their departure is tied to the continuing violence and worsening living conditions in Iraq. It is important to note that Iraqi refugees in Finland represent different generations, who have experienced persecution and violence in changing circumstances since the 1980s. Most of my interviewees arrived in Finland in 2015, after the Isis took over parts of Iraq in 2014 and the violence intensified (for a recap of the situation in Iraq, see Juntunen 2016). For them, violence and persecution were multigenerational experiences. All except one were granted a refugee status in Finland (one was denied asylum and was seeking a residence permit based on his marriage at the time of the interview). The interviewees reminisced their journey in a situation where the debates surrounding forced migration to Europe are heated, and the perilous journeys over the Mediterranean Sea are routinely depicted in the media as irregular migration (even though people arriving in Europe have the right to seek asylum) and/or as a threat to the "fortress Europe" (see Horsti 2016).

Many of the Iraqi interviewees noted that they would not had been ready to talk about their journey when they were still seeking asylum, or in the first couple of years after the journey. The security of residency in Finland and/or the temporal distance to the event made it possible for them to discuss the journey with me. As noted above, their journey narration can be read as a counter-narrative to the contemporary stigmatizing public discussions over forced migration in Europe. Through the narration, they were able establish their own justification for the journey, contemplate whether all the difficulties they had faced during and after the journey were "worth it", and explain their agency during the often-hazardous journey. This, in itself, was a clear difference to the journey narratives of the Karelians, who were children during World War II and, thus, did not possess similar agency.

Moreover, because of the recency of the event, the Iraqi interviewees limited their story to the actual physical journey taken. Many started their narrative from Turkey, not Iraq, likely because not all of them wanted to discuss the circumstances that had pushed them to leave Iraq, or because for many, the difficult part of the journey commenced when departing from Turkey to Greece. The narration typically ended when they arrived at a reception center in Finland, or when they found a more permanent place to stay in the country. None of them continued their reflection much further in their life, apart from pondering how the journey experience has influenced them or changed the way they are today. The reasons for the different framing of the journey in the interviews with Karelians and Iraqi refugees were likely related to the temporal distance between the journey and the interview, as well as the age of the interviewees during the journey and at the time of the interview. Since the Karelians evacuees were in their 80s or mid-90s during the interview, it is perhaps not surprising that many took this opportunity to review their life.

As this discussion shows, there is no straight-forward answer to the question what the journey actually is. However, my preliminary definition of the journey is that it is a biographical rupture for the individuals and groups who experience it. As indicated above, the journey can work as a metaphor that the interviewees use to make sense of their past from the perspective of today, and in negotiation with the future (cf. Savolainen 2015; Tošić & Palmberger 2016). Moreover, the journey is constituted by its spatiality and temporality as well as by its emotional, embodied, and social dimensions. In the next section, I am briefly discussing these aspects of the journey, as described by my interviewees.

"The holy journey made us" – Journey as a biographical rupture

For both Karelian evacuees and international refugees, the journey was a biographical rupture that signified an end to a part of their life and a beginning of a new phase (cf. Savolainen 2012). For Karelians, the period of instability lasted for many years. Many of them took the journey away from Karelia twice. Families typically left from Karelia for the first time in 1939 or 1940 and stayed in many places before finding a more long-term accommodation. About 70 percent (and almost all my interviewees) subsequently returned to Karelia during the Continuation War, often finding their home burned to the ground or otherwise in poor condition. Karelians were forced to leave again, this time permanently, in 1944, when Finland reached the Interim Peace Treaty with the Soviet Union and parts Finnish Karelia (along with some other areas in Finland) were ceded to the Soviet Union. Hence, for the people I interviewed, the journey actually represented an extended period of instability and movement back and forth between Karelia and the rest of Finland and from one domicile to another during their childhood (see also Näre & Kirves 2007).

Ulla Savolainen (2015) and Anna-Kaisa Kuusisto-Arponen (2012) have observed that a certain kind of restlessness often appears in Karelians' narratives. You could see a similar theme occurring occasionally in my interviews as well, at least in the case of the Karelians, who were able to observe their journey from a longer temporal distance. For instance, one of my interviewees, Tilda,[3] suggested that she has been interested in travelling around the world because of her experience as an evacuee:

> *Tilda: Yes, we have all been laughing and saying that we have been like gypsies of the time (...) We have been cast as gypsies, in this life, so we have to keep moving [laughs].*
>
> *Johanna: So, you feel like it has somehow influenced you in that way, that you have remained mobile, or how could we say it?*
>
> *Tilda: Yeah, that one must go on and see the world (...).*[4]

This sense of restlessness could be positively or negatively valued depending on the interviewee's life experiences. It could be associated positively with an ability to easily adapt to new places or to be interested in seeing new places. Tilda, for example, did not see her need to see the world as a negative characteristic. However, restlessness could also carry a more negative feeling of homelessness, of not being able to become rooted in any place.

Furthermore, the journey represented a sudden end to their childhood in Karelia, which many of the interviewees described as very idyllic. As Outi Fingerroos (2010, 175) writes, quoting the writer Elina Karjalainen, "the lost Karelia was like a world of happy people, where the sun was so warm and bright". In a way, the image of Karelia remained "frozen in time" in many Karelians' memories (see also Kuusisto-Arponen 2008). As the journey narrative was told to me decades after it happened, the fixity of peacetime in

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[3] All names are pseudonyms.

[4] The original Finnish transcription: "Tilda: Joo, siitä kaikki on nauranu että me ollaan oltu sen ajan mustalaisia. (...) Mustalaiseks on kato luotu niin, tässä elämässä, nii liikkua täytyy [naurua]. Johanna: Teistä tuntuu että se on jotenkin vaikuttanut silleen, että teillä on jäänyt semmonen liikkuvuus tai miksi sitä vois sanoa? Tilda: Joo semmonen kato että täytyy kulkee ja nähdä maailmaa (...)."

their childhood Karelia was contrasted with the mobility of the wartime. The "movement" in their stories did not, thus, relate only to the actual physical journey from Karelia but also, in a metaphoric sense, to the years of instability and uncertainty. As Olga, one of my Karelian interviewees, who was seven years old when the family fled from Karelia for the first time, explained when pondering the thought of being able to go back to the home village:

> *Sometimes I have heard someone saying that they wouldn't like to go back [to Karelia]. But if I were younger, I would go, if an opportunity arose. There are those beloved sandy beaches and everything. It was the happy period in life. After that, it was just drifting around, here and there. One has to be satisfied to have a roof over the head (...). [They were] the seven happiest years of my life.*[5]

In the interviews with the Iraqi refugees, their childhood or other life phases in Iraq were discussed only briefly. Nevertheless, the journey signified to them a temporal rupture where their life took a new course, and they also felt that they changed as a result of the journey experience. Of course, many emotions felt during the journey were valued as negative: fear, uncertainty, coldness, pain. However, there were also examples of the journey experienced as an adventure or as an event that brought a sense of independence and meaning in life. For example, Rania, a woman in her 20s from Iraq, reflected on her journey as follows:

> *Of course it is so hard, especially for a young girl who hasn't done anything on her own... Women in Iraq, of course, here is a powerful woman who can do many things but these kinds of steps for me, it was so huge to take alone, like be in the sea alone (...). It was, I feel like I really grew up through that trip, like even my thoughts, the way I think, it was like completely changed, now when I see myself how I react to something, now it is totally different.*

Rania was courageous to take the journey alone as a young woman. She felt extremely scared and vulnerable at many points during the journey, but in the end, strove to find a meaning in her experiences. Aamir, a man in his 30s from Iraq, also found that the journey experience gave him strength to face other adversities in life. Many times during the interview he highlighted that he had become a more "open-minded" person during and after the journey, as he met people of different backgrounds with the same goal

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[5] The original Finnish transcription: "Joskus mää olen kuullut joku on sanonut ettei hän ainakaan haluais mennä takasin. Mut jos oisin nuorempi niin kyllä mää lähtisin, jos tulis semmonen tilaisuus että pääsis. Siellä on ne rakkaat hiekkarannat ja kaikki. Se on se onnellinen elämänaika. Sitten se oli tätä kulkemista, sinne tänne. Ei tässä voi olla muutaku tyytyväinen, että on sentään katto pään päällä. (...) Seitsemän onnellisinta vuotta elämässä."

of seeking safety in Europe. In the following quote, with the pronoun "we," he refers to refugees and asylum seekers with similar journey experiences:

> *(W)e didn't talk about this before. (...) But now, we are healing from the memories. From the trauma. So yeah. We made it! (...) Even many times, when we had some, you know everybody has ups and downs. So, when we feel downs (...), I say, hey, I made it when I was in the sea. So, everything is gonna be fine.*

Later in the interview he continued:

> *It is like a holy journey (...). It made us, in a way... in a different way, we were different in our life (...), we are more enlightened than before. (...) Personally, I learned many things by not judging others before to know the difficulties they had in their own lives, about tolerance, about sharing (...). Patience, patience was the most important thing that I learned, that I have to patient.*

The quotes show how Rania and Aamir felt that the journey changed them in a more permanent way. BenEzer and Zetter (2014) have pointed out that the journey can be a "liminal zone" where social norms and roles can be breached. The journey undoubtedly increases migrants' vulnerability in many ways, and migrants' age, gender, and ethnicity, along with other intersecting factors, may make them more prone to mistreatment, harassment, and violence along the way (Gerard & Pickering 2013; Nardone & Correa-Velez 2016). The journey is an embodied and emotional experience that is also strongly informed by social relationships formed prior to or during the journey, as well as by power relations therein. There is, indeed, literature that brings out how especially women and children suffer traumatic events during their journey (e.g. Gerard & Pickering 2013). However, BenEzer and Zetter (2014) maintain that the journey has also capacity for empowerment. For Rania, this was indeed the case — she felt that she acquired a novel sense of independence.

This was also visible in some of the narratives of the Karelian evacuees. It should be noted that the temporal difference between the first and second departure from Karelia was about five years. During this time, many of my interviewees matured into adolescence. Many remembered the second journey more clearly, as they were already older. In addition, many had more responsibilities during this journey. For example, a couple of my female interviewees had been given the responsibility of walking the cattle from Karelia to the new place of settlement in Finland. In practice, this meant that the girls walked for long periods alone or with a group of girls with livestock to meet the family in an agreed destination. Despite being hard work, this gave many a sense of purpose and "carrying their weight" in the family's joint effort to move to a new place to live.

"The ten-hour walk, felt like minutes" – Journeys in time and place

The evacuation or refugee journey is conducted in physical spaces, through certain routes and modes of transportation. Temporally, the journey is characterized by periods of motion and stasis and varying tempos and durations (Griffiths, Rogers & Anderson 2013). In the journey narratives, spatial and temporal aspects intertwine with the emotional and embodied memories. Often memories are fragmented and rich in emotional detail. In addition, certain sensorial or perceptual memories are amplified, such as memories of smells, sounds, or colors. This is typical for memories of traumatic or emotionally charged events (for a review of research, see Crespo & Fernández-Lansac 2016), such as wartime memories.

In the narratives, there was often a clear difference between the *objective passage* of time and the *subjective experience* of time. The sense of a leg of journey taking a long time was often associated with circumstances where the journeyers felt stuck in crammed spaces. The lack of space and the associated sensorial load — smells, sounds (noise or silence), and the way the journeying felt in the body (e.g. blisters on the feet, boat rocking on the waves, train vibrating on the tracks) — together produced a feeling that the journey took a long time. For the Karelian interviewees, as they were children at the time and the event happened some 70—80 years ago, it was often difficult to estimate how *long* the journey took in reality. The most vivid memory for many was the journey that was taken by train in a cattle wagon in 1939 or 1940. These trains were packed with people, and the sanitary conditions were poor. In addition, most people left in the heart of the winter. Almost all remembered the trains being very cold, as the heaters in the train were insufficient to keep the passengers warm. The memories of the journey were filled with fragmented sensorial observations. For instance, Elvi, born in 1936, who was four years old during the family's first journey from Karelia, reminisces her train experience as follows:

> *And then my sister, three years older than me, she was wearing a red hat, and I was pulling it off her head, so that the bombers would not see it. I knew somehow that that kind of a thing would be visible from the plane. (...) And then we took the cattle wagon. It was dark and a lot of people. We lay on the floor there. (...) I remember, that it was so dark and I was scared, but I was able to be next to my mom, so that was good of course. And then, a small baby was crying there, it was only two weeks old, it didn't survive the trip. Of course it didn't because there was no warmth whatsoever.*[6]

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[6] The original Finnish transcription: "Ja sitku mun kolme vuotta vanhempi sisko, hänellä oli punanen lakki päässä ja mää olin sitä repimässä pois ettei se näy koneeseen. Mää olin tienny jostai että semmonen näkyy lentokoneeseen... Ja sit mentiin tämmösessä härkävaunussa. Siellä oli pimeetä ja ihmisii. Maattiin ihan lattialla siellä. (...) Muistan, että oli ihan pimeetä ja pelotti, mutta sai olla äidin kainalossa, nii se oli hyvä tietenkin. Ja sitten, joku pieni lapsi itki siellä, se oli 2 viikkoo vanha vaan, eikä selviytyny siitä reissusta. Ei tietenkään ku ei ollu mitään lämmintä kerta kaikkiaan."

As the quote shows, what the woman remembered from the train trip in the cattle wagon as a four-year-old was that it was dark and cold, there were a lot of people in the train, the sound of the baby crying, and the sense of fright. The quote shows well how sensory information is melded together with the feeling of being scared, the feeling that the mother's presence alleviated. In addition, certain powerful memory objects, such as the sister's red hat, remained clearly in the woman's mind—she mentioned the hat several times in the interview.

The following quote is from Rania, who described her trip by a rubber boat from Turkey to Greece. For her, the sea journey in a crammed boat *felt* as the longest leg of the journey. In the quote, she describes her physical and emotional reactions to the journey, the way it felt in her body, and how the people around her crucially influenced the experience:

Rania: (...) there was so many people, we were 64, and 15 meters boat size.

Johanna: So, it was really full.

Rania: It was so full that you can't even sit. You can't breathe, it was so hot. I was like, oh, not able to breathe like many times and they had to carry me up there next to the driver, the boat driver... To get some fresh air, because I fainted like three times during that journey, of course, there is no oxygen, there is not enough food, there is not enough water, we were in that boat for I guess 20 hours.

Johanna: Yes, long time.

Rania: Yes, long time, and of course there are these kinds of waves coming, so he had just to put the motor off and wait a little in the sea. It was so hard to see only the sky and the sea around you.

Johanna: There was no like land or....

Rania: Nothing, nothing, nothing, and of course there are kids who are crying. It was not so nice feeling... Everyone was just reading Al Quran, like trying to pray to God, so (...) you can see like old people are so scared, and you can hear from others like we have tried like three times and then the Turkish guard, they caught us and sent us to Turkey, let's hope for the best! When you hear this kind.... Oh my god! Like... it might happen to us and feeling the waves when you are sitting on that floor in the boat. Feeling that is so scary.

Johanna: I guess you really feel it when you were sitting there.

Rania: Yes. It is so scary.

In addition to the people around her that made Rania feel scared — people praying, children crying, people telling about their earlier, unsuccessful attempts to reach Greece — also the sea in its expansiveness was frightening, as she could not see any lights or the shore. Rania told me that after the journey, she could not go near any body of water or eat fish or seafood, and she was not the only one with such experiences. The traumatic nature of the sea journey — that many migrants are forced to take, as migration to Europe has become increasingly difficult — is clearly visible in many of the interview narratives.

In addition to the crammed boats and trains, several interviewees — both Karelians and Iraqi refugees — described walking long distances, which left strong bodily memories. Elyas, a man from Iraq, reminisced his walk in a forest in Germany in a group of a few asylum seekers in the following way:

> *I felt as if I was ill... it was like something unconscious, going to the unknown... I felt it went so fast. So, the ten-hour walk, felt like minutes. Nowadays I am incapable of walking for like ten hours. It felt like a coma. (...) It was so dark when we were walking, it was so dark so that you couldn't see anything. The trees were entwined with each other, and high. (...) We were holding hands while walking, we cut off our breaths, because we feared that a wild animal might sense our presence. (...) I just thought to myself: my mom should be asleep by now; does she feel what I feel at the moment?*

This quote shows, on the one hand, how a trip that actually took a time and required a great amount of physical endurance — walking for ten hours — felt to him, in retrospect, as going by very fast, in minutes. He also noted that in regular circumstances, he would not be able to take that kind of a journey. For him, this walk was the most memorable part of the whole journey, along with the sea journey from Turkey, and, again, the physical and emotional sensations were intertwined. He was frightened, and he felt like he was ill — and in that moment, he was thinking of his mother in Iraq. Elvi, quoted earlier, was as a child able to find comfort in the train by being close to her mother. Elyas, trekking through Germany, was trying to find a connection to his mother in his mind. Studies focusing on memories of forced migrations point to the prominent role that family plays in these memories, as the basic functions of family — protection, safety, intimacy, cultural survival — are challenged or made impossible during migration (Dellios 2018). Families are often disconnected from each other during the refugee journey, and for many, this can be the most difficult or even traumatic experience (for more on refugees' family separation experiences, see Hiitola 2019; Leinonen & Pellander 2020).

As these examples illustrate, spatiality and temporality of the journey were experienced emotionally, socially, and through bodies. The journey left sensory memories that could bring back the "feeling" of the journey also during the interview. Many of the memories quoted above could be considered as traumatic, as they were loaded with sensory details and emotional content. What is important to note here is that to my knowledge, very few of my interviewees discussed these traumatic memories with a professional. In postwar Finland, the difficult memories and traumas of the war years were silenced, as the focus was on rebuilding the country (Näre & Kirves 2007). In recent years, there has been an interest in finding out how the silenced memories of the war have influenced families intergenerationally (see e.g. Orispää & Tuominen 2019). It seems that there are only limited resources available for mental health support for refugees and asylum seekers today. Even these early findings suggest that offering possibilities for dealing with the traumatic journey memories could support refugees' adaptation and well-being.

Conclusion

This has been a preliminary look at some of the themes that have come up in my interviews on journey memories with Karelian evacuees and Iraqi refugees. While the focus in the interviews was, of course, on the past events, the interviewees were often constructing an image of themselves against the journey experience. Many of the older interviewees also used this opportunity to reflect one's life journey up to this day. Thus, the journey can become a metaphor for one's life story and a way to connect one's story to a larger narrative. The study supports earlier scholarship that emphasizes the journey as a transformative experience.

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Educational Paths of Migrant-Origin Students[1]

Maili Malin

Introduction

Educational pathways for young people with a foreign background are fragmented and their learning skills are weaker compared to the native population according to both international and domestic studies. Migrant-origin young people are less likely to continue to secondary education than Finns, they drop out more often, and they have fewer university degrees than young people with a Finnish background (OECD 2015a-b, 2016a-b, 2018a-b; in Finland, e.g. Karppinen 2007; Kilpi 2010; Teräs & Kilpi-Jakonen 2013; Larja et al. 2015; Portin et al. 2017; Kalalahti et al. 2017a-b). The learning outcomes of young people with a foreign background are also worse than those of young people with a Finnish background (Kuusela et al. 2008; OECD 2013; Harju-Luukkainen et al. 2014; Lappi 2017; Kirjavainen & Pulkkinen 2017). Students with a mother tongue other than Finnish, Swedish or Sámi begin their secondary education at an older age and spend more time completing their studies than do native language speakers (Portin et al. 2017). A 2012 PISA study of dozens of countries found that differences in literacy, science, and mathematics between first-generation and second-generations students with a foreign background were greater in Finland than in most other countries (Harju-Luukkainen et al. 2014). These ethnic differences in learning skills are almost entirely explained by the migrant-origin family's lower socioeconomic status (Teräs & Kilpi-Jakonen 2013; Kilpi-Jakonen 2017) and by the fact that very few migrant-origin family members speak the language of school instruction — Finnish or Swedish — at home (Lappi 2017).

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However, children and adolescents with a foreign background have a more positive attitude towards learning on average, and they find schooling more meaningful than Finns (Räisänen & Kirvirauma 2011; Harju-Luukkainen et al. 2014). An OECD study found that young people with Iraqi, Russian, and Turkish backgrounds living in Finland are more likely to feel they belong to the school community than young people from the same groups living in other countries (OECD 2015b). Parents' attitudes towards education influence the child's educational motivation. In Finland, parents with a foreign background generally have a strong belief in the value of education and they want their children to educate themselves as much as possible because the education is free and of high quality. Migrant-origin young people themselves also emphasized that they seek a good education because that will make it possible for them to find a good job (Teräs et al. 2010). Still, the effects of limited parental educational achievements or no education at all are often passed down from parents to children (Kärkkäinen 2004), including among families with an immigrant background (Larja et al 2015).

The education paths of children and young people with a foreign background involve many migrant-related issues that should be taken into account with respect to ethnic Finnish students. These issues are parental pre- and post-migration material and cultural resources, the degree of parental integration into the host society, the child's pre-migration school history, multilingualism in the family, how a child learns the school language (Arvonen 2011), and how well Finnish services function with each family. How successfully the school system and general policies concerning living conditions take these migrant-related factors into account is reflected in the educational path of migrant-origin children and adolescents, in their completion of degrees at different educational levels, in their school performance, and subsequently in their work position in early adulthood.

Parents from developing, low-income countries have a lower level of education than migrant-origin parents from more developed, high-income countries and native parents (e.g., Larja & Sutela 2015; Sutela 2015). Parents' socio-economic status gradually improves with increasing years of residence as they learn the host country's language and acquire the necessary professional skills for local labor market, which improves their chances of finding employment (Larja & Sutela 2015; Sutela 2015). The socio-economic position of Finland's largest immigrant population, those of Russian origin, is still weaker than the native population in terms of income and occupational status, although they often have a relatively high level of education when moving to Finland (Martelin et al. 2012).

Education has numerous benefits for both young people and for all society. Secondary and tertiary level education increases the likelihood that young adults will have access to more meaningful jobs, better pay, the respect of others, and better living conditions than those who have little or no education beyond compulsory level education. In local labor markets these days, relatively few low-paid jobs are available for those with only a primary school degree (Myrskylä 2011). Educated people have healthier lifestyles, live longer, and have better health than those with little education (Lahelma et al. 2004; Kestilä et al. 2006; Martelin et al. 2014).

A study by Lehtovaara (2016) found that Muslim youth feel that education helps them to cope in general in Finland and that education gives them opportunities to move abroad for work. Having a transnational community abroad makes it easy for them to choose where to live and work after secondary or tertiary education. Some of the young people said that they can fulfill the expectations of their parents by having degrees. In the same way, with a Finnish education they are able to help people in their parents' country of origin, for example in development cooperation projects (Lehtovaara 2016). Another study found that younger children view older siblings who are successful in their studies as good role models (Steel, Lasonen, & Sannino 2010). Foreign-origin ninth-grade students reported that they like going to school more than did ethnic Finnish students. They also reportedly have a higher orientation towards learning new material compared to native language speakers. Foreign-origin youths do though experience learning difficulties when following instructions, working in teams, in writing and reading tasks, and in coping with schoolmates and teachers. This finding highlights an interesting paradox: foreign-origin boys reportedly value and trust more in education than do Finns, although at the same time they experience more difficulties in learning than others (Kalalahti et al. 2017a).

In an equal school system, all students have the opportunity to participate and succeed in their studies regardless of their background. The Finnish education system aims to provide equal educational opportunities to all children and young people regardless of their home background (e.g., Varjo & Kalalahti 2016). In general, society can contribute to educational equality by reducing inequalities between population groups and by preventing socio-economic segregation of neighborhoods. For disadvantaged families with a Finnish or foreign background, residential areas with many social problems, high unemployment, negative attitudes towards school, and insecurity pose additional challenges to the upbringing and education of children (Teräs & Kilpi-Jakonen 2013). Still, municipalities can influence the composition of pupils in public neighborhood schools through their housing policies so that families with different socio-economic backgrounds are settled in the same area (Bernelius 2011, 2013; Tervonen 2017).

The City of Helsinki allocates additional funding to schools according to the number of migrant-origin children in the school district and according to the income level of the population in the district. The extra funding helps both boys with a Finnish background and young people with a foreign background obtain an upper secondary level education (Silliman 2017). In the Nordic countries, the differences in learned skills between schools are small. In Finland, school-related factors explain little about the knowledge gap between Finnish-origin and foreign-origin students (Harju-Luukkainen et al. 2014; Kirjavainen & Pulkkinen 2017).

One aim of an equal education system is that a student's performance depends solely on his/her abilities, which he/she can influence through his/her will and effort. The pupil's school performance should not be influenced by the living conditions of the child or adolescent or by characteristics of the pupil beyond his/her control, such as her/his sex, the socio-economic status of the family, migration background, family type or area of residence (OECD 2016b). On the other hand, if the parents of the child have a serious long-term illness and/or have substance abuse problems and/or if the family lives in poverty, no school system alone can equalize the learning possibilities of pupils. Other support measures are needed for adults and children in such families (e.g., Tervonen 2017).

Teaching the language of instruction at school for children whose home language is different than one of the two official national languages is an important structural factor in the school system, making possible the learning of non-Finnish-speaking children (Arvonen 2011). Learning a school language is both an object of learning and a medium for non-native students to learn school subjects. Thus, non-Finnish-speaking pupils have to work many times harder than native speakers since they must learn both the language of instruction and the content of each school subject (Kyttälä et al. 2013). Understandably, when a child's home language and the language of instruction at school differ, the child's competence in school is weaker (Kirjavainen & Pulkkinen 2017). This is particularly true among first-generation school children with foreign backgrounds, of whom only 11 percent had the same mother tongue as the language of instruction, but it also concerns many second-generation children as well, of whom only 28 percent speak Finnish, Swedish or Sámi at home (Lappi 2017).

This study focuses on the relationship between young adults' immigration background and completing the post-compulsory education. Additionally, it focuses on when they began and whether they dropped out or completed a degree at a university of applied sciences or university studies using registry data. The study covers all foreigners born in 1971—1999 who lived in Finland in 1990—2015.

Study subjects and methods

This study is a part of a Nordic benchmarking study on education pathways, labor market participation, and health among immigrant-background persons born in 1971—1999, the first generation of whom moved to the Nordic countries as underage persons (www.cage.ku.dk). The countries included in the NordForsk-funded project are Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland.

The Population Register Center (PRC) provided personal data on all persons with a foreign origin born in the years 1971—1999 and who had moved to Finland as minors and lived permanently in Finland from 1990 to 2015. In the other Nordic countries, available information is based on the first residence permit, which was used to identify persons with a refugee background and other migrant background. Unfortunately, this information is not available in Finland, and therefore, the country of birth was used as an indicator of refugee status. All persons from countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (except South Africa), the Middle East, such as Iran, Iraq, and Afghanistan, the countries of the former Yugoslavia, while those who moved to Finland from Chile in the 1970s and from Vietnam in the 1980s were defined as persons with a "refugee" background. In addition, Cambodia, Myanmar/Burma, Laos, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan were identified as refugee-sending countries.

The PRC also provided personal data from other persons born abroad between 1971 and 1999 who had moved to Finland as minors. This group includes those born in the geographical area of Europe (except the former Yugoslavia) and those born in the former Soviet Union, namely Russia and Estonia. We also formed a host population comparison group based on the PRC data, which we matched to first-generation persons with a refugee origin in terms of age (one boy and one girl). We defined persons with a Finnish background as those born in Finland with both parents having been born in Finland and who have listed Finnish, Swedish, or Sámi as their mother tongue. In addition, the PRC provided personal data on all second-generation refugees and others with an immigrant background born in Finland in the years 1986—1999. They were defined as persons with both parents (or the only known parent) having been born in a refugee country or abroad. Thus, comparative information was available for 1990—2015 on all persons born abroad between 1971 and 1999 and born in Finland to parents with a foreign background.

The PRC data were combined with Statistics Finland's records on post-compulsory studies and degrees, main activities, socio-economic status (income, occupation, employment), and area of residence between 1990 and 2015. Information on the education, income, and socio-economic status of the parents was also added. Those who have moved from Finland (n=6,728) were excluded from the study. Though some of the emigrants may have moved back to Finland, only information on their initial immigration to Finland was available. In addition, the study population was restricted to include only those who had moved to Finland as minors before 2005 so that their secondary and tertiary education could be meaningfully assessed. Table 1 shows the numbers of the different study subjects by generation.

Thus, the first-generation study subjects were 16—44 years old and the second generation 16—29 years old in 2015. The data were analyzed mainly by generation and migrant background. We also present results for those with first-generation refugee

Table 1. Foreign-born (1971–1999) and Finland-born (1986–1999) migrant background study subjects and ethnic Finnish (born in 1971–1999) comparison group.

Background	Numbers
Refugee background 1st generation	8,786
Refugee background 2nd generation	4,381
Other migrant origin 1st generation	13,583
Other migrant origin 2nd generation	3,209
Finnish background	36,458
All	**66,417**

backgrounds according to the most typical countries of origin. Those persons with second-generation immigrant backgrounds are quite young for the purposes of this study, as some of them were still studying in 2015.

Statistics Finland's Study Database contains records of the degrees obtained by persons between 1990 and 2015, and the Degree Database contains all the completed degrees coded according to the Unesco International Standard Classification of Education (ISCED) and the year of completion. ISCED is a classification system developed for international comparison. Here, we use ISCED education data, which has the following values:

- 3 = upper secondary education (upper secondary and vocational education, basic vocational qualifications);
- 4 = specialized occupational degree;
- 5 = vocational lower degree;
- 6 = university of applied science degree, engineering degree, forestry engineer, sea captain degree, and bachelor's level degree from a university;
- 7 = higher university of applied science degree, master's level degree from a university;
- 8 = licentiate and doctorate degree from a university.

We defined persons who had completed an upper secondary level degree as those who had studied at the upper secondary level with a registered ISCED score of 3—8 and completed their studies before turning 25 years of age. We assumed that the person had completed an upper secondary degree before completing a university or university of applied science degree. We defined a person as having dropped out of upper secondary school when she/he had been enrolled in upper secondary level education but did not have a degree or registered qualification by the age of 25. Some of the young people were still studying for a secondary or higher education degree at the age of 25, which was taken into account as a separate group. A young person who had not commenced any upper secondary level studies at all was defined based on the following criteria: she/he completely lacks study and diploma records for (a) the highest degree completed, (b) other ISCED qualifications completed, and (c) the highest level of education pursued, namely those who had only completed elementary school.

Completion of upper secondary studies was also examined according to the age of arrival in Finland, as it is known from earlier studies that the older a person is when she/he moves to Finland, the more challenging it is to attend school, especially for those with little school history (Alitolppa-Niitamo 2004; Teräs et al. 2010). In addition, graduates with a higher education level were also surveyed. The age limit for passing the qualification was set at 30 years of age. This applies only to the first generation, as second-generation persons are too young to be considered here. We also present the results from other Nordic countries in terms of the most common countries of origin (Dunlavy et al. 2020) to see whether there is any variation in completed degrees based on the most common countries of origin within the Nordic countries. A university or university of applied sciences graduate's ISCED code ranged from 6 to 8 and was completed before the age of 30. A young person may have pursued many degrees at one point or another. Here, we took into account only the highest degree.

Results

There were slightly more boys than girls in the study population, with a particularly large gender gap among refugees with a first-generation origin (7.6% more boys than girls, Table 2). Both refugee-origin and other migrant-origin persons had migrated to Finland on average at the same age. One-third of the respondents had moved to Finland by the age of 6, 41—42 percent by the age of 7—12, and less than a third had moved to Finland late in their teenage years, 13—17 years of age. The latter age group often faces more challenges in adapting to school in their new home country than those who moved to country as a small child (e.g., Alitolppa-Niitamo 2004). Most emigrants in the study fell into the category of those with other migrant backgrounds, approximately one-fifth of whom had moved from Finland, but also about one-tenth of those with a refugee origin who had been born in Finland had emigrated from the country.

Table 2. Gender, age of immigration, and emigration from Finland by migrant background.

	Refugee background 1st generation (n=8,786)	Refugee background 2nd generation (n=4,381)	Other migrant origin 1st generation (n=13,583)	Other migrant origin 2nd generation (n=3,209)	Finnish background (n=36,458)
Gender, %					
Female	46.2	48.8	48.9	47.8	49.8
Male	53.8	51.2	51.1	52.2	50.2
All	100	100	100	100	100
Age when moved to Finland, mean (SD)	9.2 (4.5)		9.3 (4.5)		
Less than 6 years old	31.7		30		
7–12 years old	40.7		41.9		
13–17 years old	27.6		28		
All	100		100		
Emigrated from Finland, %	6.5	11.2	17.2	17.6	1.2

Most of the refugees living in Finland had come from Somalia (21.6%), the former Yugoslavia (20.8%), and Iraq (17.9%) (Table 3). In the second generation, the most common parental countries of birth were, respectively, Somalia, Vietnam, and the countries of the former Yugoslavia.

Table 3. Refugee background countries, %.

Country of birth for 1st generation/ parents' country of birth for 2nd generation	Refugee background 1st generation (n=8,786)	Refugee background 2nd generation (n=4,381)
Afghanistan	6.3 (n=549)	0.1
Iraq	17.9 (n=1,568)	9.4
Iran	9.1 (n=800)	4.3
Somalia	21.6 (n=1,896)	34.2
Former Yugoslavia	20.8 (n=1,825)	18.8
Vietnam	9.5 (n=833)	20.2
Other	15 (n=1,315)	13.1
All	**100**	**100**

The first generation of non-refugee migrants had the highest number of upper secondary qualifications by the age of 25 (60.8%, Figure 1). In general, young people of Finnish origin (73.7%) had the highest number of qualifications. Similarly, non-refugees born in Finland (38.3%) were at the lowest level of those who had completed an upper secondary level education, but in 2015 they were quite young, they were still in the early stages of their studies, or most of them were still in their 20s. The group with the highest percentage of those leaving school early at the upper secondary level was first-generation refugees (23.1%). The group with the greatest percentage of young persons



Figure 1. Upper secondary level education before the age of 25 by migration background and generation, %.

who had not started upper secondary school at all first-generation refugees (21.9%). The number of early school leavers at the upper secondary level was the lowest among young people with a Finnish background (8%).

Age at the time of immigration influenced the study path of young people, as those who had moved to Finland as refugees at the age of 13–17 graduated far less often than those in other groups and often had had not started their secondary education at all. Approximately one in four of those migrating between the ages of 7 and 17 had dropped out of upper secondary school. Of those who had moved to Finland as a young child (less than 6 years of age), the majority were still studying at the age of 25. Among those who moved to the country at 7–12 years of age, most had already graduated (46.5%). Other foreign-born migrants had graduated at higher rates than those with a refugee origin, regardless of age. Other migrant-origin persons who had moved to Finland as young children interrupted their studies less often than those who moved to Finland at an older age (Figure 2).

A matriculation degree is the most general upper secondary degree. Migrant-origin youth born outside Finland had the highest proportion of those with a matriculation degree (34.4%), while refugee-origin persons born in Finland had the lowest percentage (18.9%) of high school graduates (Table 4). Over a quarter of Afghan, Iranian, and Vietnamese youth had completed a matriculation degree, while only 12% of Somali youth had a high school diploma. However, almost one in four Somali girls had a matricula-



Figure 2. Upper secondary level education before the age of 25 among first-generation migrants by age of settlement, %.

tion degree, because, in general, girls with a refugee background successfully completed high school more often than boys, except for Iranians.

In addition to day school education, an upper secondary education degree can also be completed via apprenticeship training, which was most common among young people with a Finnish background (9.9%) and among first-generation, non-refugee migrant youth (8.1%) (Table 4). Young people with a migration background had significantly less apprenticeships training than other groups. There is no dead end in the Finnish educational system since a person can also move from an apprenticeship into higher education. Young people born abroad completed their upper secondary education on average one year older than those with a Finnish background, whereas migrant-origin persons born in Finland completed their studies slightly younger than those persons of Finnish origin.

Table 4. High school graduates, apprenticeship training, and average age of graduates by migrant background.

	Refugee background 1st generation (n=8,786)	Refugee background 2nd generation (n=4,381)	Other migrant origin 1st generation (n=13,583)	Other migrant origin 2nd generation (n=3,209)	Finnish background (n=36,458)
Matriculation examination done, %	19.6	18.9	34.4	27.1	42.1
Apprenticeship training in upper secondary education, %	4.8	0.4	8.1	0.8	9.9
Mean age (SD) when completed the highest degree	22 (3.4)	19.5 (1.0)	21.6 (3.4)	19.5 (1.1)	20.7 (3.2)
Mean age (SD) when completed the university or university of applied sciences education	26.7 (3.1)	24.3 (1.6)	26.5 (2.9)	24.1 (1.6)	26 (3.0)

In terms of those with a refugee background by country of origin, the group with the highest number of upper secondary school graduates was persons from the former Yugoslavia (55.4%), while those from Somalia often did not graduate (27.3%). Refugees born in Somalia (31%) and Afghanistan (16.6%) had the highest dropout rates. Approximately one-third of Somali and Vietnamese adolescents had not started any upper secondary studies at the age of 25 (33.8% and 27.5%, respectively). In all groups with foreign and Finnish backgrounds, women outperformed men, with the exception of Vietnamese men. On the other hand, more women with refugee backgrounds had not pursued a secondary education at all compared to men (except Iranians). For example, 39.3% of Somali-born women had not started on upper secondary education at the age of 25, compared with approximately 30% of Somali-born men. This gender gap was greatest among those from the most typical "refugee countries." Refugee-origin men discontinued their studies more often than women. Somali-born men had the highest dropout rates (36.5%) among refugee-origin youths.

When comparing the drop-out rates among those in upper secondary school in different Nordic countries, the results are quite similar (Figure 3). In Sweden, all persons with a refugee background and born abroad drop out less often from upper secondary school. Still, Somalis have the highest drop-out rates in every Nordic country.

What is worrying with respect to gender equality is that in all foreign-origin groups, women more often than men had not started upper secondary school at all by the age of 25. At the primary education level, it would be good for teachers to more intensively support, motivate and guide girls to continue with their education. On the other hand, as men in all groups discontinued their upper secondary school education more often than women, more targeted emphasis should also be placed on men's upper secondary education and support than is currently the case.

We also looked at the percentages of those completing degrees at the university and university of applied sciences by the age of 30 (Figure 4). In general, those with a foreign background completed post-secondary degrees significantly less often than those with a Finnish background. Immigrants with a non-refugee background (25.5%) had the highest proportion of those with university of applied sciences or university qualifications. Young people with a foreign origin but born in Finland had graduated



Figure 3. Drop-out rates from upper secondary school before the age of 25 for those from the most common refugee-sending countries in the different Nordic countries, % (Dunlavy et al. 2020).



Figure 4. Educational paths before the age of 30 by migrant background and country of origin, %.

from a university of applied sciences or university less than two years younger than Finnish-born and foreign-born students (Table 4). Nearly half of those from the "other immigrant background" had completed their secondary education before the age of 30. More than half of those born in the former Yugoslavia and in Afghanistan had completed their upper secondary school education by the age of 30.

As among those at 25 years of age, in all groups under 30 women more often than men had completed a university of applied sciences or university degree (except for Vietnamese-born youth). But among those with a Finnish background and among the "other migrant" group, men more often had completed an upper secondary degree than women. As with those before 25 years of age, men discontinued their upper secondary school education more often than did women in all groups. Men with a refugee background had the highest dropout rates, one-third of whom had dropped out of upper secondary school before the age of 30. One-fifth of ex-Yugoslavian, Iranian and Afghan women had a university of applied sciences or university degree and about half of them had an upper secondary degree. Approximately a third of Iranian and Iraqi men and 43 percent of Afghan men had dropped out of upper secondary school. As many as 44 percent of Somali men had dropped out of school and 43% of Somali women had not started their studies at all by the age of 30.

Discussion

The Finnish education system is said to be one of the best in the OECD countries (Kups et al. 2019, 10), but according to this study it is not the best for first- or second-generation migrants, despite the fact that education policy aims to equalize the learning opportunities for all. Supportive actions in schools do not appear to be effective enough at bridging the educational gap between migrant-origin and Finnish-origin young people.

The decision of whether to transition from compulsory education to upper secondary education is a critical phase in a young person's future. In this transitional phase, a young person chooses his/her study career and starts studying for his/her future (first) profession (Teräs & Kilpi-Jakonen 2013; Holopainen et al. 2017). Of all compulsory school graduates in 2012, 92 percent moved on to the upper secondary level (half to high school and 42% to vocational schools) while eight percent did not continue pursuing any degree-related education (SVT 2012). At this juncture, public policy seeks to regulate and manage young people so that as many as possible apply for, enter, and begin their studies at the upper secondary level and also graduate. However, study paths from basic education to the upper secondary education level can be quite winding or intermittent, as several Finnish studies demonstrate that youth with immigrant backgrounds tend to apply less to upper secondary school and drop out more often than native Finns (e.g., Kilpi 2010; Kilpi-Jakonen 2017).

In 2015, less than 50 percent of non-native speakers and 76 percent of native speakers had completed some degree by the age of 20 after having completed primary school (Portin et al. 2017). Another study found that migrant-origin youth aged 18 to 24 left early from upper secondary school twice as often as native Finns (18% male and 11% female compared to 8% and 4%, respectively) (Larja et al. 2015).

The results of this study confirm the previous findings. In following the educational path of cohorts born between 1971 and 1999 up to the age of 25, we discovered that those persons with a foreign origin had less secondary education qualifications than Finnish-origin young people (38.3% — 60.8% vs. 73.7%). The number of graduates increased by the age of 30, when 75.3 percent of those in the non-refugee origin group and 54.4 percent from a refugee origin group had completed upper secondary education.

However, according to this register study, young people with a foreign background completed their post-compulsory studies less often than their Finnish-origin counterparts, regardless of the young person's reason for immigration or whether the young person was born in Finland or abroad. In this study, foreign-born immigrants had moved to Finland as minors. The educational paths of those with a refugee background who had settled in Finland under the age of six were more positive than for those aged 13—17. The number of those leaving early from upper secondary school was highest among first-generation persons with a refugee background, with 23 percent having dropped out of education by the age of 25 and one in four by the age of 30. Of first-generation youth with a refugee background, about one in five had never started upper secondary school in Finland.

Those born in Somalia had the lowest level of upper secondary education (27.3%) and had the highest proportion of those who did not apply for upper secondary school at all (33.8%). As many as 40.4 through 55.4 percent of young people from other refugee countries had completed upper secondary school by the age of 25. Somali-background youth also had the highest dropout rates (31%) compared to other refugee-background adolescents. By the age of 30, about one-third of Somali-born young people had at least an upper secondary degree. Somali-born women, however, were more qualified than Somali men, whose upper secondary school dropout rate was alarmingly high. By the age of 25, 36.5 percent of Somali men had dropped out of upper secondary school, whereas 44.3 percent had dropped out by the age of 30 (versus 23.1% and 26.6%, respectively, of Somali girls). On the other hand, of those who had not started upper secondary school at all before the age of 25 (39.3%) and before the age of 30 (43.4%), we found the highest numbers to be among Somali women. In Nordic comparisons, young people of Somali background drop out more than those from any other group. Still, in Sweden they drop out less than in other Nordic countries.

Foreign-origin students have identified the following reasons for discontinuing their studies: difficulties in the use of language of instruction, lack in study skills, financial difficulties, and difficult family and life situations (Teräs et al. 2010). First-generation Somalis and their parents have fled from a collapsed society where children have little school history. Some parents are illiterate, and many parents received little education before moving to another country. Somali-origin people form the largest Muslim and African-origin group in Finland. They are also a visible minority group because of their skin color and style of dress, which may result in discrimination against them at school, in their neighborhoods, and in society in general (e.g., Seikkula 2017).

Similarly, young refugees from the former Yugoslavia and Afghanistan had the highest numbers of those pursuing an upper secondary education and less early school leavers before the age of 25. In the same way, by the age of 30, over 60 percent of Afghans, Iranians, and those from the former Yugoslavia had completed at least an upper secondary level education. Parents from the former Yugoslavia are more educated than Somali parents, which may explain the positive educational career of their children. They are also a "white" and "European" group, thus avoiding inequality of treatment based on their skin color and ethnicity (e.g., Seikkula 2017). The results are worrying, and their causes need to be explored further. There is urgent need for more supportive and effective actions taken on behalf of foreign-origin young people of a visible minority background at compulsory school so that it is easier for them to enter, commit to and graduate from upper secondary school and/or complete higher level studies.

In general, it would make more sense to compare the educational paths of migrant-origin young people born in Finland with the Finnish-origin population. Unfortunately, in our study second-generation, migrant-origin youths were too young for a fair comparison. A significant proportion of second-generation, migrant-origin youth were still studying in 2015. Still, this fairer comparison is troublesome due to the differences in home and school languages in migrant-origin families, as the home language for the majority of second-generation children is not Finnish or Swedish (Lappi 2017).

Since the living conditions of foreign-origin families are, on average, poorer compared to the native population and the educational level of parents is on average lower than that of Finns (Martelin et al. 2012; Larja & Sutela 2015), it would be better to adjust for parental socioeconomic status in comparison with the education of their offspring. On the other hand, when researchers standardized the socio-economic background of students in a 2012 PISA study, they still found differences in school performance between Finnish-origin and immigrant-origin youth, especially for the second generation (OECD 2016b). Further research is therefore needed on the link between parents' and families' socio-economic status and the educational pathways of young people with an immigrant background.

The teaching staff at schools have estimated that sufficient Finnish or Swedish language skills, motivation, successful integration of the family, and a positive attitude to education facilitate entry into upper secondary education for non-Finnish-speaking students. Good cooperation between home and school, professionalism of the teachers, support from the community, and positive role models also help young people to enter and commit to studying at the secondary school level (Teräs et al. 2010). According to experts, the fragmented structure of the transition to upper secondary education can easily cause a young person to fall by the wayside along this transitional path. It seems that educational guidance and support at the primary school level are not consistently able to address the specific needs of some young people with a migrant background (Holopainen et al. 2017). Young people with a foreign background need systematic and proactive support in choosing an upper secondary education path, committing to their studies, and completing their studies.

The mother's low level of education and the student's individual syllabus (usually refers to systematic support given in learning and limited learning content) have been found to have a negative effect on a young person's poor school performance, and that he/she often does not apply for upper secondary school or find a workplace 3.5 years after completing a primary level education (Savioja 2007). Among such young people, there was relatively high proportion of non-native speakers who had to compete for upper level study places with native speakers of Finnish and Swedish (Karppinen 2007; Savioja 2007; Karppinen & Savioja 2007). This competition for study places is challenging and somewhat unfair for young people with foreign backgrounds.

International evaluations of Finnish higher education have been critical of the highly selective entrance examination system into tertiary education. Our current system places too much stress on a student's academic skills in university and university of applied sciences studies. Admission examinations delay the start of studies and force applicants to sit out the intervening years against their will (Kups et al. 2019, 10).

On the other hand, the Finnish school system has been praised and acknowledged for its language-aware teaching methods and the comprehensive consideration of the whole life situation of children and adolescents in compulsory schools (Eurydice 2019). However, in spite of language-conscious teaching and young people's right to learn in their mother tongue and take Finnish/Swedish as a second language at school, the PISA 2012 test results showed quite significant differences between young people with foreign and Finnish backgrounds (Harju-Luukkainen et al. 2014).

The perceived well-being of young people at school affects their ability to learn. According to the research, young people with a foreign background are twice as likely to experience moderate or severe anxiety at school (20% vs. 10%), school burnout (19% vs. 10%), and being bullied (14% vs. 4%) than host-country students. Young people with a foreign background also experience more problems with the schoolwork than native Finns. Somali- and Iraqi-born youth (40% vs. 18%) are particularly affected by the atmosphere surrounding schoolwork (Matikka et al. 2015). These findings may account in part for our results that young people of Somali and Iraqi background, in particular, are less likely to apply for upper secondary school, or if they do apply, they drop out more often than others.

It could be that the educational paths of young people with an immigrant background will converge with the native population in the future, as their parents increasingly graduate from the Finnish educational system and find employment at the same level as natives. This convergence of learning outcomes and educational careers will also require a change in the school community so that foreign-origin pupils have positive and fair experiences at school with schoolmates and with teachers. As language-aware teaching deepens and young people do not experience discrimination and bullying so much at school, it is possible that educational opportunities will then be truly more equal in the future than they are today.

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Muuttajat, aluetalous ja alueellinen eriytyminen

Seppo Laakso

Johdanto

Vilkas nuoriin aikuisiin painottuva tulomuutto vaikuttaa monella tavalla työ- ja asuntomarkkinoihin, yritystoimintaan sekä alue- ja kunnallistalouteen muuton kohdealueilla, mutta myös lähtöalueilla. Maahanmuutto on saanut merkittävän roolin myös Suomen muuttoliikkeessä 1990-luvun alun jälkeen ja sen osuus on vahvistunut 2010-luvulla. Muuttajien sopeutuminen muuttoalueelle on pitkä prosessi, joka liittyy osana ihmisen työuraan, tulokehitykseen, asumisuraan ja asuntokunnan muodostukseen elinkaaren aikana.

Muuttoliikkeen viimeaikaisia trendejä[1]

Suomessa keskimäärin 5 prosenttia asukkaista muuttaa vuosittain kuntien välillä. Vuonna 2018 lähes 290 000 henkeä muutti kunnasta toiseen ja näistä muutoista lähes puolet oli maakuntien välisiä. Kuntien välisten muuttojen määrä on kasvanut yli viidenneksen vuodesta 2000 vuoteen 2018. Maahanmuutto toi Suomeen yli 31 000 ja maastamuutto vei yli 19 000 henkeä vuonna 2018, nettomuuton ollessa noin 12 000 henkeä. Maahanmuutto on kasvanut lähes kaksinkertaiseksi ja nettomuutto melkein viisinkertaiseksi vuoteen 2000 verrattuna.

Vilkkaimmin muuttavat nuoret aikuiset: 20—24-vuotiaista noin 20 prosenttia muuttaa yhden vuoden aikana kuntien välillä. Myös maahanmuutto painottuu vahvasti nuoriin aikuisiin. Muuttoalttius alenee iän myötä.

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1 Tilastotietojen lähde: Tilastokeskus

Suuret kaupunkiseudut saavat muuttovoittoa sekä maassamuutossa että maahanmuutossa. Suomen 70 seutukunnasta 13 sai muuttovoittoa ja 57 koki muuttotappiota vuonna 2018. Helsingin seudun lisäksi merkittävää muuttovoittoa saivat Tampereen ja Turun seutukunnat sekä muutama muu yliopistoseutu. Sen sijaan maahanmuutossa kaikki seutukunnat saivat muuttovoittoa, mutta kaksi kolmannesta siitä tuli kymmenelle kaupunkiseudulle, pelkästään Helsingin seudulle lähes 40 prosenttia koko maan muuttovoitosta.

Helsingin seudulle ja muille suurille yliopistoseuduille muuttajat painottuvat nuoriin aikuisiin. Heistä suuri osa on opiskelijoita ja työuran alkuvaiheessa olevia. Monet ovat tässä vaiheessa myös itsenäisen asumisuran alkupäässä. Kaikilla suurilla kaupunkiseuduilla kuntien väestökehitykseen vaikuttaa lisäksi vilkas maakunnan sisäinen muuttoliike, jonka keskeisiä piirteitä ovat nuorten aikuisten muutto kaupunkiseudun kehyskunnista keskuskaupunkeihin ja perheellistyneiden asuntokuntien muutto keskuskaupungeista kehyskuntiin. Edellinen muuttovirta on vilkastunut ja jälkimmäinen muuttovirta vaimentunut 2010-luvulla edelliseen vuosikymmeneen verrattuna.

Vilkas nuoriin aikuisiin painottuva muuttoliike vaikuttaa monella tavalla Helsingin seudun ja muiden kasvavien suurten kaupunkiseutujen työ- ja asuntomarkkinoihin, yritystoimintaan sekä alue- ja kunnallistalouteen. Muuttovoiton aikaansaama väestönkasvu lisää työvoiman tarjontaa, joka on aluetalouden kasvupotentiaalin keskeinen osatekijä. Talouden käännyttyä vuoden 2008 finanssikriisistä käynnistyneen pitkäaikaisen taantuman jälkeen kasvuun vuodesta 2016 alkaen, osaavan työvoiman saatavuudesta tuli pian akuutti ongelma monille yrityksille paitsi pääkaupunkiseudulla, myös maan muilla seuduilla.

Maahanmuuttajien sopeutuminen työmarkkinoille ja osin myös asuntomarkkinoille on osoittautunut ongelmalliseksi erityisesti turvapaikkaa hakeneille ja oleskeluluvan saaneille maahanmuuttajaryhmille. Taantumavuosina maahanmuuttajataustaisten työttömyys ja työvoiman ulkopuolelle jääminen kärjistyivät, mutta talouden käännyttyä nousuun heidän tilanteensa työmarkkinoilla on parantunut.

Muuttoliike vaikuttaa myös lähtöalueilla, erityisesti muuttotappioseuduilla. Nuorten aikuisten poismuutto vie alueilta inhimillisiä resursseja ja tulevaisuuden kasvupotentiaalia. Työvoiman tarjonta vähenee ja asuntokysyntä supistuu, mikä heijastuu muun muassa tyhjien asuntojen määrän lisääntymisenä. Työikäisen väestön väheneminen monilla seuduilla heikentää alueiden vetovoimaa yritysten kasvu- ja sijoittumisalueena. 2010-luvulla tämä ilmiö on vahvistunut useissa seutukaupungeissa ja maaseudulla, muun muassa Uudenmaan reuna-alueilla.

Tutkimuksen tavoite ja toteutus

Tämä artikkeli perustuu tutkimukseen "Muuttajat ja Uudenmaan aluetalous" (Laakso 2019). Tutkimuksen tavoitteena oli tuottaa uutta empiiristä tietoa muuttajien — kotimaisten ja maahanmuuttajien — sopeutumisesta Uudenmaan maakunnan seudullisille työ- ja asuntomarkkinoille pitkällä aikavälillä. Tutkimuksessa selvitettiin laajaan rekisteriaineistoon pohjautuvalla empiirisellä tutkimuksella kotimaisten muuttajien ja maahanmuuttajien sopeutumista seudullisille työ- ja asuntomarkkinoille pitkän ajan, 16 vuoden kuluessa. Työmarkkinoille sopeutumisessa näkökulmina ovat eritaustaisten muuttajien sijoittuminen työvoimaan sekä työllistyminen ja tulokehitys. Tutkimuksessa on tarkoituksena selvittää, miten työmarkkinoille ja asuntomarkkinoille sopeutumisen kehitysurat poikkeavat henkilön ominaisuuksien ja taustan mukaan. Tulomuuttajien vertailuryhminä ovat Uudenmaan seuduilla pitkään asuneiden saman ikäisten asukkaiden tila ja kehitys samana aikana. Tutkimuksessa erityisesti selvitetään ja kuvataan eri demografisten ja sosioekonomisten ryhmien välisiä eroja muuttajien sopeutumisurissa. Alueellinen näkökulma painottuu Helsingin seutuun.

Yhtenä näkökulmana tutkimuksessa on muuttoliikkeen yhteys Helsingin seudun asuinalueiden väliseen segregaatioon eli sosioekonomiseen eriytymiseen. Miten asuinalueille muuttavat uudet asukkaat ja poismuuttajat vaikuttavat sosioekonomisten kriteerien suhteen heikoimmassa asemassa olevien alueiden väestörakenteeseen sekä tulotasoon ja työllisyyteen?

Tutkimusta varten teetettiin Tilastokeskuksella pitkittäisaineisto Uudellemaalle, Uudeltamaalta ja Uudenmaan sisällä kuntien välillä muuttaneista henkilöistä. Lisäksi teetettiin otospohjainen verrokkiaineisto kaikista Suomen asukkaista. Aineistot rakennettiin Tilastokeskuksen työssäkäyntitilaston vuosiaineistoja ja muita rekisteritietoja yhdistelemällä. Aineistot kattavat vuodet 2000 2015. Tutkimusmenetelmät perustuvat sekä vertailuryhmien välisten ajallisten kehitysprofiilien erojen analyysiin että tilastollisiin mallianalyyseihin.

Miksi ihmiset muuttavat?

Muuttoliike perustuu lähtökohtaisesti yksilöiden valintoihin. Taloustieteellisessä kirjallisuudessa näitä valintoja selitetään useimmiten inhimillisen pääoman teoriaan pohjautuvilla malleilla. Muuttopäätösten takana nähdään yksilöiden pyrkimys mahdollisimman suuren hyvinvoinnin saavuttamiseen (tai hyödyn maksimointiin) elinkaaren aikana. Erityyppiset muuttoon liittyvät kustannukset (rahalliset ja henkiset) vähentävät muuttohalukkuutta. Nuorten kannustimet muuttamiseen koulutuksen ja työn perässä ovat siksi suurimmat. Useamman työssäkäyvän taloudessa muuttopäätökseen liittyvä optimointi on luonnollisestikin haastavampaa, helposti kuitenkin suurempia työmarkkina-alueita painottavaa. Työuran myöhemmissä vaiheissa muuton tuoma kokonaishyöty, kun muuttoon liittyvät kustannukset otetaan laajasti huomioon, ovat vähäisemmät. Nämä tekijät selittävät suurelta osin muuttamisen erittäin voimakasta valikoivuutta iän suhteen. Asuntomarkkinoiden hintakehityksen eriytyminen voi toimia osaltaan muuttoliikettä hidastavana tekijänä. Asuntojen korkeat vuokrat ja hinnat suurissa kaupungeissa rajoittavat tulomuuttoa. Myös ei-taloudelliset, psykologiset tekijät voivat merkittävästi vähentää muuttohalukkuutta (mm. Laakso & Loikkanen 2004; Vuori & Nivalainen 2012; Laakso & Lönnqvist 2019).

Muuttoliikkeen mekanismeja[2]

Muuttoliike on yleensä valikoivaa, ja sen seurauksena osaamispääomaa keskittyy harvoihin sijanteihin. Korkeammin koulutettujen osalta kannustimet liikkuvuuteen ovat usein suurimmat. Tutkimuskirjallisuuden perusteella korkeasti koulutetut hyötyvät erityisen paljon muiden korkeakoulutettujen läheisyydestä (Moretti 2012). Suurempien kaupunkiseutujen monipuoliset ja erikoistuneet työmarkkinat tarjoavat laajemmat työmahdollisuudet ja myös paremmat mahdollisuudet työpaikan vaihtoon myöhemmin (Dustmann & Glitz 2011; Bacolod ym. 2009).

Samalla kuitenkin hyvät työmahdollisuudet ja korkeampi ansiotaso sekä näiden seurauksena muodostuvat, elämälaatua nostavat elinympäristöön ja kulutusmahdollisuuksiin liittyvät tekijät kapitalisoituvat ainakin osittain asuntojen hintoihin ja vuokriin. Suurempien kaupunkiseutujen korkeammat asumiskustannukset vievätkin merkittävän osa, jopa kaiken, korkeamman ansiotason tuomasta välittömästä taloudellisesta hyödystä. Toisaalta työtilaisuuksien suurempi määrä, korkeampi palkkataso ja kaupunkien muut vetovoimatekijät voivat paikata näitä korkeista asumiskustannuksista syntyviä tappiota (Glaeser & Saiz 2004; Lewis & Peri 2015).

Ruotsissa tehdyn tutkimuksen (Korpi, Clark & Malmberg 2010) mukaan muutto suurille kaupunkiseuduille pienemmistä kaupungeista ja maaseudulta paransi muuttajien enemmistön työllisyyttä ja nosti tulotasoa verrattuna lähtöalueelle jäämiseen. Kuitenkin, kun suurten kaupunkiseutujen korkeammat asumiskustannukset otetaan huomioon, useimmille muuttamisen taloudellinen nettohyöty oli negatiivinen. Sen sijaan puhtaasti taloudellisilla kriteereillä kannattavinta oli muuttaa suurilta kaupunkiseuduilta pieniin kaupunkeihin. Tutkijoiden mukaan lyhyen aikavälin taloudellinen hyöty ei selitä suurta nettomuuttovirtaa suurille kaupunkiseuduille, vaan odotukset pitkän aikavälin taloudellisista hyödyistä sekä suurten kaupunkiseutujen muut vetovoimatekijät vaikuttavat huomattavasti muuttopäätöksiin.

Usein toistuva kysymys muuttoliikkeen osalta koskee sitä, seuraavatko työntekijät työpaikkoja vai työpaikat työntekijöitä. Perinteisesti työpaikkojen on nähty olevan syy väestön muuttoliikkeeseen. Koneellistuvan maatalouden myötä työvoimaa siirtyi teollisuuskaupunkeihin uusien työmahdollisuuksien perässä. Uudemmassa tutkimuskirjallisuudessa, myös kotimaisessa (mm. Tervo 2016), on kuitenkin osoitettu, että joidenkin ammattiryhmien osalta tilanne voi olla myös päinvastainen. Yritykset hakeutuvat sinne, missä niille on tarjolla osaavaa työvoimaa. Tämän tyyppinen muuttoliike voi sitten osal-

[2] Laakso & Lönnqvist (2019)

taan johtaa kasvavan paikallisen kysynnän kautta uusien työpaikkojen syntyyn esimerkiksi palvelusektorilla. Tämä puolestaan luo uutta muuttoa työn perässä. Prosessi on siis itseään vahvistava ja voi selittää väestön keskittymistä suuremmille kaupunkiseuduille.

Kaupunkitaloustieteessä kaupunkien synnyn ja kasvun keskeisiä selityksiä ovat niin sanotut keskittymisedut. Näitä etuja voi syntyä sekä yhden toimialan keskittymisen myötä että myös talouden monipuolisen tuotantorakenteen kehittymisen kautta. Tuottavuusetuja syntyy muun muassa yritys- ja toimi-alarajat ylittävien oppimisprosessien kautta sekä kasvavien erikoistumismahdollisuuksien kautta. Toisaalta tämän kaltainen taloudellinen aktiviteetti ja väestön keskittyminen tuottaa myös vastavoimia, jotka voivat hidastaa kasvua. Tällaisia tekijöitä ovat esimerkiksi jo edellä mainittu asumiskustannusten nouseminen ja liikenteen ruuhkautumisen aiheuttamat ongelmat (Laakso & Loikkanen 2004).

Muuttoliike ja aluetalous

Alueiden välinen muuttoliike on keskeinen aluetalouteen vaikuttava ilmiö. Lukuisten tutkimusten mukaan, joita on tehty erityisesti Euroopassa ja Pohjois-Amerikassa, vilkas tulomuutto alueelle johtaa pitkällä aikavälillä yritysten tuottavuuden nousuun. Keskeinen tähän vaikuttava tekijä on muuttajien aikaansaama osaamisen monipuolistuminen, kun muuttajat tuovat muuttoalueelle mukanaan uudenlaista tiedollista, sosiaalista ja kulttuurista osaamista, joka sekoittuu alueella pitkään asuneiden asukkaiden osaamispää-omaan. Tämä edistää sekä teknistaloudellisten että yhteiskunnallisten innovaatioiden leviämistä ja soveltamista. Osaamispääoman rinnalla sekä talousteorian että empirian mukaan väestön, työpaikkojen ja tuotannon sijoittuminen tiiviisti on omiaan lisäämään tuottavuutta ja sitä kautta tuotantoa ja tuloja (mm. Audretsch & Feldman 2004; Piekkola & Susiluoto 2012).

Toinen merkittävä tekijä on se, että muuttajien myötä kilpailu työpaikoista kiristyy ja "työntää" alueella pitkään asuneita erikoistumaan vaativampiin ja tuottavampiin tehtäviin. Tutkimusten keskeinen tulos on, että muuttoliike ja erityisesti maahanmuutto johtaa alueella pitkään asuneiden ansiotason nousuun. Kuitenkin ainakin lyhyellä aikavälillä maahanmuuton lisääntyminen voi johtaa kantaväestön työllisyyden heikentymiseen ja tulotason laskuun niillä toimialoilla ja tehtävissä, joihin maahanmuuttajat sijoittuvat. Sen sijaan pitemmällä aikavälillä maahanmuutto useiden tutkimusten mukaan ei johda kantaväestön työllisyyden heikkenemiseen, mutta sen sijaan "työntää" kantaväestöä työmarkkinoilla vaativampiin ja tuottavampiin tehtäviin (esim. Cattaneo ym. 2013; D'Amuri & Peri 2014).

Luonnollisesti vaikutukset ovat riippuvaisia sekä pitkään asuneiden että muuttajien taustoista sekä yhteiskunnan kyvystä sopeutua muutoksiin ja hyödyntää uusien tulijoiden myötä alueelle tuleva potentiaali.

Muuttoliikkeellä ja sen vaikutuksilla alueen väestön määrään ja rakenteeseen sekä työvoiman saatavuuteen ja osaamiseen on vahva yhteys kilpailukykyyn. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, OECD:n (2017) mukaan "Kilpailukykyinen alue houkuttelee ja tukee menestyviä yrityksiä sekä ylläpitää ja kasvattaa alueen asukkaiden hyvinvointia".

Alueiden kilpailukyvystä on tehty lukuisia tutkimuksia, jotka yleensä perustuvat eri tavoin määriteltyihin alueellisiin tekijöihin, joiden on todettu parantavan alueen yritysten toimintaedellytyksiä ja taloudellista kasvupotentiaalia. Tutkimusten mukaan näitä ovat muun muassa saavutettavuus ja perusrakenne, keskittyminen ja alueen koko, työvoiman osaaminen ja saatavuus, innovatiivisuus ja kehitysmyönteisyys sekä yhteiskunnan toimivuus.

Erityisesti osaaminen laajasti ymmärrettynä, innovatiivisuus ja kehitysmyönteisyys kytkeytyvät tiiviisti kansainväliseen muuttoliikkeeseen, joka on ehdoton edellytys osaamisen monipuolistumiselle ja sen mahdollistamalle innovatiivisuudelle. Kumuloitunut tieteellinen luovuus yhdistettynä aktiiviseen tutkimus- ja kehittämistoimintaan ja sen edellyttämiin resursseihin johtaa innovaatioihin, jotka synnyttävät uusia tuotteita, menetelmiä ja prosesseja. Tämän tuloksena talous kasvaa, työllisyys vahvistuu ja asukkaiden reaalitulot nousevat. Osaamiseen perustuvan innovatiivisen ja tuottavan alueen tärkeimpiä perus-edellytyksiä ovat vahva ihmisten välinen luottamus, sosiaalinen suvaitsevaisuus, yrittäjyyttä tukevat instituutiot, suuri ja monipuolinen väestö, korkeatasoiset tutkimusinstituutiot sekä hyvä saavutettavuus. Nämä perusedellytykset voivat toteutua vain yhteiskunnassa, joka on avoin ulkopuolisille vaikutteille ja hyväksyy maahanmuuttajat ja heidän mukanaan tuoman väestön monipuolisuuden ja erilaisuuden (Andersson & Andersson 2015).

Muuttoliike, ikä ja elinkaari

Muuttaminen on valikoivaa iän suhteen sekä alueiden välisessä että alueiden sisäisessä muutossa, samoin kuin maahanmuutossa. Aktiivisin muuttoikä sijoittuu 18 ja 34 ikävuoden välille. Helsingin seudulle on ominaista suurkaupungin muuttoprosessi. Seutu vetää nuoria aikuisia opiskelemaan ja työmarkkinoille, mutta niiden ohella myös palvelut ja kaupunkielämä houkuttelevat. 20—34-vuotiaiden osuus Helsingin seudun tulomuutosta oli yli puolet ja nettomuutosta kolme neljännestä vuonna 2018.

Muuttajien ikäprofiilit ovat pysyneet varsin samankaltaisina vuodesta ja vuosikymmenestä toiseen siitä huolimatta, että muuttajien lukumäärät ovat vaihdelleet voimakkaasti vuosien välillä. Koko Uudenmaan tasolla muuttojen (maan sisäinen sekä maahan- ja maastamuutto) määrä kasvoi vuodesta 2007 vuoteen 2017 (Kuvio 1).

Kasvu kohdistui erityisesti nuoriin aikuisiin ja lapsiperheisiin. Sekä tulo- että lähtömuutossa muuttajien ikäjakauma on muuttunut melko vähän, mutta suhteellisen



Kuvio 1. Tulo- ja lähtömuutto (ylempi) sekä nettomuutto (alempi) iän mukaan Uudellamaalla vuosina 2007 ja 2017. Maakuntien välinen maassamuutto sekä maahan- ja maastamuutto (Lähde: Tilastokeskus).

pienetkin muutokset näkyvät huomattavina muutoksina nettomuutossa. Uudellamaalla alle 15-vuotiaiden lasten ja 25—44-vuotiaiden aikuisten muuttovoitto nousi vuodesta 2007 vuoteen 2017 ja lisäksi nettomuuton ikähuippu siirtyi 20—24-vuotiaista 25—29-vuotiaisiin.

Suurin osa Uudenmaan ja muiden alueiden välisistä muuttotapahtumista koostuu maassamuutosta. Maahanmuuton osuus Uudenmaan tulomuutosta on viime vuosina ollut suunnilleen kolmannes ja lähtömuutosta neljännes. Sen sijaan Uudenmaan saamasta muuttovoitosta maahanmuuton osuus on huomattavasti suurempi, joskin osuus on pienentynyt kuluvalla vuosikymmenellä maassamuuton muuttovoiton voimakkaan kasvun vuoksi. Maahanmuuton osuus maakunnan muuttovoitosta oli 43 prosenttia vuonna 2017 sen oltua 68 prosenttia vuonna 2007.

Taloudellisen toiminnan elinkaari

Asukkaiden toiminta ja tulotaso muuttuvat elinkaareen vaiheen mukaan. Erityisesti työssäkäyntitilaston (vuosi 2015) kuvaama pääasiallinen toiminta (työllisyys, työttömyys, opiskelu ja muu työvoiman ulkopuolisuus) on sidoksissa ikään (Kuvio 2). Työllisten osuus kasvaa ja opiskelijoiden osuus supistuu suunnilleen 35 ikävuoteen asti, jonka jälkeen pääasiallisen toiminnan jakaumassa seuraa noin 20 vuoden mittainen suhteellisen vakiintunut vaihe. 55 ikävuoden jälkeen työllisten osuus supistuu ja vastaavasti eläkeläisten osuus kasvaa. Työttömien osuus ikäryhmän väestöstä kasvaa 15—19-vuotiaiden alle 2 prosentista 60—64-vuotiaiden lähes 12 prosenttiin. Muiden työvoiman ulkopuolella olevien kuin opiskelijoiden osuus on korkeimmillaan ikävuosien 20 ja 39 välillä, johon yleensä ajoittuvat lapsiperheiden äitiys-, isyys- ja vanhempainvapaat.

Henkilön tulotasoa mitataan tässä tutkimuksessa bruttomääräisillä valtionveronalaisilla tuloilla sekä palkka- ja yrittäjätuloilla. Valtionveronalaisiin tuloihin sisältyvät palkka- ja yrittäjätulojen lisäksi muun muassa eläkkeet, työttömyysetuudet ja vanhempainrahat, mutta eivät esimerkiksi toimeentulotuki, asumistuki tai lapsilisä. Valtioneronalaiset tulot tai palkka- ja yrittäjätulot eivät kuvaa käytettävissä olevia tuloja, joihin vaikuttavat edellisten lisäksi maksetut verot ja saadut ei-veronalaiset tulonsiirrot. Bruttotulojen erot väestöryhmien välillä ovat yleisesti suuremmat kuin käytettävissä olevien tulojen erot. Tässä tutkimuksessa bruttomääräisillä tuloindikaattoreilla kuvataan ensi sijassa henkilön taloudellista asemaa työmarkkinoilla.

Henkilön tulotaso sekä veronalaisilla tuloilla että työstä saatavilla ansio- ja yrittäjäntulolla mitattuna on sidoksissa pääasialliseen toimintaan ja sen kautta ikään. Kuitenkin iän lisäksi lukuisat muut yksilölliset ja yhteiskunnalliset tekijät vaikuttavat tuloihin.



Kuvio 2. Helsingin seudun 15–74-vuotiaiden asukkaiden pääasiallinen toiminta iän mukaan vuonna 2015 (Lähde: Tilastokeskus).



Kuvio 3. Helsingin seudun asukkaiden tulotaso iän mukaan vuonna 2015 (Lähde: tutkimusaineisto, Laakso 2019).

Kuvion 3 mukaan palkka- ja yrittäjäntulot ovat keskimäärin korkeimmillaan 45—54-vuotiailla. Sen sijaan valtionveronalaiset tulot, joihin sisältyvät edellisten lisäksi eläkkeet, työttömyysturvaetuudet ja muut veronalaiset sosiaaliturvaetuudet, nousevat huippuunsa vasta 55—59-vuotiailla.

Helsingin seudulle muuttajien koulutus, työllistyminen ja tulotaso muuton jälkeen

Tutkimuksen pääasiallisena tavoitteena on selvittää laajaan rekisteriaineistoon pohjautuvalla empiirisellä tutkimuksella maassamuuttajien ja maahanmuuttajien kouluttautumista sekä sopeutumista Uudenmaan työ- ja asuntomarkkinoille pitkän ajan kuluessa. Työmarkkinoille sopeutumisessa näkökulmina ovat eritaustaisten muuttajien sijoittuminen työvoimaan sekä työllistyminen ja tulokehitys sekä näiden yhteys henkilöiden koulutukseen ja muihin taustatekijöihin.

Projektia varten teetettiin tutkimusaineisto Tilastokeskuksen työssäkäyntitilaston vuosiaineistoja ja muita rekisteritietoja yhdistelemällä. Aineiston ajanjaksona ovat vuodet 2000 2015. Muuttajien aineisto on kattava kokonaisaineisto henkilöistä, jotka ovat muuttaneet jakson aikana johonkin Uudenmaan kuntaan tai jostakin kunnasta pois (maakunnan sisäiset kuntien väliset ja muun Suomen ja seudun väliset muutot sekä muutot ulkomailta tai ulkomaille). Vertailuaineistoksi poimittiin otosaineisto koko maan väestöstä. Vertailuaineisto mahdollistaa muuttajien indikaattoreiden kehityksen vertaamisen demografisilta ominaisuuksiltaan samankaltaiseen koko väestöön. Aineistot sisältävät asuinpaikkaa ja muuttoja koskevien tietojen lisäksi mm. henkilön perustiedot (esimerkiksi syntymävuosi, sukupuoli, äidinkieli, syntymäkunta, syntymämaa jne.), koulutusta, pääasiallista toimintaa, työtä, tuloja ja veroja sekä perhettä, asuntokuntaa ja asuntoa koskevia tietoja.

Muuttajat ja koulutus

Koulutuksella on tärkeä merkitys työmarkkinoille sijoittumisen ja tulotason kannalta. Tutkimuksessa analysoidaan seudulle vuodesta 2000 alkaen muuttaneiden henkilöiden koulutustason muutosta verrattuna saman ikäisiin seudulla syntymästä asti asuneisiin tai aikaisemmin muuttaneisiin asukkaisiin. Lisäksi eri taustatekijöiden, kuten sukupuolen ja muuttajien lähtöalueen Suomessa tai ulkomailla yhteys koulutustason kehitykseen on tämän tutkimuksen keskeisenä näkökulmana.

Koulutusta koskevat analyysit perustuvat tutkintorekisterin tietoihin. Tutkimusaineistossa on käytettävissä kunkin henkilön viimeisin korkein tutkinto kunakin vuonna. Kuitenkin maahanmuuttajataustaisten henkilöiden koulutustasoa koskevissa tiedoissa on tutkimusaineistossa alipeittoa. Koulutustasoa mitataan pääasiassa Tilastokeskuksen VKTM-indeksillä, joka kuvaa tutkinnon tasosta ja alasta riippuvaisten laskennallisten opiskeluvuosien määrää perusasteen jälkeen.

Kahden Helsingin seudulle vuosina 2000—2002 muuttaneen ikäryhmän koulutustasoa verrataan Kuviossa 4 muuttovuonna ja sitä seuraavina 13 vuonna samaikäisten verrokkiryhmään kuuluvien (Helsingin seudun syntyperäiset tai aikaisemmin muuttaneet) asukkaiden koulutustasoon samoina vuosina. Muuttajien ryhmä sisältää sekä muualta Suomesta että ulkomailta muuttaneet. Vertailun tunnuslukuna käytetään kunkin ryhmän koulutusvuosien keskiarvoa.

Helsingin seudulle 16—19-vuotiaina tai 20—24-vuotiaina muuttaneiden koulutustaso oli keskimäärin suunnilleen samalla tasolla kuin verrokkiryhmän ikätovereilla muuttovuonna ja sen jälkeen seuraavat noin 6 vuotta, mutta sen jälkeen muuttajien koulutustaso jatkaa nousua jyrkemmin ja pitemmälle kuin verrokkiasukkailla. 13 vuodessa ero kasvaa muutaman opintokuukauden suuruiseksi.

Seudulle 25—29-vuotiaina muuttaneiden, joista monet ovat siinä vaiheessa suorittaneet tutkinnon muualla, keskimääräinen koulutustaso on muuttovuonna alle puoli opintovuotta korkeampi kuin saman ikäisillä verrokkiasukkailla. Ero kasvaa seuraavina 13 vuotena systemaattisesti lähes vuoteen. 30—34-vuotiaina muuttavilla ero on alun perin vajaa vuosi ja kasvaa vähän lisää 13 vuodessa.

Tutkimuksessa estimointiin myös diskreetin valinnan malleja, joilla selitettiin tutkimusaineistossa käytettävissä olevia muuttujia hyväksi käyttäen eri tekijöiden



Kuvio 4. Helsingin seudulle muualta muuttaneiden ja saman ikäisten Helsingin seudun verrokkiasukkaiden koulutustaso iän ja muutosta kuluneen ajan mukaan. Vuosina 2000–2002 muuttaneet.

vaikutusta koulutustasoon[3]. Tulosten mukaan ikä selittää korkeakoulututkinnon suorittamisalttiutta siten, että korkeakoulutukinnon suorittamisen todennäköisyys nousee 35—39 vuoteen asti. Naisilla todennäköisyys on systemaattisesti korkeampi kuin miehillä 20 ikävuodesta alkaen. Helsingin seudulla syntyneillä on alempi korkeakoulututkinnon suorittamisalttius kuin muualla Suomessa syntyneillä ja Helsingin seudulle jossain elämän vaiheessa muuttaneilla. Kun aineisto rajattiin vähintään keskiasteen tutkinnon suorittaneisiin, ulkomainen syntyperä OECD-maasta tai muusta maasta ei alenna korkea-asteen tutkinnon suorittamisen todennäköisyyttä.

Kuviot ja tilastolliset analyysit osoittavat, että Helsingin seudulle alle 25-vuotiaina muuttaneet, joista suuri osa muuttaa nimenomaan opiskelemaan, ovat seuraavien vuosien aikana kouluttautuneet pitemmälle kuin saman ikäiset syntyperäiset asukkaat. Tulokset vahvistavat aikaisempien tutkimusten ja selvitysten havaintoja siitä, että opiskelu on nuorille aikuisille keskeinen syy muuttaa seudulle, ja muuttajiksi valikoituu muualla ylioppilastutkinnon tai muun keskiasteen tutkinnon suorittaneita, joilla on edellytykset jatkaa opintoja Helsingin seudun oppilaitoksissa.

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[3] Koulutusta, työllisyyttä ja tulotasoa koskevien tilastollisten analyysien tulokset on raportoitu tarkemmin Laakso (2019).

Muuttajat ja työllisyys

Työllistymistä analysoidaan seuraavassa samaan tapaan kuin edellä koulutusta. Näkökulmana on erityisesti Helsingin seudulle vuodesta 2000 alkaen muuttaneiden työllisyyden kehitys suhteessa verrokkiryhmään, mutta lisäksi seurataan myös Helsingin seudulta samana aikana pois muuttaneiden (syntyperäisten tai seudulle aikaisemmin muuttaneiden) kehitystä (Kuvio 5). Henkilön työllisyyden indikaattorina käytetään laskennallisia työssäolokuukausia vuoden aikana, jolloin vaihteluväli on 0—12 kuukautta.

16—19-vuotiaina (lukion tai ammatillisen keskiasteen opiskelijat) Helsingin seudulle muualta maasta tai ulkomailta muuttaneiden työllisyys muuttovuonna ja sitä seuraavina vuosina ei poikennut saman ikäisten verrokkiryhmään kuuluvien työllisyydestä. Sen sijaan Helsingin seudulta muualle Suomeen muuttaneiden työllisyys kehittyi selvästi heikommin kuin Helsingin seudulle muuttaneilla tai verrokkiryhmään



Kuvio 5. Helsingin seudulle ja seudulta muuttaneiden ja saman ikäisten syntyperäisten verrokkiasukkaiden työssäolokuukaudet iän ja muutosta kuluneen ajan mukaan. Vuosina 2000–2002 muuttaneet.

kuuluvilla ikätovereilla. 20—24-vuotiaina Helsingin seudulle muuttavilla työssäolokuukausia oli ensimmäisinä vuosina vähemmän kuin saman ikäisillä syntyperäisillä asukkailla, mutta ero umpeutui suunnilleen kuuden vuoden kuluessa. Alkuvaiheen ero selittynee sillä, että seudulle muuttavista suurempi osa opiskelee korkeakouluissa ja muissa oppilaitoksissa kuin syntyperäisistä. Seudulta pois muuttaneiden työllisyys muualla Suomessa kehittyi heikommin kuin Helsingin seudulle jäävien saman ikäisten, joskin vuosien kuluessa ero kaventui.

25—29- tai 30—34-vuotiana Helsingin seudulle muuttaneiden työkuukausien määrä oli ensimmäisinä vuosina alempi kuin saman ikäisillä verrokkiasukkailla, mutta ero umpeutui muutaman vuoden kuluessa. Pitemmällä ajalla tulomuuttajien ja verrokkien työllisyydessä ei juuri ollut eroa. 25—29-vuotiaina Helsingin seudulta pois muuttaneiden työllisyys kehittyi heikommin kuin seudulle jääneillä, mutta vuosien kuluessa ero supistui. Muista ikäryhmistä poiketen 30—34-vuotiaina Helsingin seudulta pois muuttaneiden työllisyys kehittyi muualla Suomessa pitkällä ajalla hieman paremmin kuin seudulle muuttaneilla tai verrokkiasukkailla.

Kuviot osoittavat, että työllisyyden erot eri ikäisinä Helsingin seudulle muuttavien ja saman ikäisten syntyperäisten seudun asukkaiden välillä kaventuvat ja lähes häviävät muutaman vuoden kuluessa. Keskimääräinen vuosittainen työllisyys asettuu lähes kaikissa ryhmissä 9ja 10työssäolokuukauden välille. Vaikka Helsingin seudulle muualta muuttavat kouluttautuvat keskimäärin pitemmälle kuin saman ikäiset syntyperäiset asukkaat, tämä koulutustason ero ei näytä pitemmällä ajalla oleellisesti vaikuttavan työssäolokuukausien määrään.

Koulutustaso ja työllisyys

Työllisyydellä ja sen kehityksellä elinkaaren suhteen on vahva yhteys koulutustasoon. Tätä havainnollistetaan muuttovuonna 25—29-vuotiaiden työllisyyden kehityksellä Kuviossa 6. Kaikilla koulutustasoilla Helsingin seudulle muuttaneiden työssäolokuukaudet nousivat jyrkästi muuttoa seuraavana vuonna, ja sen jälkeen kasvu jatkui 4—7 vuotta. Vähintään keskiasteen suorittaneiden Helsingin seudulle muuttaneiden 25—29-vuotiaiden työssäolokuukaudet olivat muuttovuonna ja sitä seuraavina vuosina täysin eri tasolla kuin enintään perusasteen suorittaneiden (mukaan lukien koulutustaso tuntematon). Korkeakoulututkinnon suorittaneiden työllisyys oli jonkin verran korkeampi kuin keskiasteen suorittaneilla. Sen sijaan alempien ja ylempien korkeakoulututkinnon suorittaneiden välillä ei ollut oleellista eroa. Työssäolokuukausien määrän suuri ero koulutustasojen mukaan oli suuri muuttovuonna ja pysyi suurena kaikkina seuraavina vuosina.



Kuvio 6. Työssäolokuukaudet koulutustason[4] mukaan muutosta kuluneen ajan suhteen. Vuosina 2000–2002 Helsingin seudulle muuttaneet, jotka olivat muuttaessaan 25–29-vuotiaita.

Edellä esitettyjä työllisyyden kehitysprofiileja täydennettiin estimoimalla diskreetin valinnan malleja, joilla selitettiin tutkimusaineistossa käytettävissä olevia muuttujia hyväksi käyttäen eri tekijöiden vaikutusta työllisyyteen. Indikaattoreina työllisyydelle käytettiin sekä vuoden lopun työlliseen työvoimaan kuulumista (työssäkäyntitilasto) että tutkimusaineiston työssäolokuukausia eri tavoin rajattuna. Tulosten mukaan koulutustaso selittää työllisyyttä erittäin voimakkaasti, käytettiin työllisyyden indikaattorina pääasiallisen toiminnan työlliseen työvoimaan kuulumista tai työssäolokuukausia. Mitä korkeampi on koulutustaso, sitä todennäköisempää on kuuluminen työlliseen työvoimaan. Keskiasteen tutkinto nostaa työllisyyden todennäköisyyttä merkittävästi perusasteen koulutukseen (tai tutkintotiedon puuttumiseen) verrattuna. Korkeakoulututkinnot nostavat työllisyyden todennäköisyyttä edelleen siten, että korkein työllisyyden todennäköisyys on ylemmän korkeakoulututkinnon tai tutkijakoulutuksen suorittaneilla. Koulutuksen ohella ikä selittää työllistymistä siten, että suurin työllisyyden todennäköisyys on 35—39-vuotiailla, kun muiden tekijöiden vaikutus on kontrolloitu. Ulkomailla syntyneillä naisilla on merkittävästi alempi työllistymisen todennäköisyys kuin muilla ryhmillä, senkin jälkeen, kun muut tekijät on kontrolloitu.

Muuttoliike ja tulot

Helsingin seudulle muuttaneiden tulokehitystä seurattiin muuttoa seuraavina vuosina suhteessa verrokkiryhmään sekä seudulta pois muuttaneisiin. Tulojen indikaattorina käytettiin valtionveronalaisten vuositulojen keskiarvoa.

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4 Korkeakoulutuksen tasot kuviossa 6: ylemmät (ylempi ja tutkijakoulutus), alemmat (alin ja alempi).

Helsingin seudulle muuttavista yli 60 prosenttia on 18—34-vuotiaita ja aikuisista (yli 18-v.) muuttajista heitä on lähes 75 prosenttia. Näin ollen 18—34-vuotiaat dominoivat Helsingin seudulle suuntautuvaa muuttoa.

Seuraavasta kuviosta 7 näkyy, että 16—19-vuotiaina, tyypillisesti toisen asteen koulutusvaiheessa muuttaneiden tulokehitys ei poikkea oleellisesti verrokkiväestöstä koko jakson aikana. Sen sijaan yli 20-vuotiaina Helsingin seudulle vuosina 2000—2002 muualta Suomesta tai ulkomailta muuttaneiden keskimääräinen tulotaso oli muuttovuonna alempi kuin saman ikäisillä verrokkiasukkailla. Seuraavien vuosien aikana muuttajien tulotaso kuitenkin saavutti ja useimmissa ikäryhmissä myös ylitti syntyperäisen väestön tulotason. Muuttaessaan 20—24-vuotiaiden, tyypillisesti opiskelemaan



Kuvio 7. Helsingin seudulle ja seudulta vuosina 2000–2002 muuttaneiden sekä verrokkiryhmän tulotaso muuttovuonna ja seuraavina vuosina ikäryhmittäin. Tulot reaalisia vuoden 2015 ansiotasossa.

tulleiden, tulot nousivat saman ikäisen verrokkiväestön tasolle noin kuuden vuoden kuluttua muutosta ja nousivat seuraavina vuosina korkeammiksi. 25—29-vuotiaina muuttaneiden, joista suuri osa oli muuttaessaan jo suorittanut jonkin tutkinnon, tulot ohittivat verrokkiväestön tason kahden vuoden kuluttua muutosta, ja sen jälkeen ero kasvoi systemaattisesti. Myös 30—34-vuotiaina Helsingin seudulle muuttaneiden tulotaso oli muuttaessa alempi kuin saman ikäisellä verrokkiväestöllä. Muuttajat saavuttivat verrokkien tulotason noin viidessä vuodessa, mutta sen jälkeen tulokehitys eteni likimäärin samaa tahtia.

Sen sijaan samoina vuosina seudulta pois muuttaneiden tulotaso (muualla Suomessa) kehittyi kaikissa ikäryhmissä heikommin kuin verrokkiryhmällä ja tulomuuttajilla.

Kantaväestön ja maahanmuuttajien tulotason kehitys

Muuttajien tulotaso eroaa huomattavasti taustan mukaan sekä muuttovuonna että seuraavina vuosina. Ero tulotason suhteen on vielä suurempi kuin työllisyyden suhteen. Kantaväestöön kuuluneiden vuosina 2000—2002 Helsingin seudulle 25—29-vuotiaina muuttaneiden valtionveronalaiset bruttotulot olivat huomattavasti suuremmat OECD-maista muuttaneisiin ja vielä suuremmat OECD-maiden ulkopuolelta lähtöisin oleviin muuttajiin verrattuna. Muuttoa seuraavina vuosina suhteellinen ero kuitenkin supistui jonkin verran, mutta pitemmän ajan kuluessa alkoi uudelleen kasvaa. Kuviosta 8 näkyy myös, että vuoden 2008 jälkeinen taantuma sai aikaan lyhyen notkahduksen kantaväestön tulotasoon, joka kuitenkin pian jatkoi loivaa kasvua. Sen sijaan OECD-



Kuvio 8. Helsingin seudulle vuosina 2000–2002 muuttaneiden tulotaso (valtionveronalaiset tulot) muuttovuonna ja seuraavina vuosina taustan mukaan (25–29-vuotiaina muuttaneet). Tulot reaalisia vuoden 2015 ansiotasossa.

maiden ulkopuolelta lähtöisin olevien tulotaso kääntyi jatkuvaan laskuun ja myös OECD-maista lähtöisin olevien trendi jäi jälkeen kantaväestöstä.

Maahanmuuttajataustaisen kantaväestöön kuuluvia alempi koulutustaso ja työllisyys selittävät alemmasta tulotasosta suuren osan, mutta ei läheskään kaikkea. Kun verrataan kantaväestöön ja eri maahanmuuttajaryhmiin kuuluneita 12 kuukautta vuodessa työskennelleitä kymmenen vuoden kuluttua muutosta, kantaväestöön kuuluvien palkka- ja yrittäjäntulot olivat viidenneksen korkeammat kuin OECD-maista muuttaneilla ja yli kolmanneksen korkeammat kuin muista maista muuttaneilla saman ikäisillä.

Tulotason selitysmallit

Helsingin seudun 18—64-vuotiaalle väestölle estimoidut mallit eri taustatekijöiden vaikutuksesta tulotasoon vuonna 2015 täydentävät edellisten kuvioiden tulokehityksen profiileista nähtäviä tuloksia. Mallien mukaan valtionveronalaiset tulot nousevat iän mukaan 35 vuoteen asti ja pysyvät sen jälkeen lähes samalla tasolla 60 ikävuoteen asti. Koulutustason nousu kasvattaa tuloja systemaattisesti. Naisten tulotaso on alempi kuin miesten. Helsingin seudun ulkopuolelta kotimaasta seudulle muuttaneiden tulotaso ei poikkea tilastollisesti merkitsevästi syntyperäisistä asukkaista. OECD-maista lähtöisin olevien maahanmuuttajataustaisen tulotaso on alempi kuin kantaväestöllä ja OECD-maiden ulkopuolelta tulleiden vielä selvästi alempi kuin OECD-maista tulleiden. Korkeakoulututkinnon suorittaneiden maahanmuuttajataustaisten tulotaso on merkitsevästi alempi kuin vastaavan tasoisesti koulutettujen kantaväestöön kuuluvien. Sen sijaan keskiasteen tutkinnon suorittaneilla eroa ei ole. Maahanmuuttajanaisten tulotaso on alempi kuin maahanmuuttajamiesten erityisesti OECD-maiden ulkopuolta muuttaneilla.

Muuttoliike ja asuinalueiden segregaatio

Alueiden välisellä segregaatiolla tarkoitetaan väljästi määriteltynä alueiden sosioekonomista eriytymistä, jonka tuloksena sosioekonomisten kriteerien mukaan suhteellisesti muita heikommassa asemassa olevat asukkaat päätyvät tietyille asuinalueille erilleen muista asukkaista — tai päinvastoin parempiosaiset keskittyvät omille alueilleen erilleen muista.

Seuraavassa arvioidaan muuttoliikkeen yhteyttä alueiden välisen eriytymisen muutokseen. Erityisesti halutaan selvittää, miten muuttoliike on muuttanut sosioekonomisten kriteerien suhteen Helsingin seudun heikoimpia alueita. Yleisesti sovellettuja kriteereitä ovat tulotaso, pienituloisten asukkaiden osuus, työttömyysaste, työllisten ja opiskelijoiden osuus työikäisistä, koulutustaso sekä maahanmuuttajataustaisen tai vieraskielisen väestön osuus alueen asukkaista.

Kaikilla alueilla näiden tekijöiden suhteen tapahtuu muutoksia vuosien kuluessa. Muutokset voivat perustua alueella pysyvien asukkaiden työllisyydessä tai muissa olosuhteissa tapahtuviin muutoksiin ja muuttoliikkeeseen, joka tuo alueelle uusia asukkaita sekä vie alueelta pois entisiä asukkaita. Muuttajat voivat nostaa tai laskea kriteerien arvoja. Toisaalta muuttajien koulutustaso, työllisyys ja tulotaso muuttuvat muuton jälkeisinä vuosina, mikä heijastuu alueen sosioekonomisen rakenteen muutokseen.

Muuttoliike ja sosioekonominen muutos alimman aktiivisuusasteen alueilla Helsingin seudulla

Tutkimusaineistossa Helsingin seudun postinumeroalueet järjestettiin aktiivisuusasteen (työllisten ja opiskelijoiden osuus 15—64-vuotiaista asukkaista) perusteella suuruusjärjestykseen vuoden 2015 tietojen perusteella. Analyysiin otettiin mukaan aktiivisuusasteen suhteen alimpana sijaitsevat postinumeroalueet, joiden yhteenlaskettu työikäisen väestön määrä oli noin viidennes koko seudun 15—64-vuotiaista. Ryhmään kuuluu 31 postinumeroaluetta koko seudun 265 alueesta.

Työikäisen väestön valtionveronalaisten tulojen mediaani alimmassa alueryhmässä suhteessa koko seudun mediaaniin laski 87 prosentista vuonna 2008, jolloin se oli korkeimmillaan, noin 81 prosenttiin vuonna 2014, jolloin se oli alimmillaan (Kuvio 9). Muutokset tuloissa ovat selvässä yhteydessä työllisyyden voimakkaampaan heikkenemiseen alimmassa ryhmässä verrattuna koko seudun työllisyyteen.

Alimman alueryhmän muutosta tulotason suhteen analysoitiin hajottamalla muutoksia komponentteihin asukkaiden taustan perusteella jaksona 2007—2015. Alueiden



Kuvio 9. Työikäisten valtionveronalaisten tulojen mediaanin suhde alimman ryhmän alueiden ja koko seudun välillä vuosina 2007–2015.

työikäiset (18—64-v. vuonna 2015) jaettiin kolmeen pääryhmään: alueilla pysyneisiin, alueille muuttaneisiin ja alueilta pois muuttaneisiin, jotka jaettiin edelleen kantaväestöön kuuluviin ja maahanmuuttajataustaisiin:

- Alimpaan ryhmään kuuluvalla samalla postinumeroalueella koko ajan vuosina 2007—2015 asuneet:
    1. Alueella pysyneet, kantaväestöön kuuluvat
    2. Alueella pysyneet, maahanmuuttajataustaiset
- Alueelle ajanjaksona 2008—2015 muuttaneet ja alueella vuonna 2015 asuneet:
    3. Tulomuuttajat, kantaväestöön kuuluvat
    4. Tulomuuttajat, maahanmuuttajataustaiset
- Alueella vuonna 2007 asuneet, jotka muuttivat pois ajanjakson 2008—2015 aikana:
    5. Lähtömuuttajat, kantaväestöön kuuluvat
    6. Lähtömuuttajat, maahanmuuttajataustaiset.

Jokaiselle ryhmälle laskettiin tulotason mediaani (valtionveroalaiset tulot) suhteessa koko Helsingin seudun kaikkien 18—64-vuotiaiden asukkaiden vastaaviin tunnuslukuihin vuosina 2007—2015.

Eri ryhmien välillä on suuria eroja asukkaiden suhteellisen tulotason muutoksessa jakson aikana (Kuvio 10). Maahanmuuttajataustaisilla kaikkien ryhmien tulotaso on alle puolet koko seudun väestön tulotasosta. Kantaväestöön kuuluvien alueilla pysyneiden suhteellinen tulotaso on samalla tasolla kuin koko seudulla, vaikkakin laskee loivasti koko jakson ajan, kun taas alueelle muuttaneilla trendi on nouseva vuodesta



Kuvio 10. Alimman alueryhmän tulotaso (mediaani) taustan mukaan vuosina 2007–2015 suhteessa Helsingin seudun koko työikäiseen väestöön. Ikäryhmä 18–64-vuotiaat vuonna 2015.

2007 vuoteen 2012. Nopeimmin nousee kuitenkin lähtömuuttajien tulotaso. Lähtömuuttajat ovat pääasiassa nuoria aikuisia, ja heillä tulotason nousu näyttää yhdistyvän alimmasta alueryhmästä poismuuttamiseen. Maahanmuuttajataustaisilla, jotka ovat pysyneet alueilla, tulotason trendi on nouseva, kuten myös alueille ja alueilta muuttajilla. Silti maahanmuuttajataustaisten kasvava väestöosuus painaa suhteellista tulotasoa alaspäin alimmassa alueryhmässä.

Tulkinta

Tulokset osoittavat, että muuttajat vaikuttavat erittäin paljon alueiden sosioekonomisen profiilin muodostumiseen ja sen muutokseen. Tulosten mukaan Helsingin seudun alimmassa sosioekonomisessa alueryhmässä tarkastelujakson ajan alueella pysyneiden kantaväestöön kuuluvien alentunut suhteellinen tulotaso selittää osittain alueryhmän suhteellisista negatiivisista muutoksista jaksolla 2007—2015. Alueella pysyneillä maahanmuuttajataustaisilla suhteellinen tulotaso oli selvästi alempi kuin kantaväestöllä, mutta sen trendi oli kuitenkin nouseva. Alueilta pois muuttaneilla suhteellinen tulotalo oli nousevaa sekä kantaväestöön kuuluvilla että maahanmuuttajataustaisilla. Tulomuuttajien tulotaso oli keskimääräistä alempi, mutta nouseva. Alueelle muuttavat ovat keskimäärin nuoria asukkaita, joilla opiskelijoiden osuus oli korkea, mutta tulotaso nouseva elinkaarivaiheen ansioista. Kuitenkin merkittävä tekijä alimman alueryhmän aseman suhteellisessa heikkenemisessä jaksolla 2007—2015 oli suhteellisesti alhaisen aktiivisuusasteen ja alhaisen tulotason asukkaiden tulomuutto näille alueille siinä määrin, että alueiden keskimääräinen aktiivisuus- ja tulotaso suhteessa koko seutuun aleni.

Johtopäätöksiä

Muuttaminen on valikoivaa iän suhteen sekä alueiden välisessä että alueiden sisäisessä muutossa, samoin kuin maahanmuutossa. Aktiivisin muuttoikä sijoittuu 18 ja 34 ikävuoden välille. Helsingin seudun korkeakoulut vetävät nuoria aikuisia opiskelemaan ja korkeaa koulutusta ja osaamista edellyttävän työvoiman kysyntä alueen yrityksissä ja julkisella sektorilla houkuttelee jäämään alueelle. Toisaalta väestönkasvu ja korkeasti koulutettujen alojen korkea palkkataso ovat osaltaan työntäneet asuntojen hinta- ja vuokratasoa ylöspäin. Korkeat asumiskustannukset nostavat jäämisen tai seudulle muuttamisen kynnystä erityisesti matalapalkka-alojen potentiaaliselle työvoimalle.

Muualta Suomesta Helsingin seudulle muuttavat menestyvät hyvin seudun työmarkkinoilla

Asukkaiden toiminta ja tulotaso muuttuvat elinkaaren vaiheen mukaan. Työllisten osuus kasvaa ja opiskelijoiden osuus supistuu suunnilleen 35 ikävuoteen asti, jonka jälkeen pääasiallisen toiminnan jakaumassa seuraa suhteellisen vakiintunut vaihe. Myös henkilön tulotaso on sidoksissa pääasialliseen toimintaan ja sen kautta ikään, mutta sen lisäksi siihen vaikuttavat lukuisat muut yksilölliset ja yhteiskunnalliset tekijät.

Helsingin seudulle alle 25-vuotiaina muuttaneet, joista suuri osa muuttaa nimenomaan opiskelemaan, kouluttautuvat seuraavien vuosien aikana pitemmälle kuin saman ikäiset syntyperäiset asukkaat. Yli 25-vuotiaina muuttaneista suuri osa on jo tullessaan suhteellisen korkeasti koulutettuja, jotka muuttavat seudun työmarkkinoille tai jatkamaan opiskeluja pitemmälle. Kaiken kaikkiaan muualla Suomessa kuin Helsingin seudulla syntyneillä ja Helsingin seudulle jossain elämän vaiheessa muuttaneilla koulutustaso on keskimäärin korkeampi kuin Helsingin seudulla syntyneillä.

Koulutus nostaa työllistymisen todennäköisyyttä Helsingin seudun työmarkkinoilla. Erityisen suuri ero on enintään perusasteen suorittaneiden ja vähintään keskiasteen tutkinnon suorittaneiden välillä, mutta sen lisäksi korkeakoulututkinnon suorittaneiden työllisyys on korkeampi kuin keskiasteen suorittaneilla.

Tulotason kehitys ei poikkea merkittävästi Helsingin seudulle muualta muuttaneiden ja seudun saman ikäisten syntyperäisten asukkaiden välillä koulutustason erosta huolimatta.

Maahanmuuttajataustaisten työllisyys on merkittävästi alemmalla tasolla kuin saman ikäisillä kantaväestöön kuuluvilla. Maahanmuuttajataustaisten muuttajien työllisyys erosi myös maaryhmien välillä siten, että OECD-maista lähtöisin olevat maahanmuuttajataustaiset työllistyivät huomattavasti paremmin kuin muista maista lähtöisin olevat. Maahanmuuttajataustaisten Helsingin seudulle muuttaneiden tulotaso on selvästi alempi samaikäisiin kantaväestöön kuuluviin verrattuna, myös korkeakoulututkinnon suorittaneilla. Korkeakoulutetuista maahanmuuttajista suuri osa on alityöllistettyjä tai työskentelee koulutusta vastaamattomassa työssä. Tämän myötä maahanmuuttajien osaamispotentiaali ja kapasiteetti jäävät vajaakäyttöön.

Asuinalueiden väliset sosioekonomiset erot ovat kasvaneet 2000-luvulla

Asuinalueiden välinen muuttoliike vaikuttaa alueiden sosioekonomisen profiilin muodostumiseen ja sen muutokseen. Tulosten mukaan Helsingin seudun alimmassa sosioekonomisessa alueryhmässä, jossa asuu viidennes seudun asukkaista, alueella pitkään asuneiden kantaväestöön kuuluvien suhteellisesti alentunut tulotaso selittää osan alueryhmän suhteellisista negatiivisista muutoksista ajanjaksona 2007—2015.

Merkittävä tekijä alimman alueryhmän suhteellisessa heikkenemisessä ajanjaksona 2007—2015 oli matalan tulotason asukkaiden tulomuutto näille alueille siinä määrin, että alueiden keskimääräinen tulotaso suhteessa koko seutuun aleni.

Muuttoliike on Helsingin seudun erikoistuneen aluetalouden moottori

Helsingin seudun elinkeinorakenne poikkeaa suurkaupunkien tapaan muusta maasta. Helsingin seutu on erikoistunut erityisesti korkean tuottavuuden osaamisintensiivisiin palveluihin (informaatiopalvelut, rahoituspalvelut, ammatillinen, tieteellinen ja tekninen toiminta), joissa seudun osuus koko maan kyseisten toimialojen arvonlisäyksestä on yli 60 prosenttia. Toinen vahva erikoistumisalue koostuu kaupasta (erityisesti tukkukauppa), kuljetuksesta ja varastoinnista sekä majoitus- ja ravitsemistoiminnasta, joiden valtakunnallisesta arvonlisäyksestä tuotetaan seudulla lähes puolet. Myös erikoistuneet kuluttajapalvelut (muun muassa taiteet, viihde ja virkistys) ovat seudulla vahvasti edustettuina. Palveluiden rinnalla Helsingin seutu on erikoistunut osaamisintensiiviseen teollisuuteen (elektroniikan, sähkölaitteiden, koneiden ja laitteiden valmistus), jotka ovat erityisen korkean tuottavuuden aloja. Toisaalta alemman tuottavuuden aloilla, kuten kaupassa, kuljetuksessa, kiinteistöpalveluissa sekä sosiaali- ja terveyspalveluissa, on paljon alemman koulutustason ja tulotason työpaikkoja.

Helsingin seudun aluetalouden ja työllisyyden kasvu on 2000-luvulla perustunut erityisesti seudun korkean tuottavuuden erikoistumisalojen kasvuun, joka on ollut myös valtakunnallisesti merkittävää. Ylemmän korkeakoulututkinnon suorittaneiden työllisyys kasvoi 64 prosenttia Helsingin seudulla vuodesta 2000 vuoteen 2016, kun työllisyys kokonaisuutena kasvoi 10 prosenttia. Asiantuntijatyövoiman lisäys ja erikoistumisalojen kasvu ei olisi ollut mahdollista 2000-luvulla eikä sitä edeltävinä vuosikymmeninä ilman jatkuvaa suurta tulomuuttoa Helsingin seudun ulkopuolelta. Korkeasti koulutetun työvoiman tarve on edellyttänyt sekä tulomuuttoa opiskelemaan korkeakouluihin että sen lisäksi muualla Suomessa ja ulkomailla tutkinnon suorittaneiden muuttoa seudun työmarkkinoille.

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Family Life across the Gulf: Cross-Border Commuters' Transnational Families between Estonia and Finland[1]

Keiu Telve

Mobility is constantly changing. I have been studying cross-border migration for six years and writing this article during the time of the Corona virus lockdown. The constant mobility between Estonia and Finland that has taken place over the past 30 years has come to a halt and nobody knows when and on what scale it will return. On another level, though, mobility is very visible — missing the possibility to travel is one of the main topics of conversation, as is keeping in touch with family and friends living across borders and reading news from the countries we are connected to through business relations. Travelling patterns have indeed changed within months, but the underlying practices, how we maintain relations from a distance, have become even more important. This makes my research relevant from a slightly different angle.

In this article, I am concentrating on the main results of my doctoral dissertation, "Family Life Across the Gulf: Cross-Border Commuters' Transnational Families between Estonia and Finland," which I defended in 2019 at the University of Tartu's Department of Ethnology.[2] The aim of the dissertation was to better understand everyday transnationalism, because too few in-depth studies have explored the everyday habits of mobile families (Nelson 2006; Körber & Merkel 2012; Reynolds & Zontini 2014; Assmuth et al.

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1 This article is based on my PhD dissertation, which was defended in 2019 at the University of Tartu's Department of Ethnology.

2 The article is supported by two research projects: "Inequalities of Mobility: Relatedness and Belonging of Transnational Families in the Nordic Migration Space" (2015—2019), funded by the Academy of Finland, and "Inequalities in Motion: Transnational Families in Estonia and Finland" (2016—2018), funded by the Kone Foundation. Both projects were led by Professor Laura Assmuth at the University of Eastern Finland.

2018). Both the dissertation and this article focus on the transnational turn in migration studies (Vertovec 2007; Basch et al. 2000) and the "transnational family" concept (Baldassar et al. 2014; Bryceson & Vuorela 2002), while also addressing the gender blindness of Estonia-Finland migration studies (Voormann 2005) and highlighting the masculine perspective inherent in family studies. Other family members — wives, children, relatives, in some cases also close friends — are included to my study.

The article is based on a six-year ethnographic research project assessing male cross-border commuters between Estonia and Finland. I have also travelled back and forth between Estonia and Finland to conduct interviews and research. In many ways, my work combines the autoethnographic perspective with ethnographic data. I lived in Finland for seven months during the time I was writing my PhD dissertation and interviewing the informants on all aspects of their cross-border lifestyles. At the same time, because my focus was mainly on men working in the construction sector, their perspective was quite different.

My research adopts the *emic* perspective and combines different methods, including online ethnography (Kozinets 2002) and, since December 2013, three Facebook groups: Estonians in Finland (3,800 members in March 2019), FinEst-Estonians in Finland (40,200 members in March 2019) and Estonian Entrepreneurs in Finland (5,500 members in March 2019). The Facebook environment enabled me to find contacts and also gather background knowledge about everyday life and actual problems faced by members of the Estonian community in Finland. The most important part of my data involves the full transcripts of semi-structured, in-depth interviews with cross-border commuters. All the interviews took place in Estonian, and the age of the informants varied from 20 to 51 years old. Most of the men were in a long-term relationship and had at least one child.

The article is divided as follows: it continues with a brief overview of the Estonian Finland transnational sphere, after which a short overview of the results of the dissertation is provided, concentrating especially on masculine family practices among Estonia-Finland-Estonia cross-border commuting families.

Transnational field between Estonia and Finland

Estonia and Finland have close cultural and linguistic connections that have encouraged active cross-border collaboration throughout the centuries. Cross-border mobility has expanded since the 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The main pulling factors for Estonians going to work in Finland have been an accessible labor market with better wages and social guarantees and a more highly valued position of blue-collar workers in society (Kumer-Haukanõmm & Telve 2017). The transnational commuting patterns between Estonia and Finland have been encouraged even more by European Union's free movement legislation (Välisiministeerum 2009): between 2000 and 2008, the emigration of Estonians to Finland increased eightfold (Anniste 2014). Estonians have become the second largest diaspora group in Finland (Statistics Finland 2016), and all together there are approximately 50,000 Estonians in Finland (Tiit 2015).

Continual cross-border commuting, where people still live partly in Estonia, but commute weekly or monthly to Finland, increased in 2009 when the global economic crisis hit Estonia especially hard (Tammur, Puur, & Tammaru 2017). Estonia rapidly became one of the leading countries of international commuter workers per capita — at that time Estonia had 15.8 commuters per 1,000 people (European Commission, DG Employment and Social Affairs 2009), whereas by 2011 the share had increased to 14% of the working-age population. The estimated number of commuters between Estonia and Finland is 30,000 (Statistics Finland 2013), but the number is constantly changing and the number of cross-border workers cannot be tracked so well, but quite likely even more Estonians work in Finland than show up in the official statistics. Transnational commuting patterns are most visible in the rural and peripheral areas, but also northern Estonia stands out for the number of commuting workers travelling to Finland (Anniste 2014, 20; Krusell 2013). The vast majority of cross-border commuters (86%) are male, and the average age is 30—45 years (Krusell 2013). Most cross-border commuters are doing blue-collar jobs (Krusell 2013) and earning twice or even three times as much as they would in Estonia, while also enjoying better social benefits and working conditions; neither should the high social status of blue collar workers in Finland be undervalued with respect to the decision to find work outside Estonia (Telve 2016).

Transnational family practices and masculine care-taking strategies

The transnational turn in migration studies that began in the 1990s (Schiller et al. 1992; Portes et al. 1999) was soon followed by more in-depth family research, and since the early 2000s scholars have increasingly been employing the term "transnational family" (Bryceson & Vuorela 2002; Baldassar, Baldock, & Wilding 2007; Baldassar et al. 2014). Deborah Bryceson and Ulla Vuorela (2002, 3) have defined "transnational families" as "families that live some or most of the time separated from each other yet hold together and create something that can be seen as a feeling of collective welfare and unity, namely "familyhood", even across national borders." Loretta Baldassar, Cora Baldock, and Raelene Wilding (2007, 13) add that "the resulting idea of the "transnational family" is intended to capture the growing awareness that members of families retain their sense of collectivity and kinship in spite of being spread across multiple nations." Cross-border families create a complex systematic that includes remittances, cross-border communication, and caregiving practices (Boccagni 2012, 124).

My work also shows that cross-border commuting is accompanied by many difficulties—emotional distance from loved ones, physical exhaustion, time-consuming travel, and constantly adapting to new locations and shifting scenery. Such a lifestyle requires full commitment and collaboration between family members, and it must be a mutual decision supported by family collaboration. The theoretical literature has much to say about the negative aspects of the mobile lifestyles of families where one of the partners lives or works abroad (see, e.g. Woolfson 2007; White 2010). Still, it is important to keep in mind that the family life of cross-border commuters suffers from many ill-conceived stereotypes (Frigren & Telve 2019). My informants even pointed out that it is often precisely public opinion and negative rumors that make family life across borders so difficult.

During my fieldwork period, I have seen how people do succeed in maintaining close relations across the border. As my research shows, people are creating new everyday patterns for satisfying relations within families. They create new normalities as a means of providing care and help and meeting the expectations and needs of loved ones. The different practices together create a strategy that makes transnational family life possible (Telve 2019). Next, I will investigate four types of practices connected to patterns of behavior in transnational families: combining information and communication technology (ICT) and visiting, economic stability as caregiving, traditional breadwinning, and network migration as masculine caregiving patterns.

Combining ICT and visiting

Evolving communication practices have been changing the migration experience (Madianou 2016), and it is common for transnational families to have a shared physical presence interspersed with periods of distance (Baldassar 2016). E-mediated connectivity as well as face-to-face connectivity are now the cornerstones of transnational family life. Communication technologies like (smart)phones, e-mail, SMS texts, websites, videocam, and postal and banking systems have made it possible to give financial, practical, as well as emotional support through virtual modes of communication (Baldassar 2007, 5), thereby allowing people working and living in another country to be actively involved in everyday family everyday (Levitt 2001, 22; Parreñas 2005, 317—18). Estonian men also put much thought into how they can maintain strong connections with their families back in Estonia, combining different communication platforms that make it possible to stay in touch almost constantly. Allar describes it as follows:

> *We are calling my wife several times per day. Some people don't call that often; I think older generation. But we do. One call is only with my child. Well, he is not saying much, but still. Yes, with the older kid, we are calling regularly, but mainly I am speaking with my wife. I am not using that much Facebook; I am not much of a writer, I [am] only saying, come to Messenger for a video-chat. It is better when you can see the other [person] live. (Allar, 33 years old)*

As evident from the previous quote, everyday transnational family life includes calling, using Facebook Messenger, even doing homework with children over Skype. Communication helps people maintain the feeling of togetherness despite the geographical distance.

Sondra Cuban (2017, 239), though, challenges the idea of it being easy to stay in touch — even when different technologies allow us to stay in touch over greater distances, loved ones are always in some way out of reach. My work shows that especially teenagers are not willing to stay in touch over long periods of time, families often decide to delay difficult topics until they see each other face to face, and connections can be lost due to the limitations of technology and/or emotional distance. Many of my informants also pointed out that communication does not solve all the problems of cross-border relationships. It cannot compensate for the physical absence, even if it does make it easier to be away from family back in the home country.

Economic stability as caregiving

The stable financial position acquired by working in Finland, as well as fulfilling one's sense of duty as the primary breadwinner are important, with transnational fathers trying to be present in family life not only through remittances, but also by proxy (Baldassaar 2008) as well in real life, since mutual activities are greatly valued in families. I have observed that for men, economic stability and new spending possibilities also have a broader meaning of showing that they care. In many cases, my informants had grown up in modest circumstances, and they equate being able to afford different activities, like a holiday abroad, dining out in a restaurant, or buying expensive gifts, with being a good husband and a good father.

It is also relevant to notice the action-based relationship between a father and children. The men pointed out that they need economic stability and freedom to be able to spend time with their kids, to be able to take them to see a movie or go to an amusement park. Sven attempted to sum it up as follows:

> *I even don't know how to describe it; let's take an example of going to see a movie. When you work in Estonia, you earn exactly enough to get your bills payed and some money is left for buying food. You cannot afford anything else. It is weird to describe it so. Such a small thing as it is, but if your salary is modest, you are left aside from some activities ... If you are working in Finland, you find a way for these kinds of small things. If I can go to the cinema with my children, then it is already worth something. (Sven, 46 years old)*

As the above quote shows, economic stability is a precondition for being able to enjoy different activities. It allows fathers to be more carefree and enjoy the time spent together with the whole family. Spending holidays together with a family is also a way of attaining a meaning marker that shows social hierarchy; men can then talk about quality time with family in a boasting manner with their friends and co-workers.

Traditional breadwinning and new role of involved fatherhood

It is often stressed that family is a precondition for migration and that men especially migrate to support their families (Pribilsky 2004; Datta et al. 2009; Haile & Siegmann 2014). These can be the main reasons why mostly men work abroad (Krusell 2013). Datta et al. (2009) have developed three reasons to account for work migration being dominated by men: risk and adventure, bettering one's self, and providing for the family. In many cases, men are also expected to choose a more mobile lifestyle to secure better earning possibilities, which is connected with status in the home society (Sinatti 2014; Datta et al. 2009, 854).

Similarly, Estonian men initially engage in cross-border commuting to fulfill the social role of being the main breadwinner for the family. They want to secure economic stability to start a family in the future or support an existing family back home. Maintaining a family life across the gulf can also be a compromise from the family's perspective — only one member has to be mobile, while the rest of the family stays closer to home and someone is able to look after children and relatives back in Estonia. Silver described it as follows:

> *I am working there because of them [my family]. It is not for me. For my sake, I could sit here all day long. It would be no problem to work in Estonia. (Silver, 32 years old)*

Mobility starts to change families in combination with two other factors. First, families need to find new ways to maintain a feeling of togetherness (Baldassar et al. 2014, 168; Svašek 2008, 220), and second, traditional caretaking practices are reorganized (Huttunen 2010, 242; Siim & Assmuth 2016, 277). My research also shows how working in Finland starts to change family life and gender roles within the family. The change in family life and men's roles back home comes in combination higher income, which allows for new spending possibilities and changes in the rhythm of work and leisure time, and the impact of family-centered values in Finland. Working longer days in Finland, even working on weekends, helps men stay at home for longer periods of time and it gives them flexibility to also acquire new roles back home. Importantly, their appreciation of staying at home, taking care of family members, and wishing to spend quality time together with the whole family has also increased. Men in many cases stress the importance of being a good husband and a good father, and they are aware of the need to compensate for the time they have been abroad. Being at home acquires a positive image, one centered around the family, friends, and hobbies. The time spent in Estonia gives men both the time and space to focus on home life. This perspective can also be analyzed as an idealized image, whereas in real life just as many men noted that problems like unequal housework responsibilities, caring for the children and elderly people, or a lack of emotional availability are also present.

The new knowledge that the migrants receive pushes the limits of previous home society norms (Grzymala-Kazlowska 2015; Keough 2006, 446), and it can lead to a change in values that were previously appreciated (Aitken 2010). Based on my research, we can also see the transmission of values in the transnational social sphere. It is evident that Estonians who have worked in Finland for a longer period of time are eager to make use of the family benefits they have accrued from the place of employment. Men are encouraged by their employers to take more free time for family life, and many of the commuters admit that it is more comfortable for them to present themselves in a family-oriented father role in their workplaces in Finland. Allar described his surprise along these lines as follows:

> *What was clear [is that] when the child is born, you can take paternity leave. Then, they asked me whether my wife goes back to work. I thought fast. I didn't know what to say, and so said yes. And then they [the colleagues] said, right, you are staying home with the child. (Allar, 32 years old)*

Men working in Finland are more aware of their rights as fathers, and the workplace culture in Finland encourages them to make use of family benefits like extra free days, family allowances, or time off when a child is born. Also, it has been evident during my fieldwork that those who are commuting are more willing to take on the main caretaker role during the time they are in Estonia. They stay at home with a sick child, with their role as fathers being visible in social media, and that they reported that they consciously spend more time together with their children.

The changes in free-time patterns of behavior, family values largely absorbed from Finland, call for stronger emotional relations and an acknowledged responsibility for being actively part of the children's upbringing. Hence, commuting men have adopted a more involved fatherhood pattern than other Estonian men. I have been able to witness how the men stay at home with their children, take longer periods of paternal leave, and spend more time with their families compared to the time when they lived and worked in Estonia. Rainer explained how now he takes time during his visits to spend time with his daughter alone:

> *I think we get along with my daughter well. [Once per month] my wife goes to school in Tartu, and during that time we have been together, my daughter and me, like before. For example, yesterday we were together at home. We went to see a doctor; we were together the whole day long. Every now and then, we are spending these kinds of days together, only the two of us. We are going to see a movie, to the cafe, these kinds of things. (Rainer, 31 years old)*

The fathers often admitted in the interviews that they take a leading role in family life during the times they are back at home. The children's education and future possibilities are important for all the fathers who participated in my research and being as involved as possible is crucially important for them.

Network migration as a masculine caregiving pattern

Though mainly men alone are commuting between Estonia and Finland, their families are clearly involved. My fieldwork has shown how the families are included in such a commuting way of life from the very beginning. The choice to commute for the benefit of the family is made mutually as a family; likewise as authors before me (Sandowa & Westin 2010) have recognized, home community, wife, children and relatives are also very much involved in the decision making. The networks at home play a huge supportive role, and in most cases, they help the commuters establish themselves in a new country from a distance. Anu, the wife of one commuter worker expressed it as follows:

> *Of course, I am involved. First, I am following the news [about Finland] because of [my husband] Rein and my son. [...] We tend to exchange information when we call. If there is something important, I always ask, do you know about this and that what happened in Helsinki? Sometimes things come first to Estonian news before the radio there. [...] At one point, I also joined with a [Estonians in Finland Facebook] group. Rein's wallet was stolen, and I thought that maybe someone finds it along with his driver's license, but no. But they post so much in these groups. And when there is something I want to know more about, I read* Helsingin Sanomat *[online]. (Anu, wife of Rein, 49 years old)*

Cross-border commuting should not be seen as an international mobility pattern involving just individuals. Rather, it influences social networks, families, and communities as well as society on a broader scale. It is visible especially in case studies on network migration. Constant communication with family members, family visits, and back-and-forth travelling include all family members in the process of international mobility. It would be misleading to depict family members as remaining fixed within only the home society and describe them merely as locals. As the previous example showed, the family is continuously co-present by proxy and included in all the processes of settling into a new society, in the decision-making, crisis-solving, and staying-in-touch processes. Especially valuable is the amount of second-hand information and the level of detail about working abroad that family members possess, which constitutes a starting point for network migration.

In Estonia, we can notice the normalization of cross-border working that then gives rise to second-generation mobility. In many cases, young schoolboys already have possibilities to work abroad, and it may even be understood as a coming of age ritual. Migration has also previously been analyzed as a transition to adulthood (Sinatti 2014, 220; Monsutti 2007) and serve as a "rite of passage" characteristic of growing up in today's society. A transnational career provides the possibility to save money, to prepare oneself for starting a family (Mahler & Pessar 2001, 829), and it is a marker that one can take risks (Datta et al. 2009, 856). The normalization of the commuting pattern between Estonia and Finland creates new expectations, one that family, friends, and acquaintances can even influence due to the masculine working culture found in both countries, especially for boys seeking to work abroad. It has become a marker of growing up, of acquiring economic independence, and a test for adolescents entering manhood.

At the same time, encouraging offspring to work in Finland can be depicted as part of a masculine caregiving pattern. Finding a job for their sons, nephews, or other younger male relatives can be one way for men to take responsibility for their children, when otherwise they might have been brought up from a distance without much male input. It has traditionally been the norm for Estonian men to help their younger relatives choose a career and establish first contacts with a potential employer for them. Taking advantage of the transnational networks and contacts that Estonian men have established in Finland helps them to provide work opportunities in Finland for their children instead of in their hometown. Raivo remembered how he was able to find a position for his son:

> *There were no jobs in Estonia; my son was a security guard. An awful job. I have tried it myself for three days. Small room and all these screens; you have to stare at these criminals all day long. And the air conditioner buzzes all the time. Darn this. I was there three days and couldn't take it anymore. The boy stayed there for four months and got tired. It is the thing in Estonia—when you do not have experience, they do not employ you; it's the circle. But at the same time, my company won over some new sites. Then, my manager asked whether we have friends or family members who would like to work here: ask them now. Now there is a possibility to employ them. (Raivo, 49 years old)*

As the previous quote and many other similar cases demonstrate, working together abroad gives Estonian men the opportunity to actively take part in the upbringing of their boys. Transnational fathers miss being an active role model, being a disciplinarian, and having an influence, and they are in many cases afraid that they are not able to give the necessary attention from a distance. As previous literature has pointed out (Parreñas 2008), this may be especially difficult in the case of teenage boys, who are more in need of their father's direct support and presence, and working actively side by side gives fathers a much-needed opportunity to provide hands-on instruction. Helping young male relatives start their careers offers transnational male workers the possibility to teach practical skills, it allows them to spend time together at the workplace, and it is important for masculine bonding.

It is also evident that in every case, network migration is not a planned or expected course of events. Ideally, the fathers would expect that their sons could do better than them career wise and desire that the sons would acquire a university education and a highly skilled specialist career. Madis explained it as follows:

> *He [Madis's 18-year-old son] has argued for many summers now that he will come with me to work in Finland. "No, I will not take you." I do not take him, just because if he goes there, he gets used to the money. He gets money and thinks that there is no point in going to school. [...] He will become what we make him. If I raise him to be a house painter, he will be a painter. I do not want him to be a painter. Because of that, I have not hired him. I do not want to be a bad dad, but thanks to that, he has independently come through very nicely. He has gotten summer jobs by himself. I let him be here, in Estonia, together with his friends and acquaintances. When he comes with me to this foreign environment, starts doing work, it's pointless. It does not have a point, there is no future in our opinion. (Madis, 39 years old)*

In many cases, sons have become more experienced in finding cross-border work than in pursuing a university education. Their expectations of finding a stable and higher income and potentially contributing to a family successful story of how they have been able to improve their livelihood thanks to cross-border commuting have rather a strong influence on them in terms of choosing the same career path. They already have intense second-hand experience with working abroad, they have visited Finland, they know people there, and they understand the positive as well as negative aspects of working abroad. In many cases, they are even better equipped for a transnational lifestyle than their fathers.

Conclusion

Men have previously been detached from family research and their role has been undervalued in care-taking chains. My research shows how even men who are not present on a daily basis want to be included in family relationships and how they are working hard to keep the connection to home and family alive. As I demonstrated with this article, transnational families have created many daily practices that help them sustain family relations and give support despite the geographical distances. The most prominent patterns are a combination of virtual communication technologies and visiting, with improved economic stability and new possibilities to invest in quality time with the whole family, and most importantly, the increase in involved fatherhood being key.

My research has also shown how transnational work experiences are making families more aware of different international opportunities and proven that close family members are included in such mobility. Commuting is a life strategy, and the people with first-hand or second-hand experiences of working abroad have more international opportunities and may well be more willing to try working in another country in the future, which especially impacts boys and young men coming from transnational families.

Even though at the moment is seems to us that the cross-border commuting era is over, or at least on hold, the cultural knowledge accumulated through working abroad can be activated years later. Estonians have experiences of working and living abroad, and such internationally convertible skills can easily be reactivated due to economic instability or in the case of an attractive job offer from another country. My research shows that experiences with transnational life can have an impact over successive generations and that international cross-border commuting can still be activated years later.

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Suomalaiset tutkinto-opiskelijat ulkomailla

Irma Garam

Taustaa

Opiskelu ulkomailla on merkittävä globaalin liikkuvuuden muoto. Maailmanlaajuisesti yli viisi miljoonaa opiskelijaa suorittaa korkeakoulututkintoaan ulkomailla (OECD 2019). Valtavirta kulkee Aasian maista, kuten Kiinasta, englanninkielisiin länsimaihin, kuten Yhdysvaltoihin, Iso-Britanniaan, Australiaan ja Kanadaan. Myös Suomi on saanut osansa kansainvälisten opiskelijoiden virrasta: ulkomaalaisten tutkinto-opiskelijoiden määrä korkeakouluissa on kasvanut läpi 2000-luvun. Noin seitsemän prosenttia korkeakoulujen kaikista opiskelijoista on ulkomaalaisia. Kansainvälisesti Suomi profiloituu kansainvälisiä opiskelijoita vastaanottavana maana, jossa korkeakoulut kehittävät englanninkielistä koulutustarjontaa ja rekrytoivat opiskelijoita myös ulkomailta.

Vähemmälle huomiolle on jäänyt se, että myös ulkomaille opiskelemaan lähtevien suomalaisten määrä on kasvanut. Kelan opintotuen turvin ulkomailla koko tutkintoa ulkomaisessa korkeakoulussa opiskelevien määrä on kymmenessä vuodessa yli kaksinkertaistunut 4 000 opiskelijasta yli 9 000 opiskelijaan (Kuvio 1). Ulkomaille opintotukea saavien määrä on noin kolme prosenttia korkeakoulujen koko opiskelijamäärästä tutkijakoulutus pois laskettuna. Se vastaa keskikokoisen yliopiston tai suurehkon ammattikorkeakoulun koko opiskelijamäärää.

Eniten suomalaisopiskelijoita lähtee Iso-Britanniaan, Ruotsiin, Viroon, Alankomaihin ja Yhdysvaltoihin. Erityisen voimakkaasti ovat kasvaneet Ruotsissa ja Virossa aloittaneiden opiskelijoiden määrä, mutta myös muissa kohdemaissa on tapahtunut kasvua. Eri kohdemailla on erilainen profiili sen suhteen, mitä aloja sinne mennään opiskelemaan. Esimerkiksi Iso-Britanniassa opiskellaan runsaasti humanistisia aloja, Ruotsissa kauppatiedettä ja lääketiedettä sekä Virossa kauppatiedettä ja oikeustiedettä, mutta myös lääketiedettä.



Kuvio 1. Kelan opintotukea ulkomaille koko tutkinnon suorittamista varten saavat lukuvuosina 2006–2007 – 2018–2019.

Kasvava ulkomaille opiskelemaan lähtevien joukko herättää huolen aivovuodosta: menettääkö Suomi osaavaa, korkeakoulutettua väestöään ja kuinka ulkomaille lähteneitä saisi houkuteltua takaisin? Esimerkiksi pääministeri Sipilän hallitusohjelmassa tiedostettiin, että Suomi joutuu kilpailemaan myös ulkomailla opiskelleista nuorista (Valtioneuvoston kanslia 2015). Myös julkisuudessa on herätelty huolta Suomen osaamistaseesta (ks. esim. Tieteentekijöiden liitto 2017; Myrskylä 2017).

Tässä artikkelissa tarkastelen Opetushallituksessa (OPH) tehdyn selvityksen pohjalta ulkomailla koko tutkintoaan opiskelevia suomalaisia: keitä he ovat, miksi he lähtevät ulkomaille opiskelemaan, miten he pitävät yhteyttä Suomeen opiskeluaikanaan ja millaisia paluusuunnitelmia heillä on. Selvityksessä tarkasteltiin ulkomaille lähteviä Kelan opintotukitilastojen avulla. Lisäksi ulkomailla opiskeleville lähetettiin loppuvuodesta 2016 kysely, jossa kartoitettiin syitä lähteä, kokemuksia ulkomailla opiskelusta ja paluuhalukkuutta. Kyselyyn vastasi yli 1 400 opiskelijaa. Selvityksen uloksia on raportoitu tarkemmin OPH:n verkkosivuilla (Opetushallitus 2020) sekä raporteissa Garam (2018) ja Opetushallitus (2017; 2018).

Keitä ovat ulkomailla opiskelevat suomalaiset?

Ulkomailla opiskelevien joukko on profiililtaan jossain määrin erilainen kuin Suomen korkeakouluissa opiskelevat. Koulutusvalintoja ei tehdä tyhjässä, vaan niitä pohjustavat monet aikaisemmat valinnat ja sosiaalisen taustan kaltaiset rakenteelliset tekijät (ks. esim. Kivinen ym. 2012). Sama pätee myös ulkomailla opiskeluun: joillekin se on luontevampi valinta kuin toisille.

Ensiksikin ulkomailla opiskellaan eri aloja kuin Suomessa. Ulkomailla opiskellaan runsaasti humanistisia ja taidealoja, yhteiskuntatieteitä sekä kaupallista alaa. Näiden alojen opiskelijat muodostavat kaksi kolmasosaa ulkomailla opiskelevista. Toisaalta tekniikan ja luonnontieteitten kaltaisia "kovia aloja" suomalaiset opiskelevat ulkomailla selvästi vähemmän kuin Suomessa. Poikkeuksen muodostavat lääketiede ja eläinlääketiede, joita opiskellaan paljon ulkomailla ja joiden suosio on myös kasvanut nopeasti.

Ulkomaille lähtee sukupuolen mukaan valikoitunut joukko: ulkomaille lähtijöissä on naisia enemmän kuin Suomen yliopistoissa ja ammattikorkeakouluissa opintonsa aloittaneissa. Kelan opintotukitilastojen mukaan esimerkiksi lukuvuonna 2014—15 opintonsa ulkomailla aloittaneista 64 prosenttia oli naisia, kun Suomen yliopistoissa ja ammattikorkeakouluissa vastaavat osuudet olivat 56 ja 55 prosenttia. Ulkomailla korkeakouluopintonsa aloittaneiden joukossa on myös hieman runsaammin iältään vanhempia henkilöitä. Lukuvuonna 2014—15 ulkomailla opintonsa aloittaneista 22 prosenttia oli iältään vähintään 25-vuotiaita, kun vastaavan ikäisiä oli Suomen korkeakouluissa aloittaneista vain 16 prosenttia.

Ulkomaille lähtevien joukossa on selvästi enemmän ruotsin- ja muun kielisiä kuin kotimaassa aloittavissa (ulkomailla aloittavista 24 %, Suomen yliopistoissa 11 %, ammattikorkeakouluissa 9 %). Lisäksi ulkomaille lähtee herkemmin pääkaupunkiseudun lähellä asuva henkilö: yli puolet (58 %) ulkomaille lähtevistä asui Uudellamaalla, kun vastaava osuus Suomessa korkeakouluopinnot aloittaneissa on 31 prosenttia.

Lisäksi ulkomaille lähtevät tulevat keskimäärin hieman varakkaammasta perhetaustasta kuin Suomen yliopistoissa tai ammattikorkeakouluissa aloittavat. Ulkomailla aloittavista yli viidesosa (22 %) kuului kategoriaan, jossa vanhempien yhteenlasketut tulot ovat yli 150 000 € vuodessa. Suomen yliopistoissa aloittavilla vastaava osuus on 14 prosenttia ja ammattikorkeakouluissa 6 prosenttia.

Kyselyvastausten perusteella näyttää myös siltä, että kansainvälinen kokemus kasaantuu jossain määrin samoille henkilöille. Ulkomaille lähtevät opiskelijat ovat jo valmiiksi kansainvälisesti melko kokenut joukko. Yli puolella (59 %) vastaajista oli aikaisempaa kokemusta ulkomailla asumisesta, joko nykyisessä opiskelumaassa tai muualla. Vajaalla kolmasosalla (28 %) asuu puoliso tai muu perheenjäsen parhaillaan opiskelumaassa. Tyypillisesti kyse on puolisosta tai kumppanista, mutta myös sisaruksista, vanhemmista tai muista sukulaisista. Lisäksi 11 prosenttia vastaajista kertoi, että hänellä on sukulaisia, jotka ovat kotoisin nykyisestä opiskelumaasta.

Miksi ulkomaille?

Ulkomaille opiskelemaan lähtöä on usein tarkasteltu rationaalisena päätöksentekoprosessina, jossa henkilö arvioi lähdön hyötyjä ja kustannuksia. Opiskelijoiden kansainvälistä liikkuvuutta on selitetty samoilla tekijöillä kuin maahanmuuttoa yleisemminkin: lähtö- ja kohdemaan palkka- ja elintasoerolla, entisillä siirtomaasuhteilla sekä maassa jo asuvien saman maalaisten määrällä (Perkins & Neymayer 2014; Garam ym. 2014, 16—22).

Selitysmalli sopii kuitenkin ehkä paremmin kolmansista maista kehittyneisiin teollisuusmaihin lähteviin opiskelijoihin kuin Suomesta vaikkapa Ruotsiin, Viroon, Iso-Britanniaan tai Alankomaihin opiskelemaan lähteviin. Myös työn perässä ulkomaille lähtevien suomalaisten on havaittu vastaavan huonosti perinteistä kuvaa pakon edessä ja paremman toimeentulon perässä muuttavista. Sen sijaan he hakevat mahdollisuuksia kehittyä ja toteuttaa itseään (Koikkalainen 2011).

Ulkomaille lähdön syitä jaotellaan myös työntö- ja vetotekijöihin. Työntötekijöillä viitataan siihen, että jokin asia lähtömaassa motivoi henkilön lähtemään ulkomaille. Vetotekijöillä puolestaan tarkoitetaan kohdemaassa olevia asioita, jotka houkuttelevat henkilön lähtemään (esim. Lee 2014; Mazzarol & Soutar 2002).

Opetushallituksen kyselyssä opiskelijoilta kysyttiin ulkomaille lähdön syitä strukturoidulla kysymyspatterilla, jossa vastaajat arvioivat kunkin syyn tärkeyttä omalle kohdalleen asteikolla 1—5 (Kuvio 2). Merkittävimmät syyt lähteä ulkomaille opiskelemaan ovat halu saada uusia kokemuksia, mielenkiinto ulkomaisessa ympäristössä opiskelua kohtaan, kansainvälinen ura ja halu asua ulkomailla. Ulkomaille opiskelemaan lähtijöitä houkuttelee siis ennen kaikkea mahdollisuus uusiin kokemuksiin ja kansainvälistymiseen. Suoraan opintoihin tai sisäänpääsyyn liittyvät tekijät, kuten se, ettei pääse Suomessa haluamaansa koulutukseen tai haluttua koulutusta ei tarjota Suomessa, ovat huomattavasti vähäisemmässä roolissa.

Ulkomaille opiskelemaan lähdön motiivit eivät ole kymmenessä vuodessa merkittävästi muuttuneet. Syitä lähteä ulkomaille opiskelemaan tutkittiin myös Kelan vuonna 2008 julkaisemassa selvityksessä (Saarikallio ym. 2008). Samat syyt olivat myös silloin kärjessä: ulkomaisessa ympäristössä opiskelu, kansainvälinen ura ja seikkailunhalu. Halu oppia kieltä tai parantaa kielitaitoa sekä halu tutustua uuteen kulttuuriin ovat Opetushallituksen kyselyssä hieman vähemmän tärkeitä kuin kymmenen vuotta sitten, vaikka edelleen suuri osa pitää niitä tärkeinä. Vastaavasti halu parantaa mahdollisuuksia kansainväliseen uraan on tämän kyselyn vastaajille useammin tärkeä syy kuin kymmenen vuotta sitten. Koulutukseen pääsyyn ja opintojen saatavuuteen liittyvät syyt olivat yhtä usein tärkeitä molemmissa tutkimuksissa.

Kuvio 2. Ulkomaille lähdön syyt (% vastaajista, joille syy on tärkeä).

Neljä orientaatiota ulkomaille lähdön taustalla

Yksittäisten lähtösyiden joukosta voi tiivistää neljä laajempaa ulottuvuutta ulkomaille lähdön taustalla: kansainvälisen kokemuksen saaminen, sisäänpääsymahdollisuudet, koulutuksen laatu ja vaihtoehdon tuttuus. Orientaatiot voi mieltää myös erilaisina ulkomaille opiskelemaan lähtijän perustyyppeinä.

Kansainvälisen kokemuksen etsijälle opinnot ulkomailla ovat tärkeä mahdollisuus uusiin kokemuksiin ja seikkailuun. Hänestä ulkomailla asuminen on kiinnostavaa.

Orientaatio korostuu erityisesti kaupallisen alan, humanistisen alan, yhteiskuntatieteen ja taidealan opiskelijoilla. Samoin se korostuu Alankomaissa, Yhdysvalloissa ja Iso-Britanniassa opiskelevien keskuudessa. Opiskeluala ja -maa eivät ole tässä toisistaan riippumattomia, vaan kyseisiä aloja opiskellaan paljon juuri näissä maissa. Orientaatio korostuu myös opiskelijoilla, joilla on jo aikaisempaa kokemusta ulkomailla asumisesta ja niillä opiskelijoilla, jotka eivät ole yrittäneet hakea Suomesta vastaavaa opiskelupaikkaa. Kansainvälisen kokemuksen saaminen on selvästi yleisin orientaatio kyselyvastaajien keskuudessa.

Parempien sisäänpääsymahdollisuuksien hakija toivoo pääsevänsä ulkomailla helpommin sisälle korkeakouluun tai ylipäänsä saavansa opiskelupaikan. Orientaatio korostuu niiden opiskelijoiden keskuudessa, jotka ovat hakeneet vastaavaa opiskelupaikkaa Suomesta, mutta eivät ole päässeet sisään. Sisäänpääsymahdollisuudet jakavat kyselyyn vastaajia selkeimmin äärilaitoihin: monelle se ei ole lainkaan tärkeä tekijä ulkomaille lähdön taustalla ja vastaavasti monelle se on erittäin tärkeä. Sisäänpääsymahdollisuudet ulkomaille lähdön motiivina korostuu ylivoimaisesti eniten lääketieteen ja eläinlääketieteen opiskelijoilla, kohtalaisen runsaasti myös käyttäytymistieteen ja psykologian sekä oikeustieteen opiskelijoilla. Opiskelumaista motiivi on vahvin Latviassa ja Virossa opiskelevilla, joissa hankalan sisäänpääsyn aloja usein opiskellaan, ja jossain määrin myös Ruotsissa opiskelevilla.

Laadukkaan koulutuksen tavoittelija arvostaa tunnettua oppilaitosta ja hyvälaatuista koulutustarjontaa. Orientaatio korostuu taidealan, tekniikan sekä matkailu-, ravitsemis- ja talousalan opiskelijoilla. Opiskelumaista se esiintyy vahvimmin Alankomaissa ja Britanniassa opiskelevilla.

Tutun vaihtoehdon valitseva arvostaa sitä, että opiskelupaikka tai -maa on entuudestaan tuttu, sieltä löytyy tuttuja tai läheiset ovat suositelleet opiskelupaikkaa. Vaihtoehdon tuttuus ei kaiken kaikkiaan ole kovin yleinen orientaatio ulkomaille lähdölle. Se korostuu opiskelijoilla, joilla on muitakin kontakteja opiskelumaahan kuin nykyiset opinnot, esimerkiksi puoliso tai sukua opiskelumaassa tai aikaisempaa kokemusta maassa asumisesta. Lisäksi orientaatiota esiintyy joissakin harvinaisemmissa maissa opiskelevien keskuudessa, kuten Kanadassa, Venäjällä ja Kiinassa.

Polku ulkomaille

Aikaisempi hakuhistoria sekä opintopolku taustoittavat myös ulkomaille lähtöä. On merkillepantavaa, että pieni enemmistö (56 %) kyselyn vastaajista ei ole edes hakenut Suomessa vastaaviin opintoihin. He muodostavat ryhmän, joka on nimenomaan halunnut lähteä ulkomaille. Vastaavasti hieman vajaa puolet ulkomailla opiskelevista kertoo hakeneensa myös Suomessa vastaavaan koulutukseen. Heistä kolmasosa (34 %) ei saanut Suomesta haluamaansa paikkaa. Tälle ryhmälle ulkomaille lähtö sinänsä ei ole tärkeää, vaan kyse on ennemminkin opiskelupaikan varmistamisesta. Kymmenesosa sai opiskelupaikan Suomesta, mutta valitsi silti ulkomaille lähdön.

Tyypillinen hetki lähteä ulkomaille opiskelemaan on ylioppilastutkinnon jälkeen. Selvä enemmistö kyselyyn vastaajista oli tehnyt ylioppilastutkinnon tai vastaavan toisen asteen tutkinnon Suomessa ja siirtynyt tämän jälkeen ulkomaiseen korkeakouluun opiskelemaan. Noin joka kuudes vastaaja oli opiskellut myös jonkin korkeakoulututkinnon Suomessa ennen ulkomaille lähtöä. Tyypillisesti kyse oli ammattikorkeakoulututkinnosta tai alemmasta korkeakoulututkinnosta yliopistossa.

Yhteydenpito Suomeen opintojen aikana

Kuinka hyvin ulkomailla opiskelevat integroituvat opiskelumaahansa? Entä ylläpitävätkö he kontakteja Suomeen? Vastaukset näihin kysymyksiin voivat valottaa myös sitä, kuinka luonteva vaihtoehto Suomeen palaaminen on opintojen jälkeen. Kyselyssä tarkasteltiin, ketkä muodostavat ulkomailla opiskelevan sosiaalisen verkoston, keiden kanssa opiskelijat ovat tekemisissä ja kuinka paljon he ylläpitävät eri tilanteissa yhteyksiä opiskelumaahan ja Suomeen. Vastausten perusteella näyttää siltä, että ulkomailla opiskelevat pitävät yllä yhteyksiä sekä Suomeen että opiskelumaahansa.

Valtaosa ulkomailla opiskelevista (67 %) on työskennellyt opintojen loma-aikoina. Opintojen loma-aikana työskentely on tärkeä keino ylläpitää yhteyksiä Suomeen, sillä tyypillisesti nämä työt tehdään Suomessa. Sen sijaan opintojen ohessa tehdyt työt ja opintoihin kuuluva työharjoittelu tehdään yleensä opiskelumaassa. Työskentely opintojen ohessa on kuitenkin selvästi harvinaisempaa kuin lomilla työskentely. Erityisen ahkerasti yhteyksiä Suomeen työnteon avulla ylläpitävät Virossa opiskelevat, jotka työskentelevät Suomessa selvästi muita useammin niin opintojen ohessa kuin lomillaankin.

Ulkomailla opiskelevien sosiaalinen verkosto muodostuu pääosin paikallisista opiskelijoista ja Suomessa olevasta perheestä. Näiden kahden tahon kanssa ulkomailla opiskelevat kertovat olevansa eniten tekemisissä. Useissa selvityksissä on huomattu, että kansainväliset opiskelijat viihtyvät usein keskenään ja kokevat paikallisiin opiskelijoihin tutustumisen haastavaksi (ks. esim. Moisander 2015). Siksi onkin yllättävää, että suomalaisopiskelijat kertovat olevansa tekemisissä paikallisten opiskelijoiden kanssa enemmän kuin muiden kansainvälisten opiskelijoiden. Ystäviä ja tuttavia ulkomailla opiskelevilla on sekä Suomessa että opiskelumaassa ja kumpaankin ryhmään pidetään yhteyttä. Sen sijaan muihin opiskelumaassa asuviin suomalaisiin opiskelijat pitävät vain vähän yhteyttä.

Ulkomailla opiskelevat pitävät yllä kontaktia Suomeen myös seuraamalla uutisia ja tapahtumia. Opiskelijat seuraavat Suomen uutisia ja tapahtumia hieman enemmän kuin opiskelumaansa. Sen sijaan työpaikkoja opiskelijat seuraavat enemmän opiskelumaasta kuin Suomesta. Kaiken kaikkiaan ulkomailla opiskelevat eivät kuitenkaan seuraa työpaikkoja kovin aktiivisesti.

Ulkomaille lähdön orientaatiolla on yhteys siihen, keiden kanssa on tekemisissä. Kansainvälistä kokemusta korostavat opiskelijat ovat keskimäärin muita enemmän tekemisissä muiden kansainvälisten opiskelijoiden kanssa ja vastaavasti vähemmän suomalaisten opiskelijoiden kanssa. He myös seuraavat enemmän opiskelumaansa tapahtumia, uutisia ja työpaikkoja. Vastaavasti sisäänpääsymahdollisuuksia lähdön motiivina korostavat opiskelijat ovat keskimääräistä enemmän tekemisissä muiden suomalaisten opiskelijoiden kanssa ja vähemmän kansainvälisten opiskelijoiden. He seuraavat muita enemmän Suomen tapahtumia, uutisia ja työpaikkoja.

Myös se, työskenteleekö opintojen aikana Suomessa vai opiskelumaassa, linkittyy yhteydenpitoon näihin maihin. Opiskeluaikana Suomessa työskennelleet pitävät muita enemmän yhteyttä muihin suomalaisiin sekä seuraavat tapahtumia, uutisia ja työpaikkoja Suomesta. Vastaavasti opiskelumaassa työskennelleet pitävät muita enemmän yhteyttä paikallisiin ja kansainvälisiin opiskelijoihin. Yhteyden olemassaolo ei kerro syy-seuraussuhteesta. Näyttää kuitenkin siltä, että aktiivisuus Suomen suuntaan jollakin elämän alueella ruokkii myös muita yhteyksiä Suomeen. Sama pätee opiskelumaan kohdalla.

Kaiken kaikkiaan ulkomailla opiskelevat kokevat kotiutuneensa hyvin sekä opiskelupaikkakunnalleen että -maahansa: 83 prosenttia kertoi kotiutuneensa hyvin opiskelupaikkakunnalle ja 78 prosenttia opiskelumaahan. Ulkomaille lähdön orientaatio on yhteydessä myös kotiutumisen tunteeseen: kansainvälistä kokemusta korostavat kokevat kotiutuneensa keskimäärin paremmin, sisäänpääsymahdollisuuksia korostavat hieman huonommin. Samoin työkokemus opiskelumaasta ja yhteydenpito paikallisiin on yhteydessä siihen, että kokee kotiutuneensa hyvin. Jälleen kerran on mahdoton sanoa, kummin päin syysuhde menee: tuottaako kotiutumisen tunne aktiivista yhteydenpitoa paikallisiin ja maan tapahtumiin vai päinvastoin. Joka tapauksessa yhteydenpito opiskelumaahan ja siellä asuviin ihmisiin sekä tunne omasta kotiutumisesta muodostavat kokonaisuuden, jossa osat kulkevat käsi kädessä.

Paluuhalukkuus

Harva ulkomaille muuttava suomalainen suunnittelee muuttavansa lopullisesti, mutta käytännössä oleskelu ulkomailla saattaa jatkua pitkään (Björklund 2011, 40). Opiskelu on luonteeltaan määräaikaista, joten myöskään opiskelemaan lähtevät tuskin tekevät lopullisia päätöksiä. Miten ulkomaille lähteville lopulta käy: jäävätkö he ulkomaille vai palaavatko Suomeen? Aikaisemman tutkimuksen perusteella näyttää siltä, että kohtalaisen moni palaa takaisin Suomeen opintojen jälkeen. Kelan vuonna 2007 toteuttaman kyselyn mukaan yli puolet (57 %) ulkomaisesta korkeakoulusta valmistuneista opintotuen saajista oli palannut Suomeen 1—5 vuotta valmistumisen jälkeen (Saarikallio ym. 2008). Tulokset ovat kuitenkin jo melko vanhoja, joten tilanne voi olla muuttunut.

Tässä kyselyssä lähestyttiin parhaillaan opiskelevia, joten tarkkaa tietoa heidän tutkinnon jälkeisestä polustaan ei vielä ole. Opiskelijoiden vastaukset tulevaisuudensuunnitelmista antavat kuitenkin suuntaa sille, kuinka mahdollisena Suomeen paluu näyttäytyy ja mitkä tekijät muuttoon vaikuttavat.

Ulkomailla opiskelevien tulevaisuudensuunnitelmia leimaa epävarmuus ja epätietoisuus tulevasta asuinmaasta. Vajaa puolet (46 %) ei osaa sanoa, jääkö opintojen jälkeen nykyiseen opiskelumaahansa vai hakeutuuko muualle. Neljännes uskoo palaavansa takaisin Suomeen ja vajaa viidennes pysyvänsä nykyisessä opiskelumaassaan. Epätietoisuus on 15 vuodessa lisääntynyt, sillä CIMOn aikaisemmassa selvityksessä vain 30 prosenttia valitsi vastaavassa kysymyksessä vaihtoehdon "en osaa sanoa" (Garam 2003).

Epävarmuus tulevaisuudensuunnitelmista vähenee jonkin verran ja todennäköisyys jäädä opiskelumaahan kasvaa, kun tarkastellaan niitä opiskelijoita, jotka arvioivat valmistuvansa vuoden sisällä kyselyajankohdasta. Samalla myös todennäköisyys palata Suomeen hieman vähenee. Silti vielä vuoden sisällä valmistuvistakin 38 prosenttia ei osaa sanoa tulevaa asuinmaataan, 26 prosenttia uskoo sen olevan nykyinen opiskelumaa, 22 prosenttia Suomi ja 14 prosenttia jokin kolmas maa.

Ulkomaille lähdön motiiveilla on yhteys myös tulevaisuudensuunnitelmiin. Opiskelijat, joille kansainvälisen kokemuksen saaminen on tärkeä motiivi lähteä ulkomaille, suunnittelevat muita harvemmin (16 %) Suomeen paluuta. Vastakkaisen ryhmän muodostavat opiskelijat, joille sisäänpääsymahdollisuudet ovat tärkeä ulkomaille lähdön motiivi. He suunnittelevat keskimääräistä useammin (32 %) Suomeen paluuta.

Opiskeluaikaisella yhteydenpidolla Suomeen on myös merkitystä paluuaikomuksiin. Opiskelijat, jotka pitävät opiskeluaikanaan yhteyttä Suomeen työskentelemällä Suomessa tai seuraamalla Suomen uutisia ja tapahtumia, myös uskovat muita useammin palaavansa opintojen jälkeen Suomeen. Toisaalta opiskelijat, joilla on muitakin sidoksia kuin opiskelu nykyiseen opiskelumaahansa, pysyvät maassa todennäköisemmin myös opintojen jälkeen. Muita sidoksia ovat tässä esimerkiksi opiskelumaassa asuva puoliso tai perheenjäsen, opiskelumaasta kotoisin oleva suku tai aikaisempi kokemus maassa asumisesta.

Tuleva asuinmaa valitaan työmahdollisuuksien perusteella

Kun ulkomailla opiskelevat pohtivat tulevaa asuinmaataan, tekevät he harkintaansa ennen kaikkea työ- ja uramahdollisuuksien perusteella. Myös maan yleistä ilmapiiriä opiskelijat pitävät tärkeänä kriteerinä tulevan asuinmaan valinnassa. Suomen kannalta huono tulos on, että harva opiskelija kokee nämä tekijöiksi, jotka lisäävät halukkuutta palata Suomeen. Suomea ei siis pidetä ura- ja työmahdollisuuksien näkökulmasta erityisen houkuttelevana vaihtoehtona. Sen sijaan Suomen puolesta puhuvia kriteereitä ovat puhdas luonto ja ympäristö, turvallisuus, korkea elintaso, sosiaali- ja terveysalan palvelut sekä yhteiskunnan toimivuus. Nämä tekijät lisäävät useimmin opiskelijan halukkuutta palata Suomeen. Lisäksi moni kokee Suomessa asuvan perheen tekijäksi, joka lisää halukkuutta palata takaisin Suomeen.

Avovastauksissa opiskelijat saivat omin sanoin kertoa, miltä Suomi näyttää ulkomailla asuvan opiskelijan silmin. Vastaukset piirtävät kahtiajakautuneen kuvan maasta, jossa nähdään paljon hyvää, mutta myös huonoa. Ulkomailla opiskelevat arvostavat Suomessa maan turvallisuutta ja yhteiskunnan toimivuutta. Asioiden koetaan sujuvan Suomessa. Suomea arvostetaan myös tasa-arvoisena yhteiskuntana, jossa lähtökohtaisesti tuetaan kaikkia. Sen sijaan työllisyystilannetta opiskelijat pitävät Suomessa huonona, minkä seurauksena myös omat mahdollisuudet saada Suomesta mielekästä työtä ja rakentaa uraa näyttäytyvät rajallisina. Lisäksi opiskelijat moittivat Suomen ilmapiiriä huonoksi. Suomi nähdään sulkeutuneena, ahdasmielisenä ja suvaitsemattomana maana.

Kysely tehtiin loppuvuodesta 2016, jolloin Suomi oli talouden taantumassa. Vastaukset heijastavat sen hetkistä tunnelmaa, eivätkä välttämättä ole yleistettävissä. Mutta mikäli vastaavat käsitykset Suomesta huonosti työllistävänä ja ahdasmielisenä maana jäävät elämään pidemmäksi aikaa, voi niistä tulla rasite Suomen maineelle.

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Dynaaminen ruotsinsuomalaisuus

Kai Latvalehto

Toisen sukupolven ruotsinsuomalaisuus

Ihmisiä on muuttanut Ruotsin ja Suomen maantieteellisten alueiden välillä kautta aikojen, mutta on syytä alleviivata, että 1960- ja 70-lukujen suuri muuttoaalto on peruskivi sille, mitä ruotsinsuomalaisuus tänään on. Sotien jälkeen yli puoli miljoonaa suomalaista on muuttanut Ruotsiin. Nykyisin Ruotsissa asuu yli 720 000 ihmistä, joilla on vähintään yksi isovanhempi Suomesta.

Tyypillinen ruotsinsuomalainen on tänään kuitenkin muuta kuin 1970-luvulla, kun Volvojen armadat toivat nuoret (pääosin) työläisperheet synnyinsijoilleen Suomeen kesälomille. Nykyisessä ruotsinsuomalaisuudessa on 1960- ja 70-lukujen suurten muuttovuosien lisäksi toinen merkittävä peruskivi — kyse on työväenluokkaan painottuvasta vähemmistöryhmästä. 1970-luvulla ruotsinsuomalaisista yli kaksi kolmasosaa työskenteli teollisuuden parissa (Jaakkola 1984, 17). On syytä kuitenkin muistaa, että näin suureen väestöryhmään mahtuu monenlaisia käänteitä, yksilöitä ja ruotsinsuomalaisuutta.

Yleistämisiä on vältettävä, mutta ruotsinsuomalaisuuden parista on havaittavissa mielenkiintoisia yhteneväisiä piirteitä. Esimerkiksi sukupolvikuilu näyttäytyy aivan eri tavalla kuin historiallisesti vakiintuneissa vähemmistö- ja maahanmuuttajaryhmissä. Ruotsinsuomalaisia sukupolvia erottaa myös jyrkästi lähihistoria ja kasvuympäristö. Valtaosa ensimmäisestä sukupolvesta varttui sodanjälkeisessä ja maatalousvaltaisessa Suomessa, joka oli vasta siirtymässä sähköttömiltä savottakämpiltä rivitaloihin ja pikiteiden varsille. Ja ainoastaan kymmenen vuoden sisällä toinen sukupolvi istuskeli ruotsalaisissa lähiöissä rasvainen tukka silmillä betonisten kerrostalojen kellareissa kuunnellen rockmusiikkia. Sukupolvikuilu verrattuna kantaväestön vastaavaan, sekä Ruotsissa ja Suomessa, on huomattava. Suhde Suomeen, suomalaisuuteen ja myös ruotsinsuomalaisuuteen on erilaista, jos olet asunut lapsesta saakka Ruotsissa. Kun entiseltä Ruotsinsuomalaisten nuorten liiton puheenjohtajalta Dennis Barvstenilta kysyttiin seminaarissa marraskuussa 2016 määritelmää toisen sukupolven ruotsinsuomalaisesta, hän vastasi, että tyypillinen nuori ruotsinsuomalainen ei ajattele olevansa ruotsinsuomalainen, saatikka, että hän tuntisi kuuluvansa johonkin kansalliseen vähemmistöryhmään.

Kuviosta 1 käy selkeästi ilmi, kuinka ruotsinsuomalaisuus on muuttunut: enää ei ole kyse etupäässä työikäisistä Suomessa syntyneistä ihmisistä. Valtaosa ensimmäisen sukupolven ruotsinsuomalaisista on nyt eläkeiässä.

Lisäksi tilastoinneissa lasketaan ensimmäiseen sukupolveen kuuluviksi lapsena vanhempiensa kanssa muuttaneet, jotka faktisesti identiteeteiltään edustavat toista sukupolvea. Suurelle osalle ensimmäisen sukupolven ruotsinsuomalaisista suhde omiin juuriin ja suomalaisuuteen on ollut tärkeä. Toiselle sukupolvelle kysymykset juurista ja identiteetistä näyttäytyvät erilaisessa valossa, jota tarkastelin lähemmin väitöskirjassani *Finnish Blood, Swedish Heart? — Examining Second-Generation Sweden-Finnishness* (Latvalehto 2018). Seuraavassa esittelen muutamia otteita informanteiltani, joissa ilmenee toisen sukupolven spesifisesti eroavia näkökantoja "perinteiseen" ruotsinsuomalaisuuteen, joka on ihan nykyvuosiin saakka nähty molemmissa valtioissa nimenomaisesti ensimmäisen muuttajasukupolven kokemuksiksi.

Kuvio 1. Suomalaistaustaiset Ruotsissa kolmessa eri sukupolvessa (Lähde: Sveriges Radio, Sisuradio 2019).

Ruotsinsuomalaisuuden käsite ja toinen sukupolvi

Enemmistöyhteiskuntien vallitsevat näkemykset ovat vaikuttaneet ruotsinsuomalaisiin laajasti. Tämä on havaittavissa toisen sukupolven suhtautumisessa ruotsinsuomalaisuuteen käsitteenä. Usein toisen sukupolven ruotsinsuomalaiset sanovat olevansa 100 prosenttia ruotsalaisia ja 100 prosenttia suomalaisia, mutta entäpä ruotsinsuomalaisia? Aika usein viitataan tässä yhteydessä omiin vanhempiin, eli heidät nähdään "oikeina" ruotsinsuomalaisina, aikuisina työn perässä muuttaneina, jotka ovat eläneet suomalaisina Ruotsissa. Tätenhän enemmistöyhteiskunnat sekä Ruotsissa että Suomessa ovat ruotsinsuomalaisuuden nähneet. Keijo ilmaisi asian seuraavasti:

> *Keijo: Nej, jag är så dålig på det där, jag är inte med i den matchen. Jag skiter i det. För mig behövs det inte. Jag är jag och jag lever här som finne, det är inget konstigt. Det finns säkert många finnar som blir förbannade för mig för att jag säger så, om dom skulle höra mig. "Vadå, tycker du inte om Finland?" Jo!*

Toisaalta monet ovat kokeneet käsitteen vapauttavana, kun suomalaisuus ei ole tuntunut täysin sopivalta määritelmältä itselle. Tämä on usein ollut seurausta oman identiteetin, juurien ja elämän peruskivien syvällisemmästä läpikäynnistä.

> *Elina: Då hittade jag begreppet "sverigefinne" på nätet. Jag ville definiera, sätta punkt på den här jävla mumindiskussionen. Då var det här ett ganska nytt begrepp, det var för tio år sedan jag började jobba med detta. Och det var nytt, ah! Ett begrepp, sverigefinne! Äntligen ett begrepp, jag slipper förklara att jag är svensk, är född i Sverige, har finska föräldrar, finska rötter blablablaa, alltså det där omständiga, då att det fanns sverigefinne, alltså en etikett på det hela. Då upptäckte jag också att det var en minoritet sedan 2000, aha, det visste jag inte. Rätten till språket, okej.*

Useissa vastauksissa ja pohdinnoissa ruotsinsuomalaisuuden subjektiivisille tulkinnoille näkyy myös ruotsinsuomalaisuuden kohonnut status 2000-luvun aikana.

> *Laura: Jag gillar det. Men dom flesta vet ju inte, som inte är insatta. Vi blir ju finlandssvenskar, eller så säger dom att vi kan ju inte kalla er finnar, för det är fult att säga finne. Nej, jag är ju finne. Jag är inte finländare. Jag tycker om det, men det är att bearbeta in det lite mer. För jag kommer alltid vara finne, även om jag är född här och aldrig bott i Finland en enda sekund. Det är så fräsigt att det har blivit så fräckt nu helt plötsligt. Men jag kan inte allvarligt sagt inte riktigt ta det på allvar. Det är som en hipstergrej nästan, att nu är sverigefinnarna fräcka och språket är så vackert och det kommer så mycket fin kultur från Finland och så. Jag bara slås av det, för vi var ju längst ner i skalan, på stegen.*

Toisen sukupolven edustajille positiiviset puolet ja vahvuudet ruotsinsuomalaisuudessa näyttäytyvät selkeästi erilaisissa kuoseissa kuin vanhempien sukupolvelle. Ruotsinsuomalaisuus voidaan nähdä sekä yhteiskunnallisena lähtökohtana kuin monikulttuurisena mausteena ja voimavarana.

> *Annika: Till motsats till många kan jag känna en enorm glädje av varenda en som kommer upp och som jag kan få hjälp av att förstärka min identitet, jag är jätteglad för det. Utan att för den sakens skull liksom se tillbaks i min historia. Men lite som en ny identitet, som jag tycker är spännande och rolig. Som berättar om både klass och resa och mångkulturell bakgrund. Att man har olika identiteter, det är ett spännande landskap att befinna sig i, att man är så olika i sig själv.*

Miksi sitten ilmeisen harvat ruotsinsuomalaiset toisen sukupolven ihmiset ovat tarttuneet taustaansa, kun taas toiset eivät? Yksi ryhmä on luovan työn ja taiteiden parissa työskentelevät, joiden lähtökohtaisesti on luontevaa tutkia ja työstää omaa taustaansa. Toinen ryhmä on joutunut kohtaamaan jonkin suuren elämänmullistuksen, kuten läheisen menettämisen, jonka seurauksena on jouduttu pohtimaan ja myös työstämään oman elämänsä kivijalkoja. 2010-luvulla esille nousseita toisen sukupolven ruotsinsuomalaisia on kuitenkin ollut jälleen harvemmassa. Suomalainen tausta on Ruotsissa noussut arvoasteikossa aina 1980-luvulta saakka, joten yksilötasolla tämän päivän nuoret ruotsinsuomalaiset eivät kenties koe tarvetta syvempiin identiteettipohdintoihin edes samassa mittakaavassa kuin muutama vuosi sitten. Eräs merkittävä piirre on tässä kuitenkin se, että 1960-, 1970- ja vielä 1980-luvun alkupuolella syntyneet ruotsinsuomalaiset varttuivat ja kasvoivat nimenomaisesti suomalaisissa perheissä, laajalti suomenkielisinä, osittain suomenkielisen koulutuksen parissa. Tällöin kontrasti ja mahdollisesti konflikti sisäisen ja ulkoisen kasvuympäristön välillä oli suurempi. Ruoka oli suolaisempaa ja ruotsinsuomalaisuus oli suomalaisempaa. Toisen sukupolven kokemuksissa näkyy myös vaihteluvälit rajuina. Osa saattaa olla täysin ruotsinkielisiä, harvalukuisempi joukko on sujuvan kaksikielisiä. On olemassa joukko toisen ja etenkin kolmannen sukupolven ruotsinsuomalaisia, joilla ei ole minkäänlaisia yhteyksiä Suomeen. Nelikymppinen Ruotsissa syntynyt Markku vierailee puolestaan joka kesä Suomessa, kiertäen kaikki serkut ja sedät ja tädit läpi kahvittelemassa. Hänelle ruotsinsuomalaisuus merkitsee olla osa historiallista ketjua ja yhteyttä pohjoiseen Suomeen, jossa hän ei ole koskaan asunut.

> *Markku: Så tänkte jag mitä se Matti siellä metässä teki talavet? Suoraan kotoa muutti sinne mettätyöläisten, ja pensionärsboende. Hur var det för Olli när han blev lämnad som 12 år gammal för att vakta huset när tyskarna kom? Fan jag var 40 innan jag kände att jag började bli vuxen, han var 12! Det finns ingen svensk kompis som har något liknande att berätta, man måste hoppa tillbaka mycket längre tillbaka i den svenska historien för att det ska bli. Och det med fattigdomen har man aldrig tagit tag i — det var ju fattigt!*

> *Det är ingen jävla klyscha. Fattigt folk levde på sin egen gård, så är det ju. Var det kallt för länge, då blev det mindre potatis. Man blir en helare halv om man besöker det här lite då och då. Man vet vilken jävla halva man är i alla fall.*

Puolikkaista kokonaisiksi. Toisaalta voidaan ajatella myös siten, että kahdesta puolikkaasta ei tule yhtä, vaan peräti kaksi. Kaksi on aina enemmän kuin yksi.

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Näkökulma: Ulkosuomalaiset haluavat säilyttää yhteyden Suomeen

Tina Strandberg

Muuttoliikkeen seurauksena maailmalla asuu lähes kaksi miljoonaa suomalaistaustaista henkilöä, joista noin 300 000 on Suomen kansalaisia. Määrästä huolimatta ulkosuomalaiset ovat vielä hyödyntämätön voimavara, kun keskustellaan ulkosuomalaisten osaamisen hyödyntämisestä, koulutusviennistä Suomen rajojen ulkopuolelle tai työperäisestä maahanmuutosta Suomeen.

Yhteys Suomeen säilyy Suomen kansalaisuuden, kielen ja kulttuurin kautta

Monikansalaisuus (kaksoiskansalaisuus) hyväksyttiin Suomessa vuonna 2003 voimaan tulleessa kansalaisuuslaissa. Mahdollisuus säilyttää Suomen kansalaisuus asuinmaan kansalaisuuden rinnalla on osoittautunut ulkosuomalaisille ja heidän jälkeläisilleen tärkeäksi ja halutuksi tavaksi pitää yhteyttä Suomeen. Kaksoiskansalaisuus on auttanut ulkosuomalaisia arjen elämässä ja helpottanut mahdollista paluuta Suomeen.

Suomi-Seura ry:n[1] tuoreen selvityksen (Arvola 2019) mukaan 19—29-vuotiaiden suomalaisnuorten siivet vievät maailmalle, mutta yhteys Suomeen halutaan säilyt-

[1] Suomi-Seura ry on ulkosuomalaisten asiantuntija- ja palvelujärjestö, joka edistää maailmalla asuvien suomalaisten asioita. Suomi-Seura vahvistaa noin 2 miljoonan ulkosuomalaisen yhteyksiä Suomeen ja tuo ulkosuomalaisuutta näkyväksi yhteiskunnallisessa keskustelussa ja päätöksenteossa sekä välittää ajanmukaista tietoa Suomesta ulkomaille. Suomi-Seura edistää ulkosuomalaisten ja Suomen välistä vuorovaikutusta, vaalii kulttuurista yhteyttä ja vahvistaa Suomi-kuvaa. Suomi-Seuralla on ulkosuomalaisparlamentti, joka on ulkosuomalaisyhteisöjen yhteistyöfoorumi.

tää. Ulkosuomalaisnuoret haluavat opettaa lapsilleen suomen kielen ja kulttuurin. He toivovat verkostoitumista ja kokevat, että ulkosuomalaisuus pitäisi huomioida paremmin Suomessa.

Suomen kielen ja kulttuurin ylläpitäminen maailmalla ei ole itsestäänselvyys. Kieli vahvistaa kulttuurista identiteettiä, oman kulttuurin tuntemusta ja siteitä entiseen kotimaahan. On merkittävä kulttuuriteko panostaa toimijoihin, jotka vahvistavat ulkosuomalaisten kielellisen ja kulttuurisen yhteyden säilyttämistä Suomeen.

Suomi-koulut ovat ulkosuomalaisten menestyksekkäin sivistyspyrkimys viime vuosikymmeninä. Suomi-kouluja on maailmalla yli 140 ja ne toimivat noin 40 maassa. Koulujen tarkoituksena on tukea lasten ja nuorten suomen kielen ja suomalaisen kulttuurin oppimista sekä hankitun kielitaidon säilyttämistä. Ruotsinkieliset ulkosuomalaislapset ja -nuoret voivat vastaavasti opiskella ruotsia Ruotsi-kouluissa. Suomi-kouluissa annettavan opetuksen tavoitteena on saavuttaa riittävä kielitaito sukulaisuussuhteiden ylläpitämiseksi, mutta usein tavoitellaan myös menestyksellistä siirtymistä opintoihin ja työelämään Suomeen.

Ulkomailla toimivia suomalaisia peruskouluja on kuusi: Belgiassa Brysselissä, Espanjassa Fuengirolassa (myös lukio), Venäjällä Moskovassa ja Pietarissa sekä Virossa Tallinnassa ja Tartossa. Ulkomaankouluissa opiskellaan suomalaisen opetussuunnitelman mukaisesti ja ne mahdollistavat suomalaislasten ja -nuorten saumattoman paluumuuton Suomeen. Ulkomailla asuvat suomalaislapset voivat myös asuinpaikasta riippumatta opiskella perusopetuksen oppimääriä Kansanvalistusseuran ylläpitämässä Etäkoulu Kulkurissa.

Suomen koulutusjärjestelmä on yksi maailman parhaista. Suomalaiset ulkomaankoulut tekevät suomalaista koulutusjärjestelmää näkyväksi maailmalla ja ovat parasta koulutusvientiä Suomelle. Kouluissa kasvaa kansainvälisiä ja kielitaitoisia tulevaisuuden osaajia, joita Suomessakin tullaan tarvitsemaan.

Kotiinpaluusta houkutteleva vaihtoehto ulkosuomalaisille

Suomesta muutti ulkomaille runsaat 19 000 henkeä vuonna 2018, joista noin 60 prosenttia oli Suomen kansalaisia. Suomi sai ulkomaan kansalaisista muuttovoittoa noin 15 500 henkeä, mutta oman maan kansalaisista tuli lähes 3 600 hengen muuttotappio (Tilastokeskus 2020).

Suomi-Seuran selvityksen mukaan Suomi houkuttelee nuoria paluumuuttamaan muun muassa turvallisuutensa, hyvän koulutuksensa ja terveydenhuoltojärjestelmänsä ansiosta. Silti puhuttaessa työperäisestä maahanmuutosta ulkosuomalaiset ovat vielä kovin näkymätön ryhmä. Monet paluumuuttajat kokevat, että ulkomailla hankittua tutkintoa, työkokemusta, kielitaitoa ja verkostoa ei arvosteta Suomessa. Kynnys lähteä maailmalle on matalampi kuin kynnys tulla takaisin.

Miksi Suomi ei houkuttele, vaikka olemme eri mittareilla mitattuna ykkönen maailmassa? Ulkosuomalaiset ovat varteenotettava, mutta vielä näkymätön ryhmä, kun Suomessa keskustellaan työperäisestä maahanmuutosta. *Ulkosuomalaisten muuttoa takaisin Suomeen* tulisikin aktiivisesti edistää kehittämällä paluumuuttoa tukevia palveluja, jotta kotiinpaluu olisi mahdollisimman sujuva myös pitkään maailmalla olleille.

Ulkosuomalaisten poliittista painoarvoa on lisättävä

Merkittävä määrä suomalaisia asuu ulkomailla. Siitä huolimatta ulkosuomalaisten poliittinen painoarvo on suomalaisessa päätöksenteossa yhä vaatimaton. Tätä selittää se, että vain harva ulkomailla asuvista noin 250 000 suomalaisesta käyttää äänestysoikeuttaan Suomen vaaleissa. Alhaiseen osallistumiseen ovat vaikuttaneet yhtäältä käytännön hankaluudet, kuten pitkät etäisyydet äänestyspaikalle, ja toisaalta ulkosuomalaisille tärkeiden teemojen näkymättömyys vaalikeskusteluissa ja -kampanjoissa. Ulkosuomalaiset ovat hajallaan ympäri maailmaa ja äänestävät eduskuntavaaleissa eri vaalipiireissä. Siten ulkosuomalaisten äänet jakaantuvat eri vaalipiireihin (Peltoniemi 2018).

Vuonna 2017 tapahtui historiallinen vaalilainsäädännön muutos. Suomen vaalilakia uudistettiin niin, että ulkomailla pysyvästi asuvat äänioikeutetut ja vaalien ajan tilapäisesti ulkomailla asuvat tai oleskelevat muut äänioikeutetut saivat oikeuden äänestää yleisissä vaaleissa kirjeitse.

Kevään 2019 eduskuntavaaleissa kirjeäänestys oli ensimmäistä kertaa mahdollista ulkosuomalaisille. Ulkosuomalaiset äänestivät vilkkaammin kuin koskaan aikaisemmin ja äänestysaktiivisuus nousi 2,6 prosenttiyksikköä. Ulkomailla asuvista äänioikeutetuista äänesti 12,7 prosenttia. Kirjeääniä annettiin yhteensä noin 6 200.

Sisäministeriö vastaa ulkosuomalaisasioiden koordinoinnista ja hallituksen ulkosuomalaispoliittisesta ohjelmasta. Nykyinen ohjelma on kolmas ja se on laadittu vuosiksi 2017—2021 (Sisäministeriö 2018). Ohjelman tavoitteet liittyvät muun muassa vaaleihin, kansalaisuusasioihin, passi- ja henkilökorttiasioihin, ulkomailla toimivien Suomi-koulujen, suomalaisten ulkomaankoulujen sekä Eurooppa-koulujen toimintaan, sosiaaliturva- ja terveyspalveluasioihin.

Suomalaisten liikkumista maailmalla ja sen yhteiskunnallisia vaikutuksia tulisi ennakoida pitkäjänteisemmällä suunnittelulla. Ulkosuomalaiset ovat erottamaton osa Suomen tarinaa ja suomalaista kansalaisyhteiskuntaa. Perinteisestä siirtolaisuudesta on siirrytty tavoitemuuttoon ja ulkomaille lähtijät ovat yhä koulutetumpia. Ulkosuomalaisten verkosto kasvaa ja monimuotoistuu. Tarvitsemme innovatiivisia ja rohkeita tekoja, jotta myös ulkosuomalaiset saadaan aktiivisesti osallistettua Suomen tulevaisuuskuvan rakentamiseen.

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Päätössanat ja katse tulevaisuuteen

Minna Säävälä

Arvoisat kuulijat ja Symposiumin osallistujat,

Siirtolaisuusinstituutti on tullut kypsään aikuiseen ikään. 45 vuotta on sisältänyt monenlaisia muutoksia ja Suomi vuonna 1974 oli varsin erilainen kuin nyt. Itselleni Siirtolaisuusinstituutti on ollut tuttu noin 13 vuoden ajan siitä lähtien, kun siirryin yliopistolta tekemään muuttoliikkeeseen ja monikulttuurisuuteen liittyvää tutkimusta Väestöliiton Väestöntutkimuslaitoksessa. Sittemmin olen jättänyt aktiivisen tutkijanuran, mutta olen toiminut muutaman vuoden Siirtolaisuusinstituuttisäätiön hallituksen jäsenenä ja päässyt siten seuraamaan aiempaa lähempää Instituutin nykyelämää.

Seuraavassa lyhyt katsaus Symposium-päivien antiin.

Toimitusjohtaja Tuomas Martikainen esitteli Instituutin historiaa lyhyesti Symposiumin ensimmäisenä päivänä ja toi esiin, miten erilaisessa yhteiskunnassa toiminta alkoi. Vuoden 1974 Suomi oli rakennemuutoksen Suomi, jossa kaupungistuminen ja Ruotsiin muutto olivat ehkä kaksi merkittävintä sosiaalista ilmiötä. Jo silloin oltiin yhteiskunnallisessa polttopisteessä. Vuosina 1969 ja 1970 oli koettu niin suuri Ruotsiin muuttoaalto, että sen seurauksena maan väkiluku oli pienentynyt (noin 80 000 muutti näinä vuosina, kuten Kai Latvalehto toi esiin omassa esityksessään). Seitsemänkymmenluvun alkuvuodet olivat tosin hiukan pienempien muuttomäärien vuosia. Tuolloin väestönkehitykseen liittyvät huolet ja tutkimustarpeet olivat varsin erilaisia kuin nyt.

Liikkuvuus ja erilaisuuksien kanssa eläminen ovat olleet nykyihmislajin elämän keskeisiä ilmiöitä koko sen olemassaolon ajan eli vajaat 200 000 vuotta. Tästä kertoi hienosti esitelmässään emeritusprofessori Patrick Manning. Hän esitteli myös mielenkiintoisia ennusteita maailman väestön tulevaisuudesta. Hänen mukaansa suotuisa tulevaisuus-kehitys johtaa tilanteeseen, jossa vapaaehtoinen kansainvälinen muuttoliike itse asiassa lisääntyy. Tämä onkin muuttoliikkeitä koskevan tietämyksen johtopäätös yleisemminkin: kansainvälinen muuttoliike lisääntyy, kun taloudellinen tilanne paranee ja yhä useammalla on resursseja alkaa toteuttaa toivomaansa muuttoa (esim. Collier 2013).

Toinen asia on, miten vastaanottavaisia vauraat yhteiskunnat ovat ottamaan vastaan tulijoita. Joka tapauksessa tulisi ajatella niin, että maailman suotuisan kehityksen seurauksena ja oireena on kasvava kansainvälinen siirtolaisuus. Pakkomuuton, kuten poliittisen pakolaisuuden ja ympäristöpakolaisuuden ilmiöt noudattelevat puolestaan erilaisia lainalaisuuksia kuin siirtolaisuus. Ekologisiin syihin pohjaava pakkomuutto kohdentuu todennäköisesti lähialueille ja toteutuu ilmastonmuutoksesta kärsivien maiden kaupungistumisena ja vasta välillisesti mahdollisena kansainvälisen muuttoliikkeen kasvuna.

Vanhempi tutkija Timothy Heleniak kuvasi sitä, miten maahanmuuttajien työelämäosallisuus muotoutuu Pohjoismaissa. Tämä nosti esiin sen merkittävän seikan, että muuttoliikkeestä odotetaan tulevaisuudessa helpotusta huoltosuhteen heikkenemisestä kärsiviin ja kutistuvan työikäisten määrän yhteiskuntiin, kuten Suomeen. Samassa tilanteessa ovat käytännöllisesti katsoen kaikki korkean tulotason maat maailmassa, pian myös Kiina. Tämä kysymys näkyy ajankohtaisesti esimerkiksi kiistelyssä siitä, miksi työlupien saaminen kestää ulkomailta tulossa oleville työntekijöille niin pitkään. Viranomaiset lupailevat nopeutusta, mutta hallituksemme haluaa pitää kiinni työvoiman saatavuusharkinnasta.

Muuttoliike koskee keskeisesti perheitä ja lasten hyvinvointia. Akatemiatutkija Johanna Leinonen kuvasi esitelmässään Karjalan evakkojen lapsuusnarratiiveja muutosta ja matkanteosta sekä muistista. Erikoistutkija Maili Malin katseli lapsuutta ja muuttoa nykyhetken näkökulmasta sitä, miten pakolaistaustaiset lapset pärjäävät koulussa nyky-Suomessa. Pakolaistaustaisten vaikeudet päästä eteenpäin koulutusjärjestelmässä ovat huolestuttavia.

Kuulimme tohtori Keiu Telven esitelmän ylirajaisuudesta Viron ja Suomen välillä elävissä perheissä sekä tohtori Kai Latvalehdon esityksen ruotsinsuomalaiseksi kasvamisesta. Nämä neljä esitelmää tuovat esiin tärkeän seikan: sen, miten muuttoliikkeet vaikuttavat perheisiin ja lapsiin sekä heidän hyvinvointiinsa ja lasten kasvettua heidän suhteeseensa ympäristöönsä. Identiteetit ovat monikerroksisia ja yllätyksellisiäkin. Kai Latvalehdon esitelmä jätti mieleen ajatuksen siitä, ettei yhdenkään muuton kokeneen perheen lapsen pitäisi joutua kärsimään häpeää omasta taustastaan.

Symposiumin toisen päivän puheenaiheet ovat kosketelleet maan sisäistä muuttoliikettä sekä ulkosuomalaisuutta. Kaupunkitutkimus TA:n toimitusjohtaja Seppo Laakso toi esiin, miten alueet eriytyvät ja Pellervon taloustutkimuksen ennustepäällikkö Janne Huovari puhui monipaikkaisuuden kasvavasta ilmiöstä sekä alueellisesta liikkuvuudesta. Suomalaisista tutkinto-opiskelijoista ulkomailla saimme ajantasaista tietoa Opetushallituksen vastaavan asiantuntijan Irma Garamin esityksestä. Vastaava tutkija Miika Tervosen vetämässä paneelissa keskusteltiin ulkosuomalaisuuden muuttuvasta kuvasta ja siihen liittyvistä uhkista ja mahdollisuuksista. Mukana olivat toiminnanjohtaja Tina Strandberg Suomi-Seurasta, tohtori Johanna Peltoniemi Helsingin yliopistosta ja psykologi Päivi Oksi-Walter Tampereen kaupungilta.

Alueellinen eriytyminen ja monipaikkaisuuden lisääntyminen ovat tulevaisuudessa merkittäviä tekijöitä, emmekä täysin osaa vielä kovin tarkkaan ennustaa tai arvioida, mitä sosiaalisia, kulttuurisia ja poliittisia seurauksia muutoksilla tulee olemaan.

Lopputulemana voimme sanoa, että Muuttoliikesymposium on tuonut esiin Siirtolaisuusinstituutin uutta luovana, akateemisesti luotettavana, vuorovaikutteisena ja monipuolisena tutkimus- ja muisti-instituutiona. Siirtolaisuusinstituutin luonne on, kuten toimitusjohtaja Martikainen kuvasi, "hybridi" — Instituutti ei ole puhtaasti akateemiseen maahanmuuttotutkimukseen keskittynyt, kuten monet yliopistojen yhteydessä toimivat muuttoliiketutkimuksen keskukset Euroopassa ja muualla, vaan samalla pitänyt yllä siirtolaisuuden historian ja luonteen välittäjän, palveluntuottajan ja yhteiskunnallisen vaikuttajan roolia museo-, arkisto- ja näyttelytoiminnalla.

Instituutti on vahvistanut tutkimustoimintaansa erittäin menestyksekkäästi saamalla runsaasti rahoituksia äärimmäisen kilpailluilla areenoilla. Henkilökuntaan on rekrytoitu uutta luovia ja lahjakkaita uusia työntekijöitä, joilla on nyt resurssit keskittyä tutkimuksen tekemiseen. Tässä mielessä Instituutin tulevaisuus näyttää hyvin valoisalta.

Näiden kahden päivän esitelmät ovat hyvin tuoneet esiin Instituutin kahtalaisen luonteen tutkimus- ja muisti-instituutiona, jonka toivon säilyvän itsenäisen Siirtolaisuusinstituutin toiminnassa myös jatkossa. Uskon myös monen muun Siirtolaisuusinstituuttisäätiön hallituksen jäsenen toivovan samaa. Itsenäinen Instituutti irrallaan yliopistolaitoksesta, mutta siihen kytköksissä, tuo monia vapauksia ja mahdollisuuksia, joista ei kannata luopua.

Lopuksi muutama ajatus tulevaisuudesta.

Kun ikää Instituutille tulee 45 vuotta lisää, miltä maailma näyttää tuolloin, vuonna 2064? Kuka tietää, kuka meistä enää on sitä todistamassa, mutta jotakin voimme tulevasta uumoilla. Mitä näemme tulevaisuudessa muuttoliikkeille tapahtuvan? Tulevaisuuden ennustaminen on vaikeaa. Väestön osalta se on erityisen vaikeaa. Yleisesti ottaen, kaikki väestöennusteet menevät enemmän tai vähemmän pieleen. Tämä on väestöennusteiden luonne.

Varmaa on, että tutkimuskenttä säilyy haasteellisena ja koko ajan yhä ajankohtaisempana. Siirtolaisuus Suomesta maailmalle ja maailmalta Suomeen sekä muuttoliikkeet Suomen sisällä tulee tulevaisuudessa kietoutumaan toisiinsa yhä monimuotoisemmilla tavoilla. Jos professori Manningin ennuste pitää paikkansa, maailman suotuisa kehitys itse asiassa merkitsee yhä kiihtyvää siirtolaisuutta. Ehkä vuonna 2064 Kainuun peltoja ovat alkaneet viljellä kiinalaisperäiset uudisraivaajat, jotka asuttavat omia kyliään nyt autioituvilla sijoilla. Ja pelloilla kasvaa paksoita ja ginsengiä kasvaville Aasian ja Afrikan markkinoille.

Ilmastonmuutoksen tulevaisuudesta emme varmasti tiedä, mutta todennäköistä on, että siitä kumpuava muuttoliike on mahdollisesti eritoten etelän maiden sisäistä ja välistä liikettä sekä sikäläisen kaupungistumisen kiihtymistä. Kaupungeista sitten lähtee resursseja omaavia muuttajia yhä enemmän myös pyrkimään vauraisiin maihin. Ilmastomuutos voi tosin keikauttaa päälaelleen sen kuvan vauraudesta, joka nyt vallitsee. Muuttoliikkeen kohdealueet voivat vaihtua. Ehkä elinolosuhteet vaikkapa Siperiassa voivat alkaa vetää puoleensa? Muuttajat ovat dynaaminen voimavara. Ne yksilöt ja yhteiskunnat, jotka osaavat tarttua mahdollisuuteen, menestyvät.

Pakolaisuutta tuottavien aseellisten konfliktien väheneminen esimerkiksi Lähi-Idässä näyttää epätodennäköiseltä. Lähi-idän ja Maghrebin väestö on hyvin nuorta ja siellä on liikkumaan altista väkeä ilman aseellisia konfliktejakin. Saharan eteläpuolisen Afrikan väestö kasvaa tulevaisuudessa voimakkaasti ja samoin siellä on noin joka kolmas halukas muuttamaan muualle. Muuttoa pois maasta tulevan vuoden sisään valmistelee konkreettisesti Afrikassa noin 5 prosenttia väestä (Gallup 2019).

Suurimman haasteen tulevaisuuden kannalta vauraissa maissa, kuten Suomessa, asettaa voimistuvan uuskansallismielisen ja populistisen politiikan suosion kasvu. Miten tällaisessa konfliktiherkässä poliittisessa ilmastossa pystytään luomaan olosuhteet, joissa uudet tulijat voivat ansaita elantonsa, löytää ystäviä ja saada ihmisarvoa kunnioittavan elämän? Muuttoliike nyt ja tulevaisuudessa kytkeytyy hyvinvointivaltion tulevaisuuteen—pystytäänkö sitä pitämään yllä ja kehittämään monikulttuuristuvassa yhteiskunnassa? Säilyykö poliittisen järjestelmän legitimiteetti ja yhteiskuntarauha? Mikä on se yhdistävä arvonimittäjä, jonka varaan voidaan rakentaa hyvinvoiva ja demokraattinen monikulttuurinen suomalainen yhteiskunta?

Tulevaisuus ei ole jossakin tuolla kaukana, vaan elämme sitä joka päivä jo nyt. Eilisen tulevaisuus on tämä päivä. Yksi on varmaa: ihmisten liikkuvuus ei vähene, olipa huominen synkkä tai valoisa. Instituutille siis riittää työsarkaa tulevaisuudessakin.

Lopuksi haluan kiittää lämpimästi omasta ja koko Siirtolaisuusinstituutin säätiön hallituksen puolesta Instituutin koko henkilökuntaa, erityisesti Symposiumin järjestelyistä vastannutta tutkimusjohtaja Elli Heikkilää ja kaikkia esiintyjiä sekä kuulijoita tämän antoisan Symposiumin järjestämisestä näin onnistuneesti.

Kirjallisuus

Collier, Paul (2013). *Exodus. Immigration and Multiculturalism in the 21st Century*. London: Allen Lane.

Gallup (2019). Number of Potential Migrants Worldwide Tops 700 Million. Saatavilla: https://news.gallup.com/poll/211883/number-potential-migrants-worldwide-tops-700-million.aspx . Luettu 31.10.2019.

Kirjoittajat

Garam Irma, Vastaava asiantuntija, Opetushallitus

Heikkilä Elli, Tutkimusjohtaja, Siirtolaisuusinstituutti

Heleniak Timothy, Senior Research Fellow, Nordregio, Sweden

Laakso Seppo, Toimitusjohtaja, Kaupunkitutkimus TA

Latvalehto Kai, Tohtori, Ruotsinsuomalainen kulttuurilähetystö, Oulu

Leinonen Johanna, Akatemiatutkija, Suomen Akatemia/Siirtolaisuusinstituutti (2018—2020), Oulun yliopisto (2020-)

Malin Maili, Erikoistutkija, Siirtolaisuusinstituutti

Manning Patrick, Professor Emeritus, University of Pittsburgh, USA

Martikainen Tuomas, Toimitusjohtaja (2015—2020), Siirtolaisuusinstituutti

Myllymäki Kalle, Maahanmuuttopäällikkö, Varsinais-Suomen ELY-keskus

Strandberg Tina, Toiminnanjohtaja, Suomi-Seura ry

Säävälä Minna, Siirtolaisuusinstituutin hallituksen jäsen, ohjelmajohtaja, Väestöliitto

Telve Keiu, Ph.D., University of Tartu, Estonia

Ohjelma

X VALTAKUNNALLINEN MUUTTOLIIKESYMPOSIUM

Mihin suuntaan Suomi kehittyy?
Liikkuvuuden ja muuttoliikkeen dynamiikka

X NATIONAL MIGRATION SYMPOSIUM

In Which Direction Finland Is Evolving?
The Dynamics of Mobility and Migration

17.–18.10.2019

TURUN TAIDEHALLI, JUHLASALI,
VANHA SUURTORI 5, TURKU, FINLAND

45 1974–2019

MIGRATION INSTITUTE
OF FINLAND

THURSDAY 17.10.

9.00–10.00	Registration and Coffee

Chair Director Tuomas Martikainen, Migration Institute of Finland

10.00	Opening of the Symposium Director Tuomas Martikainen, Migration Institute of Finland
10.10	The Government's Greetings Head of Immigration Affairs Kalle Myllymäki, ELY Centre for Southwest Finland
10.30	45-Year History of the Migration Institute of Finland Director Tuomas Martikainen, Migration Institute of Finland
11.00	Migration in World History Professor Emeritus Patrick Manning, University of Pittsburgh, USA
12.00	Discussion
12.15–13.30	Lunch at Own Cost

International Migration

Chair Senior Researcher Marja Tiilikainen, Migration Institute of Finland

13.30	The Wary Welcome: Migration and Diversity in the Nordic Countries Senior Research Fellow Timothy Heleniak, Nordregio, Sweden
14.30	Discussion
14.45	Coffee
15.15	On the Road to Exile: A Comparative Research of Forced Migration Narratives Academy Research Fellow Johanna Leinonen, Academy of Finland/ Migration Institute of Finland
15.45	School Performance of the Refugee Youth in Finland Senior Researcher Maili Malin, Migration Institute of Finland
16.15–16.30	Discussion
19.00–23.00	Siirtolaisuusinstituutin 45-vuotis juhlaillallinen, Ravintola Teini, Uudenmaankatu 1, Turku

Ilmoittautuminen / Registration:
https://my.surveypal.com/Muuttoliikesymposium
https://my.surveypal.com/Migration-Symposium

PERJANTAI 18.10.

Maan sisäinen muuttoliike ja liikkuvuus

Puheenjohtaja Tutkimusjohtaja Elli Heikkilä, Siirtolaisuusinstituutti

10.00	Muuttajat, aluetalous ja alueellinen eriytyminen Toimitusjohtaja Seppo Laakso, Kaupunkitutkimus TA
10.30	Alueellisen liikkuvuuden ja monipaikkaisuuden mahdollisuudet ja seuraukset Ennustepäällikkö Janne Huovari, Pellervon taloustutkimus
11.00	Family Life Across the Gulf: Cross-border Commuters' Transnational Families between Estonia and Finland Ph.D. Keiu Telve, University of Tartu, Estonia
11.30	Keskustelu
11.45	Omakustanteinen lounas

Ulkosuomalaiset

Puheenjohtaja Vastaava tutkija Miika Tervonen, Siirtolaisuusinstituutti

13.00	Suomalaiset tutkinto-opiskelijat ulkomailla Vastaava asiantuntija Irma Garam, Opetushallitus
13.30	Dynaaminen ruotsinsuomalaisuus Tohtori Kai Latvalehto, Ruotsinsuomalainen kulttuurilähetystö, Oulu
14.00	Aivovuoto vai resurssi? Muuttuva ulkosuomalaisuus -paneeli, Paneelin vetäjä vastaava tutkija Miika Tervonen, Siirtolaisuus-instituutti. Panelistit: Toiminnanjohtaja Tina Strandberg, Suomi-Seura ry YTT Johanna Peltoniemi, Helsingin yliopisto YTM Päivi Oksi-Walter, Tampereen kaupunki
14.45	Keskustelu
15.00	Symposiumin päätössanat ja katse tulevaisuuteen Siirtolaisuusinstituutin hallituksen jäsen, Perhetoimintojen johtaja Minna Säävälä, Väestöliitto
15.15	Päätöskahvi

Elli Heikkilä (toim.)

MIHIN SUUNTAAN SUOMI KEHITTYY? LIIKKUVUUDEN JA MUUTTOLIIKKEEN DYNAMIIKKA

IN WHICH DIRECTION IS FINLAND EVOLVING? THE DYNAMICS OF MOBILITY AND MIGRATION

Siirtolaisuusinstituutti on vuodesta 1975 lähtien järjestänyt viiden vuoden välein Muuttoliikesymposiumin. Instituutti juhlisti 45-vuotista toimintaansa järjestämällä kymmenennen Muuttoliikesymposium 2019 -tapahtuman. Symposiumin teemana oli *Mihin suuntaan Suomi kehittyy? Liikkuvuuden ja muuttoliikkeen dynamiikka. In Which Direction is Finland Evolving? The Dynamics of Mobility and Migration.*

Tapahtumassa käsiteltiin muuttoliikkeitä laajasti kansainvälisen muuton, maan sisäisen muuttoliikkeen ja liikkuvuuden sekä ulkosuomalaisten näkökulmasta. Ohjelma oli rakennettu siten, että ensimmäinen päivä pidettiin englanninkielellä ja toinen pääosin suomenkielellä. Esitelmöitsijöinä ja alustajina olivat alan kotimaiset ja kansainväliset asiantuntijat.

Laajan käsityksen maailman muuttoliikkeistä kautta aikain antoi pääpuhujamme Professor Emeritus Patrick Manning USA:sta. Pohjoismaiden muuttoliikkeiden kehitystä tarkasteli toinen pääpuhujamme Senior Research Fellow Timothy Heleniak Ruotsista. Muilta osin Symposiumin ohjelma koostui eri asiantuntijoiden esitelmistä etupäässä Suomen tilanteesta, mutta myös Suomen ja Viron välisestä työssäkäynnistä, ja ulkosuomalaisuudesta. Kirjaan tuotetut asiantuntija-artikkelit ovat kielellä, millä ne Symposiumissa pidettiin.

Maastamuutto, maahanmuutto sekä maan sisäinen muuttoliike ja liikkuvuus ovat monin tavoin kytköksissä toisiinsa ja ilmiöiden syvempi tuntemus on ensiarvoisen tärkeää. Kirja antaa ajankohtaista tietoa julkisen sektorin edustajille, poliittisille päätöksentekijöille, tutkijoille ja laajalle muuttoliikkeistä kiinnostuneelle yleisölle.

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